# Problems of Communism

JANUARY-APRIL 1971—SPECIAL ISSUE



FOCUS ON ASIA

Patterns of Communism
Robert A. Scalapino

Japan
Paul F. Langer

Indonesia
Ruth T. McVey

North Korea
Joungwon A. Kim

The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict
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Is China Expansionist?
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Peter Van Ness

BOOK REVIEWS
G. F. Hudson
J. Bandyopadhyaya
and others

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# Problems of Communism

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JAN-APRIL 1971 VOL XX

*Problems of Communism* is a bimonthly publication. Its purpose is to provide analyses and significant background information on various aspects of world communism today. Opinions expressed by contributors do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the United States Government. Editorial office: U.S. Information Agency, 1776 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20547.

HOW TO SUBSCRIBE:
Outside the United States, *Problems of Communism* may be obtained by writing to the nearest office of the U.S. Information Service. Residents of the United States may purchase annual subscriptions or single copies by writing to the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. Price per copy: $.50. Subscription price: $3.00.

TO OUR READERS:
The new format of this journal was conceived by William Hopkins, Art Director of *Look* (New York), in cooperation with Joseph D. Hockersmith. USIA wishes to thank the publishers of *Look* for their cooperation.

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# FOCUS ON ASIA

EDITORS' NOTE: This special issue of *Problems of Communism* is devoted to communism in Asia, a vast and complex movement embracing one large and several small Communist states, as well as numerous non-ruling Communist parties at various stages of development and operating in a variety of countries. Asian communism is characterized by both unity and diversity. Its unity stems from the common roots of its constituent parts in the soil of Asian political culture and from their shared vision of the future. Its diversity is the result of a multiplicity of different and often mutually incompatible short-term objectives pursued by individual Communist parties and states in response to the particular requirements generated by their specific situations.

In the lead-off article, Mr. Scalapino focuses on the special characteristics of Asian communism, such as its commitment to the politics of violence, which he attributes to the unique interaction of indigenous Asian political traditions with certain operational tendencies of an activist European communism. The different development patterns of Communist parties in non-Communist states are then examined in studies of the Japanese and Indonesian parties: the first, written by Mr. Langer, shows the progression of the CPJ from its former subordination to the tutelage of Moscow and Peking to a posture of firm autonomy, while the second, done by Miss McVey, describes the retrogression of the PKI from its position as an influential mass party before the attempted coup of 1965 to its present status as a congeries of underground guerrilla groupings.

Turning to the established Asian Communist states, Mr. Kim sees the actions and policies of the North Korean regime as revolving around the regime's attempt to gain legitimacy for itself in the international arena and among its own subjects. The situation of Communist China is examined in three articles: Mr. Hinton reviews the clash of Chinese and Soviet nationalism in the Ussuri border conflict of 1969, and Franz Michael and Peter Van Ness offer contrasting interpretations of China's foreign policy in Asia and elsewhere.

Future issues of our journal will present studies of North Vietnam, Soviet policy in Asia, India's Naxalite movement, and other subjects.



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# Patterns of Asian Communism

By Robert A. Scalapino

Like all political systems, communism is a method, first, of gaining power and, second, of holding on to it after it has been won. These two separate functions suggest an important preliminary distinction that needs to be made in analyzing Asian communism today.

Outside of Mainland China, Mongolia, North Korea, and North Vietnam, where the Communist Party already wields ruling authority, the Asian Communist parties or movements are all still in the stage of attempting to gain power. While their tactics run a considerable gamut, only in Japan, Ceylon, and India (excluding the Naxalites) are they accepted participants in the regular political process, seeking to achieve their objectives by legal, parliamentary methods. Everywhere else in Asia, the Communist movements operate as an illegal force challenging those in authority by every available means, and the vast majority of them are firmly committed to armed revolution as the only effective method of attaining power. Their primary tactics are those of violence and the forceful overthrow of the established governments confronting them.

In the handful of countries where the Communists already rule, the primary concern of the regimes has naturally shifted to the tasks of preserving and consolidating their own power and building up the power of the states they rule. They are determined to make their own revolution the final one for their respective societies, and their postrevolutionary institutions attest to that determination.

Yet, in sharp contrast to the majority of established Communist regimes in Europe, those in Asia (with the exception of Soviet-dominated Mongolia) still retain to a considerable degree, in their postrevolutionary policies and ideological positions, a continuing commitment to violence. This characteristic manifests itself internally, for example, in the continuing, heavy stress placed on the necessity of waging unremitting class struggle, as strikingly evidenced in China's Cultural Revolution. Externally, it manifests itself in the strenuous resistance of these regimes to the whole concept of peaceful coexistence between socialist and capitalist states and in their active encouragement and support of "wars of national liberation."

This poses the question: Why is the commitment to violence so extensive and enduring in the Asian Communist movements generally? Bearing in mind that all but a few of these movements have yet to win power, two interrelated factors would appear to be centrally involved. First, parliamentary, party-centered politics remain weak or nonexistent in much of Asia, making the route to power via the ballot box difficult, if not impossible. Moreover, the power of elected bodies is normally limited, and the election processes themselves are challengeable.

More fundamentally, however, the answer appears to lie in a second, much broader and more complex phenomenon. Asian communism has derived its preferred style of revolution partly from select but crucial aspects of traditional Asian political culture interacting harmoniously with certain political-ideological tendencies characteristic of communism as an operative system. In the Asian cultures, majoritarianism, for example, has never had any particular

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legitimacy. In the absence of consensus, political minorities were "morally" free to pursue their own route. More importantly, political institutions at the national level have been notably fragile, especially where monarchy has declined or gone out of existence. For the individual citizen, politics have been, above all, locally oriented, and personal loyalties primordial. Thus, when communism en route to power essentially ignores the borrowed processes of parliamentarism and national political institutions in general, and when it concentrates instead upon capturing and redirecting small-group, local political institutions and then linking these together into larger units that can assault "the state," it operates in harmony with the essence of traditional Asian political culture. It is this intricate, mutually reinforcing process that has shaped the politics of revolution in Asia, and these politics in turn have tended to generate or underwrite a certain special type of Communist leadership.

## The Pioneers of Asian Communism

This was, to be sure, not true in the early days of Asian communism. In general, the first Asian Communist leaders in the period immediately after the Bolshevik Revolution were Westernized, reasonably well-educated, urbanized intellectuals. In many cases, they came from the class traditionally habituated to rule, particularly from its lower levels; and not a few were sons of families who had slipped in the social hierarchy from a higher to a lower, if still governing, rank. In any case, they were part of the very small group within their society who possessed tools of leadership vitally needed in a transitional period—notably education and awareness of an external, "advanced" world. Their Westernization was sometimes secondhand, acquired via European schools in their homeland or through reading substantial quantities of translated materials; but many were reasonably well-travelled. They were, in the conventional sense of the term, cosmopolitan. To cite a few typical examples, Ch'en Tu-hsiu, the first leader of the Chinese Communist Party, was a Peking University professor and editor of an intellectual journal dedicated to a wide-ranging study and evaluation of the latest currents in 20th-century political thought; M. N. Roy, one of the most significant of the first generation of Indian Communists, came from the same Westernized, intellectual type of background that produced Jawaharlal Nehru and countless other cultivated Indians of that era; and Hitoshi Yamakawa, the first leader of the Japanese Communist movement, was a free-lance intellectual widely read in Western political theory and the author of numerous Germanic-type political tracts.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the Asian communism of this period was both *avant-garde* and wholly derivative. It bore the imprint, however, of two distinctly different Western influences. The first was the intellectual protest movement born out of the industrial revolution, a movement which possessed indisputable liberal and humanist credentials. The second was the illiberal Bolshevik Revolution. It might be argued that Bolshevism was immanent



*M. N. Roy, one of the pioneers of Indian communism in the 1920's. He exemplifies the early type of Asian Communist leader, bourgeois in origin, highly intellectual, and Western-oriented.*



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in Marxism; however, it is also permissible to suggest that the character of protest which Marxism embodied in the region of its birth carried connotations substantially different from those imbedded in the Russian Revolution. The former reflected anger at the price which had to be paid for "progress"; the latter reflected in powerful form the anguish that men felt where progress was absent or negligible. In our own times, we have seen these two distinct types of protest emerge in ever more distinct form, even while uniting on occasion with respect to techniques.

In becoming Bolshevized, Marxism became more meaningful for Asia, while at the same time the hold of the truly Westernized, urban intellectual on the leadership of the Asian Communist movement was loosened. That hold, incidentally, was never absolute. Indeed, it might be more accurate to describe *most* of the Asian Communist leaders—even of the early period—as "marginal intellectuals," by which I mean that they were removed from the mainstream of their own intellectual community, or as "petty intellectuals," *i.e.*, possessed of a more modest education and career than generally characterizes the true Asian "intellectual," whether of the classical or the modern type. For every real intellectual such as Ch'en Tu-hsiu, M. N. Roy, or Hitoshi Yamakawa, there were myriad Mao Tse-tung's, Kazuo Fukumoto's, and Ho Chi Minh's. Asian communism, in sum, has never had a great intellectual heritage despite the role of certain intellectuals within the movement. And such an intellectual heritage as did exist in the earlier days began to decline almost uniformly as Asian communism moved from the salon and the university into the streets, and from the urban centers into the countryside.

## Changing Patterns of Leadership

Only in an "advanced" society like Japan, where the urban-rural gap was moderated by a variety of forces and the dominance of urbanized life became steadily more pronounced, did metropolitan intellectual leadership of the Communist movement continue largely unchallenged. Elsewhere, leadership came to be divided between two types: (1) petty intellectuals (often from areas nearby, and marginal to, urban centers), men generally of the lower middle class measured in terms of the social strata of their society; and (2) peasant-soldiers, *i.e.*, military men who were rural in their background, psychology, and cultural proclivities. These two elements which became dominant in the Asian Communist leaderships—the petty intellectual and the peasant-soldier—should, of course, be considered "pure types." In reality, the leadership components were more mixed, with rural, suburban, and urban elements intermingled, frequently within the same individual; and in some cases, leaders who started out as urban intellectuals themselves made the transition to the rural, peasant-soldier viewpoint as the nature of the Communist movement changed. In any event, the emergence of a new type of leadership corresponding to the changing needs and nature of Asian communism is a striking phenomenon not to be overlooked.

We can discern three interrelated factors, all of them dynamic in varying degree, that were central to the changing character of Asian Communist leadership: first, the political culture of the particular society; second, the nature and timing of the Western impact upon it; and third, the society's socio-economic level and rate of development. In recent times, conditions relating to each of these factors have generally tended to foster the mixed petty-intellectual/peasant-soldier type of leadership described above.

Insofar as the political culture is concerned, it has already been pointed out that, because of the predominantly local orientation of traditional Asian politics, the revolutionary route in much of Asia has tended to lead through the village. In the more recent period, it has tended to lead especially through villages close to an urban center, where the disturbing pulse of change could be felt—but it has *not* centered in the metropolis itself because, there, traditional organizational patterns broke down before the emergence of modern ones to take their place. As for the impact of the West, Asian reactions to Westernism developed a certain pendulum-like swing. The type of blind anti-foreignism, the pure xenophobia, that characterized one widely dispersed segment of Asian society in the initial reaction to the West declined; but so did the proclivity toward blind emulation of the West that was characteristic of a much smaller segment, primarily within the intelligentsia. In the political sphere, moreover, it was easier for many Asians to adhere to the relatively simple, broad ideas of the type encompassed in Marxism, especially since these harmonized with the pervasive attitude of anti-colonialism and also, to some extent, with the particular stage of development in which Asia found itself. Thus the overall impact of the *advanced* West upon Asian communism declined in both ideological and organizational terms,



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and the movement became increasingly *Asianized,* creating a need for new types of leadership. Finally, socio-economic development in Asia has generally been both rapid and uneven. In particular, the urban-rural gap has grown ever wider, even as expanded and improved communications have made the gap more noticeable. With all these various factors operative, it is natural that the doctrines of rural-based guerrilla warfare (fed in some measure by an urban underground) have permeated the Asian Communist movements in widely separated areas.

In the more "backward" Asian societies, it is true, we have seen that it is possible for a still more classic element than the petty intellectual—namely, true "feudal" types coming from the great landed families or from the royal lineage itself—to assume a leading role in a Communist movement. Prince Souphanouvong, who heads the Communist front (*Neo Lao Hak Sat*) in Laos, is a case in point, but it is admittedly a rare one. Far more common in Asia has been a type of Communist leader whom, in late 19th-century America, we would have associated with the populist movement—a figure born out of the mixed, contradictory strains characteristic of a vast region in rapid transition, where the frustrations caused by low levels of "progress" combine with the tensions resulting from an uneven and differentiated process of development favoring the urban over the rural regions.

## The Rank and File

The comparatively stronger rural element in the makeup of Asian Communist leaderships is even more discernible when one examines the socio-economic composition of Communist party memberships. Only where the Communist movement is legal does the urban proletariat figure prominently on party rosters and assume a significant role in party activities. This is true in Japan and in select regions of India, where metropolitan workers constitute a substantial part of the Communist party following (together with student-intellectual and lower middle-class elements). Prior to the September 1965 coup, it was also true in Indonesia, where a legal party had come closer to building a mass base artfully constructed of mixed worker-peasant components than any other non-ruling Asian Communist party. Most of the non-ruling Asian parties, however, are illegal and cannot construct impressive urban bases. And as they feel compelled (or are forced) to move into guerrilla warfare, the nature of their rank and file inevitably changes as much as their leadership. Not only are they forced to depend more intensively upon the peasantry, as would be expected; but in most regions they must also appeal to a wide range of ethnic minorities because these minorities usually live in precisely those areas that have become tactically important to the Communists. In many cases, the cooperation of these minorities is essential if permanent Communist bases are to be built and maintained; only with their help—or at least their sufferance—can adequate defenses be constructed and offensive operations prepared.

It is true that formerly the only ethnic minorities that played an important part in Asian Communist movements were urban (or town)-based: *i.e.,* the Koreans in Japan and the "overseas" Chinese in such areas of Southeast Asia as Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, Burma, Cambodia, and especially Malaysia-Singapore. In certain of these states, the Chinese still remain important to the Communists, providing funds and urban organizational tissue for the party as the one *affluent* minority whose grievances and cultural ties permit some degree of mobilization for Communist purposes; but in general, the role of the overseas Chinese in the Communist movements of Southeast Asia has declined (Malaysia-Singapore excepted).

Today it is no longer to the "advanced," affluent ethnic minorities that the Communists look, but rather to the "backward," poverty-stricken hill peoples—the Nagas of Northeastern India, the Karens and Kachins of Burma, the Meos, Yaos, and Akhas of Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam. Among these peoples there are numerous tensions and grievances which the Communists can effectively exploit: the age-old regional and ethnic rivalries of Asia; the adverse effect on minority aspirations of the relatively narrow, capitol-centered, monolithic nationalism that has characterized the first decades of independence in these areas; and the trauma experienced by primitive peoples when subjected to the process of modernization.

The Communist appeal to ethnic minorities, let it be reiterated, stems from tactical necessity, not from Marxian logic. As we shall see, it involves the Communists in a number of paradoxical political positions; nevertheless, at this point, it is of vital importance to the movement in a number of Asian states. Ideally, of course, the Communists strive for a political front embracing the entire rural-urban spectrum, tying peasants and hill peoples to city students, "intellectuals," and workers, with an underground structure where necessary. Rarely,



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however, is this "ideal" front realized. Not even in China in the period when the Nationalist regime was collapsing did the Communists create an urban infrastructure comparable in any sense to their rural organization—a fact that was to have long-range repercussions in the years that followed.

## Parties in Power

It is appropriate to turn at this point to the four ruling Communist parties of Asia—those of Mainland China, Mongolia, North Korea, and North Vietnam—with particular attention to trends within their leadership and membership. At the outset, however, we must set the Communist regime of the Mongolian People's Republic apart, because its heavy dependence upon Soviet protection and authority makes it an exception to the normal pattern of Asian communism. At all points, MPR leaders, whatever their socio-economic antecedents, have achieved or held power only if they were acceptable to Moscow.

In those ruling Communist parties which have a "revolutionary" tradition, such as those of China and North Korea, we find that earlier leadership patterns persist. More specifically, these parties are still dominated by leaderships representing an amalgam of petty-intellectual and peasant-soldier elements reflective of the rural or quasi-rural guerrilla antecedents of the parties, or at least of those segments of them which survived. The situation in North Vietnam is somewhat more complex as a result of the unique relationship between various elements of the Vietnamese elite, including its Communist component, and France. In certain respects, the first and second generations of Vietnamese Communists have had more substantial Western roots, and hence a greater degree of cosmopolitanism, than their Chinese and Korean counterparts. Here too, however, the process of *Asianization* is now underway in intensive fashion. This will be reflected in the younger generations as they emerge from a quasi-rural, isolated guerrilla environment.

Such leaders as these cannot avoid a certain ambivalence toward modernization, and particularly toward urbanism, despite the dedication to the tasks of nation-building and economic development which the circumstances of their societies have inspired in them. Toward the traditional "high culture" of their societies, their attitude is a curious mixture of reverence and disdain reflective of their combined rural and revolutionary roots, and their hostility toward the urban intellectual is deeply ingrained and difficult to conceal. Their commitment to narrow the urban-rural gap, as well as the fact that it stems as much from cultural as from economic reasons, cannot be doubted. Hence, the Soviet model of modernization, with its withholding of resources from agriculture to pay for industrialization, has always bothered them even when they felt obliged—at least initially—to adopt it.

Contrary to much Western speculation, it seems unlikely that the next generation of top Chinese, North Korean, and North Vietnamese political and military leaders will be greatly different from the present generation. They will most likely be generalists, not specialists. They will have been trained in such manner as to integrate them into either the petty-intellectual or the military grouping (accepting our definition of the former term), and most of them will betray the cultural attributes of men whose initial or most profound experiences relate to a rural—or to a small or medium-size town—environment.

This means that the early stages of economic and political "modernization" in the Communist states of contemporary Asia are being—and probably will continue to be—directed by men whose own primary culture and careers are not defined by the metropolitan sector of their society. It should be emphasized that this fact does not mean that these states face a future in which technicians will play no role. On the contrary, political as well as socio-economic needs will require a rapid increase in both the number and the types of technicians, inasmuch as functional specialization and the expertise that must accompany it are necessary preconditions for the fulfillment of Communist goals. The specialists, however, are not likely to reach the top rungs of political power during the next generation of leadership, and quite possibly for some generations still to come.

Indeed, the Communist leaderships now in power in Asia have shown every intention of blocking the advent of the technicians to supreme power *indefinitely*. Looking at both the Soviet and Western experiences, they fear the technocrat, seeing in him the ultimate liquidator of the revolution. Consequently, they continue to place the highest premium on the training of new generalists for party, military, and administrative careers. Significant portions of the younger political elite are being channeled into general assignments in rural or "backward" areas, not merely from political-economic necessity but as



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a part of their formal preparation for national leadership.

To be sure, in the long run and with growing industrialization, it will probably prove impossible to deny the technocrats a growing measure of influence and, ultimately, a major share of top-level political power. For the near future, however, the political dynamics of the Asian Communist regimes will center upon the skill with which generalists, many of whom will have had a modest education and limited experience (often military in character), can manipulate the technicians so as to produce the type of political and economic order desired.

## Trend Toward Urbanization

At the same time, a growing contradiction seems likely to develop between the makeup of the leadership and that of the party rank and file in the Asian societies under Communist rule. Whereas the top party leaders will doubtless continue to be drawn from the sources noted above, there is a tendency towards broadening the party base by shifting away from the historic reliance upon the petty-bourgeois intellectuals and peasant masses and resting the party instead on *worker*-peasant foundations. Ideological considerations, among other factors, demand that the "proletariat" play the vanguard role. Thus, all the Asian Communist parties in power are striving to increase the percentage of their "worker" membership. The result may be that, at the all-important district and provincial levels, an urban worker-functionary class—a class increasingly technocratic and bureaucratic in style—will emerge and come to dominate party management. The peasant, it should be remembered, can be trained to be a guerrilla fighter far more easily than he can be trained, after the revolutionary phase is over, to be an active political participant properly schooled in ideological and organizational matters. In sum, as the revolution fades and political processes become routinized, the situational advantages of the urban environment and the urbanite reassert themselves.

Looking at the problem from a "Maoist" perspective, there would appear to be two possible answers to this dilemma. The first and more difficult solution is to "urbanize" the peasant through the application of socio-economic policies that will cause him to undergo cultural changes making him indistinguishable in thought and behavior from the "proletariat." The second and quite possibly the more likely solution is to provide for the periodic reassertion of peasant power through an expansion of the military role in decision-making and governance. In Asia, even under a Communist regime, the army remains the easiest and most convenient route for the social advancement of the peasant, at least until the industrialization process reaches a more advanced stage than at present. The Communist regime in China already appears to be taking the second path. In the course of the so-called Cultural Revolution, we witnessed a kind of *coup d'etat* taking place within party and state, the end result of which has been a significant increase in the power of the military with its peasant base.

Whatever developments may occur, the composition of the party membership will serve as an important index of trends affecting the distribution of political power, particularly with respect to rural *vs.* urban and regional *vs.* national strength. While the ruling Asian Communist parties currently continue to contain a preponderance of peasant members, in terms of both numbers and importance, white-collar and industrial worker elements are gradually moving upward, reflecting ideological commitments as well as economic trends. This, together with the advantages of an urban setting for organizational purposes, threatens to challenge the rural-urban equilibrium or what might be called the homogenization process so devoutly desired by leaders who are themselves prone to a rural bias.

After looking at Asian Communist parties both in and out of power, we should take brief note of leadership and membership trends in the few parties that have come to power regionally or locally *via* elections. Here we are concerned exclusively with India, where both the Communist Party (Right) and the Communist Party (Marxist) recently shared political office and—in the latter case—control of West Bengal. In general, the same trends apply to these parties as apply to the Communist parties of Japan and Ceylon, which adhere to the parliamentary route. Even the leadership of the Naxalites—who are the farthest left of India's three rival Communist factions—is firmly bourgeois-intellectual, with strong elements of labor support, both at the leadership and membership levels. Some inroads into the peasantry have been made, especially by the left-wing Communist parties, but both "Left" and "Right" Communists in India remain primarily dependent upon their urban middle-class and worker support.

Thus, for Asian communism, the parliamentary route is essentially an urban one, and the revolutionary route a rural one—reflecting both the technical obstacles involved in confronting any modern



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government today and the types of political mobilization most logical and suitable to the various classes within the respective Asian societies.

## Internationalism and Nationalism

We are now in a position to examine more objectively the issues on which Asian communism makes its major appeals. Once again a historical perspective and a sense of developmental sequences are essential if we are to approach the current scene with some understanding of its complexities. As is well known, Asian communism started primarily as an anti-nationalist movement profoundly conscious of its integration into a supranational structure controlled from Moscow. One need not read deeply in the Asian Communist literature of the 1920's and 1930's to discover this fact. Policies—and leaders—had to be acceptable to the Comintern (and later, the Cominform), and there was only *one* fatherland: that of the world's proletariat, namely, the USSR.

Even in this period, however, nationalism was found to be an excellent tactical issue in certain settings. Thus, with Lenin pointing the way, the first Asian Communists espoused policies that combined the use and abuse of both nationalism and democracy, those two great historic movements of the 19th-century West. Throughout Asia, and particularly in colonial and quasi-colonial regions, a united front of all "patriotic" forces was to be forged against Western dominance. In this context, moreover, a bourgeois-democratic revolution was to be advanced, flying the banners of Western liberalism.

Tactically this program was a brilliant one, not least because it exploited the moral ambiguity of the Western global role at a time when domestic politics were becoming an increasing, if still unnoticed, factor in international politics. Nothing, however, should obscure the fact that if this was a policy aiming at a "managed" democracy, it was no less a policy of "managed" nationalism. That is to say, nationalism was "good" when it was used to mobilize a wide range of forces under Communist leadership against the West or Japan; it was "bad" when it was made an end in itself or threatened "the unity of the international proletariat," which Communists in this era equated with the national interests of the Soviet Union.

This basic paradox did not escape the first Asian Communist leaders, a number of whom refused to live with a movement that was directed ultimately from external sources toward ends that were both utopian *and* foreign. Indeed, the very individuals mentioned earlier—Ch'en Tu-hsiu, M. N. Roy, and Hitoshi Yamakawa—all broke with the Communist Party before the decade of the 1920's had ended, and they were to be joined by scores of others. Of greater importance to this discussion, however, are two critical questions: When and how did Asian communism traverse the route from a largely uniform "internationalist" movement, peripheral to Asian society in vital respects and bearing the imprimatur of the Kremlin (or, at a minimum, of a Western-dominated coterie of supranational intellec-



*Mao Tse-tung in the early 1930's, when he headed the "Chinese Soviet Republic" in Kiangsi Province. He was the prototype of the modern Asian Communist leader, a mixture of petty intellectual and peasant soldier, primarily rural and Asian in outlook. (Photo copyright © 1938, 1944 by Random House, Inc. Copyright © 1968 by Edgar Snow. Reprinted courtesy of Grove Press, Inc.)*



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tuals), to an increasingly indigenous (although not necessarily a specifically nationalist) movement, diverse and inconsistent, but inescapably Asian? And how far down that route has Asian communism gone up to this point?

## Nationalism *vs.* Localism

To explore these questions, we must turn to the evolving policies of the Asian Communist parties, looking first at those parties which are engaged in a revolutionary quest for power. Among such parties, is nationalism the crucial appeal? A number of scholars and observers of varying political persuasions would unhesitatingly answer "Yes." The evidence, however, is at best conflicting, and on balance it would appear to suggest that the importance of nationalism to such parties at this point in time is less considerable than has been commonly asserted. Nationalism remains an appeal, but not an exclusive one, and not always a central one. Indeed, depending upon the target, nationalism may either be of scant consequence or a positive disadvantage.

To the Asian peasant, for example, nationalism is generally of secondary importance. At most, it can be used to stimulate the xenophobic tendencies deeply imbedded in this community, but these are as frequently directed against other segments of the same society as against the supposed external foe. Thus, to appeal to the peasants' "nationalist" sentiments is, in all probability, to appeal primarily to his *localist* feelings. It may also be possible to generate feelings akin to nationalism by exploiting the charismatic appeal of an individual leader—a folk hero. This is probably the most promising tactic, but given the strongly localist focus that characterizes peasant politics, it will certainly not have universal meaning or appeal.

With few, if any exceptions, Communist movements seeking revolutionary victory have found that their most effective appeal is one that is based on a mixture of economic, social and political issues and strongly oriented toward *immediate* and *local* grievances. Such an appeal need not necessarily form a consistent, integrated pattern. In order to promote revolution in the modern Asian setting, the Communists are compelled to fight on a wide range of issues, hoping that a sufficient number will strike home to swell the ranks of party adherents. Much like the tacticians of modern American political parties, Communist functionaries observe and catalogue popular grievances, albeit by methods more crude than those of scientific public opinion polls. These grievances are then woven into appeals disseminated in various ways, ranging from the simple, single leaflet to the sustained campaign.

Thus, demands concerned with the corruption and arbitrary attitudes of local officials, with taxes, marketing conditions and prices, with education, and above all with land control and ownership, form the central complex of Communist rural appeals. In South Vietnam, for example, Communist tracts have often been directed at a single district or village and have dealt with a single local issue such as "the oppressive treatment accorded by the government to the family of Ngoc Van Tran," the corruption of the local hamlet chief, or the inequitable system of local taxation. If the subject of nationalism is raised, as it usually is, it is generally subordinated to such concrete, practical issues. And when they appeal to ethnic minorities, the Communists do not hesitate even to attack nationalism in certain forms in favor of espousing a wide range of separatist causes. How else, indeed, could they have gained significant influence among such groups as the Meos of Thailand and the Kachins of Burma?

Nationalism in its purest and most expansive sense is an issue which the Communists utilize mainly in appealing to the urban student-intellectual community. Yet even here it is usually interwoven with a complex set of issues, many of which involve seemingly minor questions or single incidents, such as student grievances concerning school examinations and admission procedures, or the dismissal of a radical student. The same is true of Communist campaigns to woo other segments of the community such as the workers and the "progressive" bourgeoisie.

## Revolutionary *vs.* Parliamentary Tactics

In the light of these highly flexible tactics, it can be seen that the sharp line which has previously been drawn between revolutionary politics and parliamentary politics in Asia is misleading. Let us take a small but revealing example. On the one hand, Communist agents tell the Meo minority in Thailand that there is no reason why they should not grow opium poppies, and that, if the Communists were in power, they would not interfere with local customs; yet, at the same time, other Communist representatives are berating the Thai government for keeping its hill people in a state of backwardness



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and are promising Meo adherents to communism training as mechanics, clerks and teachers under an eventual Communist regime. In other words, they are attempting to play on both sides of the fence. The question of whether the hill people (or backward rural people in general) should be allowed to enjoy their traditional life without interference from outside, or whether they should be given the full "advantages" of modernization, will long remain a crucial and divisive issue in the open and quasi-open societies of Asia. And in their current approach to it, the Communists are being just as inconsistent as one would expect of any politician seeking a maximum number of votes in parliamentary elections.

There is another sense, of course, in which Communist revolutionary tactics in Asia do differ from those customary in the parliamentary arena. These tactics now center upon the concept of permanent revolution, namely, a commitment to revolution on an indefinite basis until victory is attained; and coercive techniques, including assassination, blackmail, and kidnapping, have now become routinized in many revolutionary situations and are no less differentiated and complex than the persuasive techniques employed. Thus, the Communists' aim must be to perfect their organizational and leadership skills so that the mix of coercive-persuasive methods and of military-economic-political actions can be quickly altered and/or long maintained, as circumstances dictate. The true Communist has removed the word "defeat" from his vocabulary, acknowledging—if the occasion demands it—only "zigzags," "setbacks," and "strategic retreats." His policies, both persuasive and coercive, are sufficiently flexible to permit him to maintain—however many battles may be lost—that the revolution will ultimately be won.

In the tactical sphere, the Communist parties engaged in parliamentary competition, whatever their advantages in terms of greater security, have certain distinct psychological and ethical liabilities which do not accrue to their revolutionary comrades. They must accept at least some of the rules of the parliamentary game, and in so doing they risk gradually becoming identified as part of the Establishment, however radical their proclaimed policies. To the extent that they are brought into the established power structure, moreover, this problem becomes all the more complicated, for then a legacy of policy as well as a pattern of behavior is built. It is yet too early to determine how this will affect the future of such parties as the Indian Communist Party (Right), the Indian Communist Party (Marxist), and the Ceylon Communist Party. It would seem likely, however, that those Asian Communist parties committed to parliamentarism, like their counterparts in the West, will develop a less intense and more complex psychological relationship toward both members and followers.

## The Functions of Ideology

As already emphasized above, the Communist movement, when it is engaged in a competition for power, must—like other political movements—adjust pragmatically to the political circumstances in which it finds itself, and its capacities in this respect will bear heavily upon its revolutionary (or electoral) success or failure. This certainly does not mean, however, that ideology is unimportant to the Communists, both in and out of power, although it is the author's belief that the role of ideology in the Communist movements of Asia has been widely misconstrued.

What, then, are the functions of ideology in general? First, it fixes the broad perimeters within which a party member must think and act and provides a set of guiding principles for judging the efficacy of policies and individuals when and as that becomes necessary. This is its function as sanction. Second, there is within ideology a certain stimulus to creative thought, to the acceptance of a given method of collecting and ordering data, and then applying it to issues of concern. This is its intellectual function. The central function of ideology, however, is neither as sanction nor as intellectual stimulus; it is rather psychological and ethical. Whether applied by parties in quest of power or by parties already in command of their societies, ideology sets forth goals in such fashion as to help each party member retain a sense of purpose, and at the same time it provides a set of simple maxims, a core of basic "truths," that legitimize the party and the movement, sanctify any directive issued, and underwrite any personal sacrifice demanded.

What should be emphasized here is that the intellectual content or, more precisely, the stimulus to intellectualism in Asian Communist ideology today is minimal and strictly secondary. As we shall note, intellectualism in the Asian countries under Communist regimes has found channels outside that of ideology. Indeed, no aspect of these regimes is more intriguing than the increasingly psychological and manipulative role assigned to ideology by the Communists at the expense of its rational, intellectual



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integrity, and the corresponding need for members of the society to find intellectual outlets elsewhere. In the case of parties in revolutionary quest of power, this problem is less acute because the act of revolution demands that all faculties—intellectual, emotional, technical—be directed toward the one central goal of victory, and activism takes clear precedence over contemplation.

Communist ideology, whether it is being utilized by a party in revolt or by one already in power, also implies a counterculture which is juxtaposed to that of the "enemy." And here we come to the most conspicuous bond among Communist parties occupying different positions or roles in their societies.

The traditional Asian political system was generally one of loose linkage, with considerable autonomy allowed at the regional and village levels. Such a system made possible nominal control via a monarchical system despite the relatively large terrain involved and the primitive communications available. To be sure, in the more advanced (and integrated) traditional Asian polities, a common culture and set of values (an ideology) existed, but this ideology provided for the loose political linkage just noted and left a large arena for "private government." (In using this term, I refer to the many political functions undertaken in traditional Asian societies by the family, the clan, and the social organization, apart from and in addition to those performed by public government, whether local, regional or national. An extensive private-governmental system helped to limit the functions of public government and also enabled the society to tide over periods of governmental crisis at the public level, thus helping to preserve its basic political culture.)

Although this traditional system of politics survived repeated assaults, the Communists were able to take its measure, using portions of it, attacking other parts and, in any case, penetrating it deeply. The Communist aim has been to detach individuals from their allegiance to the prevailing order and win them over to a competitive system much more total in its scope and more demanding in its requirements, but also promising to provide greater psychic and socio-economic rewards. And even though the promise may remain unfulfilled, the individual, as he is brought into the Communist system, enters a new culture and finds it progressively more difficult (even in a competitive situation) to maintain his position in both worlds. He is forced to choose, and what the Communists seek to do—aided by the full array of coercive and persuasive weapons which they can bring to bear—is to make him choose at the appropriate time and to assure that his choice is a *total* one permitting of as limited a retention of the old culture as possible.

Thus, it is not merely a shadow government or a shadow political system that the Communists attempt to establish in those areas which come under their control. It is, rather, a whole alternate society whose most conspicuous feature is a near-total absence of privatism and an insistence upon full involvement. Even if the Communists rarely succeed in the fullest measure in this undertaking, it nevertheless continues to be their goal. Let us, therefore, see how this central feature of Asian communism is translated into the policies of the Communist parties currently holding power.

## The New Role of Nationalism

As noted earlier, these ruling parties find themselves confronted with the two immediate tasks facing all "emerging" societies in this century: nation-building and economic development. Hence, the construction of a new culture and the creation of a "new socialist man" have these immediate objectives in mind. Certain weapons can now be more sharply focused, and one of these is nationalism, since there is less need at this postrevolutionary stage to accommodate regionalism, ethnic separatism, or a sizable foreign presence (although, with respect to the first problem, China faces special difficulties because of her size). Consequently, one of the more striking aspects of the Asian Communist states of today is the extent to which their use of nationalism resembles the more extreme examples of the 19th and 20th-century West. The high priority accorded to the enhancement of state power, the appeals for unstinting sacrifice on behalf of the state, and the constant glorification of violence are prominent features of the nationalist-Communist states of contemporary Asia.

Nation-building, however, is a task not easily accomplished by institutional means alone, even when highly efficient Communist organizational techniques are applied. Therefore, like many less intense political movements, Asian communism also invokes the charisma of a supreme leader. Two systems of allegiance are thus constructed simultaneously: the one institutional, collective, impersonal, and routinized; the other personal, individual, emotional, and dynamic. Although elements of complementarity exist between these two systems, contradictions of significant proportions also emerge. For one thing,



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when the "cult of personality" is elevated to a dominant role, it raises certain basic issues which in the West preoccupied the political thought of the absolutist states of the 17th and 18th centuries. Is the ruler bound by the social contract? Can limits be placed upon his power? Under prevailing conditions in Asia, moreover, all institutions are in some degree personalized despite the uniform mold from which they have been drawn: the imprint of Mao, Kim and Ho is stamped upon party, army and state in the societies they rule(d). One result of this is that these societies seem destined to go through complex and prolonged succession crises—crises that will affect institutions as well as individuals.

In the particular case of China, this crisis may well be exacerbated by the need constantly to review the distribution of power between the national, regional, and local levels. Despite the firm Communist commitment to nationalism and the techniques available to enforce greater centralization, China is simply too vast and populous to be governed from a single center. Experimentation with power allocation, therefore, will almost certainly be continued in the post-Mao era.

Thus, the utilization of nationalism in these young Asian Communist states does not differ in major degree from earlier trends in the West, suggesting that serious dangers lie ahead. It is generally recognized that the so-called "Communist world" has been powerfully affected in its internal relations by the nationalist triumph over Marxist internationalism. Those relations now display the same range of positions—alliance, "neutralism," and hostility—that have marked historic relations among non-Communist states. Containment and power balances are now operative principles *within* as well as outside the Communist orbit.

## Communist "Managed" Democracy

Internally, meanwhile, the Asian Communist regimes already in power can now narrow the range and sharpen the focus of their earlier political and socio-economic appeals. It is no longer necessary for them to pledge those "bourgeois" political freedoms which can be so imperfectly achieved in an emerging society. In a thoroughly "managed" democracy, the "freedoms" of speech, press and assemblage take very special forms: there are "the people" whose true voice speaks via the party; and there are the "enemies of the people" to whom these freedoms must be denied. In the utter simplicity of this perversion of liberalism lies one secret of Communist management.

In no sense, however, does this exhaust the more subtle aspects of Asian Communist culture. The most profound change that this culture entails is the progressive elimination of *competitive* social, religious, and economic organizations, and hence the complete extinction of privatism. Having eliminated privatism, the party can proceed to undertake the total allocation of individual thought and energies. It is in this respect, far more than in their assault upon Western-style liberalism, that the Asian Communists can be considered revolutionary.

At a minimum, this is producing a generation that is much more politicized and collectivist. It is still a generation, however, capable of measuring its economic interests and career aspirations. The ultimate testing of Asian communism therefore seems likely to take place in the economic sphere, and it is here that the most critical policy divisions within the ruling elites have occurred. As is commonly recognized, the trend in Communist Asia has been away from the Soviet model of development, largely because Soviet policies have failed to solve the problems of a backward agriculture. Neither the economic circumstances of the Asian Communist states nor the political-cultural proclivities of their leaderships will permit the same low priorities for agriculture that have characterized historic Soviet policy.

Thus, recent years have witnessed various experiments in economic policy by the Asian Communist regimes, especially China and North Korea, the two Communist states enjoying a greater degree of latitude in these matters. The policy of "walking on two legs," involving an increased emphasis on agricultural relative to industrial development; the commune system as a means of achieving increased administrative efficiency in agriculture; and the effort to develop greater rural self-sufficiency through a system of small and medium rural-based industries utilizing local resources—these are but a few of the efforts underway. It remains to be seen whether collective agriculture can be made viable, and what price in terms of incentives will ultimately have to be paid.

Meanwhile, the Communist parties in power hope to enforce their priorities and achieve their goals by creating the "new socialist man." The function of ideology in this respect, as suggested earlier, is to provide the individual citizen with purpose and a "correct" set of values. He is to find his psychological and emotional satisfaction in belonging to an



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integrated community of believers, while his intellectual needs are to be served by the channeling of his creative energies into such fields as science and technology and the solution of concrete problems in the areas of political and economic development.

Consciously or unconsciously, the young Asian Communist states are thus separating ideology and intellectualism. Stripped of intellectual content and prepared in forms suitable for "the masses," ideology is reduced to the level of Mao's Maxims for Growing Children. Creative political thought atrophies, and Mao's (Kim's, or Ho's) Thought is worn like a magic amulet to ward off evil. The vulgarization of political ideas is, indeed, the most conspicuous feature of the new Communist politics in Asia. Creative impulses are to be channeled into the scientific laboratory, the factory workshop, the cadre's administrative office.

Here, we can perhaps discern the future, if only dimly. The technician looms ahead as the prospective enemy of the good "Maoist," precisely because the supreme paradox of the Asian Communist regimes lies in the fact that they are denuding politics of intellectual content even while they endow the technical aspects of their society with such strength. They are reviving, in new form, the ancient battle between "religion" and "science," with little effort at this point to develop a synthesis and with an almost studied primitivism in their approach to political thought. It is therefore not without good reason that their leaders are beginning to fear that the weapons with which they are equipping the party will ultimately prove no match for those in the hands of the technocrats—that, in short, they are developing a system which at some point the party, in its present form, will be unable to handle, however successful it may be in delaying the final showdown by appeals to keep the faith. There is, indeed, little doubt that within the present evolutionary trends in Asian communism lie the seeds of major change.



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# The New Posture of the CPJ

**By Paul F. Langer**

In July 1970, when the Communist Party of Japan (CPJ) convened its 11th Congress in Tokyo, Secretary General Kenji Miyamoto could report that the party's membership, for the first time in its history, had reached 300,000, making the Japanese party the largest non-governing Communist organization outside Western Europe.[1] In the national elections held a few months earlier (on December 27, 1969), the Communists received 6.9 percent of the total vote, indicating that the Japanese Communist movement had continued its steady growth since the mid-1950's.[2] Miyamoto's announcement thus constituted a clear demonstration of the viability of the CPJ despite years of internal dissension caused by the conflicting appeals of Moscow and Peking.

But the 11th Congress was to serve an even more important purpose, and one indicating its concern over this conflict: a series of documents was presented to the membership which represented a serious attempt to assert the party's independence of both Moscow and Peking and to adapt its strategy and program to the open society of postwar Japan.[3] The CPJ's new image was dramatized by the opening of most meetings of the Congress (except those concerned with personnel and financial affairs) to the general public, a break with the party's tradition of secrecy. The party leadership also proposed to drop the traditional term "party cell" and to substitute for it "branch," a term commonly used by the non-Communist parties of Japan. The new era in the party's history was further emphasized by the election of the first representative of the postwar generation to a top leadership position. Significantly enough, this newcomer, Tetsuzo Fuwa (pseudonym of Kenjiro Ueda), who was chosen to be a member of the Standing Presidium and Chief of the Party Secretariat,[4] has made a name for himself as a party spokesman on ideological matters related to differences with Moscow and Peking.[5] He was a key member of the

[1] Party membership at the time of the 7th Congress in 1958 was 45,000; at the 8th Congress in 1961, 88,000; at the 9th Congress in 1964, 140,000; at the 10th Congress in 1966, 250,000.

[2] In 1955, the CPJ received 2 percent of the total vote cast in national elections to the House of Representatives; in 1958, it received 2.6 percent; in 1960, 2.9 percent; in 1963, 4.0 percent; in 1967, 4.8 percent.

[3] These included a new set of party regulations, a comprehensive report of the Central Committee, and a party resolution entitled "Perspectives of the 1970's and Tasks of the Communist Party of Japan." The preamble of the new party regulations stresses the need for "independent and creative development of the theory and practice of the Japanese revolution," speaks of "holding fast to the position of autonomy and independence combining proletarian internationalism and true patriotism," and declares that the party will resolutely fight any interference in its affairs by "great-power chauvinism." See *Gekkan Gakushu* (Monthly study—Tokyo), August 1970, p. 135.

[4] This new position in the CPJ organization is substantially less important than that of Secretary General, which was abolished at the same time, although it obviously provides considerable leverage in party affairs. Kenji Miyamoto, the former Secretary General and real leader of the party (which is nominally led by the Chairman and elder statesman, Sanzo Nosaka), now bears the title of Presidium Chairman.

[5] Born in 1930 and a graduate in physics of the prestigious Tokyo University, Fuwa combines substantial experience as a labor union leader with academic qualifications and long service in the central party organization. His present stature is also reflected in the fact that most of his articles on ideology and important issues of party strategy, originally published in *Akahata* (Red Flag) and other Communist or left-wing publications, have recently been reissued in book form.

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1966 party mission which visited North Vietnam, Communist China, and North Korea and, after a confrontation with Mao Tse-tung, firmly established the CPJ's autonomy from foreign advice.

What might be called the "coming of age" of the Japanese party is the product of a quarter-century of internal argument, adjustment, and compromise. Adaptation to the new Japan of the postwar period posed a series of challenges to the CPJ in its struggle for political power, challenges met with greater or less flexibility and imagination by its leaders depending upon their own bias and upon the nature and degree of pressures from Moscow and Peking. The question of opposition to American "imperialism," the Japanese stance in the Sino-Soviet conflict and the meaning of that conflict to the CPJ, the proper definition of Japanese society (and thus, by implication, of the revolution towards which the party was working, proletarian or bourgeois-democratic)—these and other issues preoccupied the party leadership in the late 1940's and throughout the 1950's and led to shifting and often contradictory postures. By 1961, however, as will be seen below, the CPJ had resolved the most troublesome of its conflicts and had adapted itself to the realities of postwar Japan. The election results and the party's growing membership rolls throughout the decade, culminating in the figures cited in Miyamoto's report to the 11th Congress, attest to the fact that the party, after many false starts and setbacks, has firmly established itself on the political scene.

## Prewar Legacy

To understand the convolutions of party policy before 1961, one must examine the role of the CPJ in Japanese life before World War II and the problems it faced when it was legalized and its leaders reinstated in 1945. When it was founded in 1922, the Communist Party of Japan was but a frail offshoot of the Japanese socialist movement, itself a minority group outside the mainstream of Japanese political life. Intellectuals and quasi-intellectuals played leading roles in the small illegal Communist organization and, much of the time, made up the majority of the rank and file as well. This predominance of intellectuals biased the party toward a preoccupation with theoretical arguments over Marxist-Leninist doctrine, and its failure to attract a base of support among the people (particularly the peasants, despite their growing general political awareness) further divorced the prewar party from Japanese life. It is not surprising that communism in prewar Japan had a pronounced conspiratorial and sectarian flavor.[6]

These characteristics were accentuated by the special nature of the party's "enemy," the prewar Japanese government. The Japanese state was modernizing and successfully competing with the West at a time when other Asian countries had succumbed to Western economic and military domination. Thus the CPJ could not serve as a focal point for mobilizing anti-colonialist and anti-foreign sentiments, nor could it ride the wave of nationalism, as Communist parties elsewhere in Asia were able to do. It was not foreign, Western imperialism that the party was called upon to fight, but an indigenous, home-grown variety in the form of a militaristic and expansionist government supported by an extremely efficient and ruthless police force and judicial apparatus whose full strength was brought to bear against the weak Communist organization.

Under these circumstances, the Japanese Communists quite naturally sought guidance and support abroad, primarily from the Soviet Union and the Communist movement in China. The CPJ owed its life to the initiative of the Comintern—the 4th Comintern Congress in 1922 actually wrote the draft of the CPJ platform. Soviet influence was undiminished until, on the eve of World War II, it became impossible for Japanese revolutionaries to maintain their foreign contacts. Not only had the party's strategy and doctrinal theses originated in Moscow, but its leaders had developed close contacts with the Soviet Union; many of them were trained there. When these men emerged from prison or exile to revive the CPJ after Japan's defeat, they were understandably slow to absorb the drastic changes which were taking place at home and abroad.

While the "old men" of the CPJ found it difficult to confront the postwar world on its own terms rather than through the lenses of the past, the very nature of that new world made changes in party attitudes mandatory. Japan has become one of the world's most open and politically permissive societies. Great freedom is allowed all ideologies and organizations, including the Communists. Vast social and economic changes have taken place since the war, and they put the Japanese intellectual's faith in Marxism to

[6] The most complete English-language account of the prewar Japanese Communist movement and its doctrinal debates is found in George M. Beckmann and Genji Okubo, *The Japanese Communist Party*, 1922-1945 Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1969. Vol. 14 and 15 of *Gendai Shi Shiryo* (Modern History Materials), Tokyo, 1964-65, contain a massive collection of relevant documents in the original Japanese.



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a severe test. The nation's prosperity has drastically changed the condition of the worker in the cities and in the countryside. The effect of the increase in nationalistic feeling and self-confidence among the Japanese people, particularly marked in the last few years, has been to push the Japanese Communists toward an independent position in the world Communist movement. Such developments abroad as Togliatti's structural reform theories have stimulated similar attempts in Japan to adapt Marxist dogma to the new realities. The outbreak of the Sino-Soviet conflict in the 1960's and its subsequent intensification—the very fact that Moscow and Peking can no longer agree on the "correct" strategy—has further undermined the confidence and loyalty that the two powers had been able to command from the CPJ before the war, and made the need for re-examination of imported theories and strategies even more obvious. The Japanese Communist leadership, despite its roots in prewar dogmatic thinking, has gradually become convinced that Soviet and Chinese formulas may not be relevant for Japan. As might be expected, this evolution in party thinking has been slow: it has spanned two decades and is a continuing phenomenon. Its direction is indicated by a key sentence in the resolution adopted by the 11th Congress in 1970: "We have created a program which creatively adapts Marxist-Leninist theory to the realities of Japan." [7]

## Search for a Strategy

The CPJ's progress toward the "creative adaptation" spoken of in the resolution began rather smoothly. Immediately after the war, while defeated Japan busied itself in rebuilding its shattered economy under the American military occupation, the reconstituted and now legalized party looked about for a program suited to the new atmosphere of rapid political, economic, and social democratization created by the occupation. In the absence of guidance from abroad, the party's chief strategist, Sanzo Nosaka, a veteran of the Comintern who returned from Mao Tse-tung's wartime headquarters in Yenan early in 1946, a more pragmatic and flexible leader than many others in the party, decided to combine Maoist formulas with his own analysis of the ingredients required for the revolutionary struggle in Japan. He played down the role of the United States, declared Japanese imperialism to be the principal enemy of all progressive forces, and advocated a bourgeois-democratic revolution which could attract the support of all segments of the population except, of course, the "monopoly capitalists." Nosaka spoke of a "peaceful path to power" and the creation of "a Party beloved by the people." These tactics paid off, and in four years Nosaka had built an organization of 100,000 members. In the general election of 1949 the Communist slate polled 10 percent of the total vote, and the renascent CPJ seemed well on its way toward becoming an integral part of Japanese political life. Given time, the party seemed capable of making inroads into the much larger electoral base of its natural rival, the Socialist Party.

This optimistic forecast might well have been fulfilled had not the party's isolation from the outside and its preoccupation with its own domestic stance been abruptly brought to an end. Early in 1950, a few months after the CPJ's demonstration of strength at the polls, a new strategy of militancy and outright violence was forced upon the Japanese Communists when the Cominform journal, speaking for the Soviet and Chinese parties and seconded by a similar statement emanating from Peking, denounced Nosaka for his "grave mistakes." [8] The sudden interest of Moscow and Peking in the policies of the Japanese party stemmed from the changed international situation: the U.S.-Soviet alliance had given way to the Cold War, the Communists had come to power in China, and in Korea an East-West military confrontation was developing. At this point, the CPJ could no longer be left to its own devices. Like Communist parties elsewhere, it was expected to do its share in obstructing U.S. policy, particularly the U.S. war effort conducted from bases in Japan.

### SELF-RELIANCE FOR THE Cps

It has already been confirmed by various events in the 1960's that the overcoming of great-power chauvinism and the establishment of a self-reliant and independent position is the direction in which the world Communist movement is inevitably advancing. . . .

**—"New Declaration of Great-Power Chauvinist Intervention," *Akahata* (Red Flag, Tokyo), Aug. 5, 1970.**

[7] *Zen-ei* (Vanguard—Tokyo), Special Party Congress Issue, August 1970, p. 160.

[8] *For a Lasting Peace; For a People's Democracy* (Bucharest), Jan. 6, 1950. The blame for this crude intervention was later placed on Stalin; it was "undertaken on the personal initiative of Stalin," according to a letter of April 18, 1964, from the Soviet party to the CPJ. See *Partiinaia zhizn* (Moscow), No. 14, 1964.



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Abandoning its pragmatic approach, the Japanese Communist leadership instantly reverted to its tradition of absolute faith in the correctness of Soviet guidance. The advice from abroad was listened to carefully, and the strategy recommended by the Cominform was promptly adopted, despite the fact that it represented a complete about-face in the party position. Most of the party apparatus was moved underground and staffed with second-echelon leaders, while the majority of the top officials took refuge in Peking. The Chinese Communists, apparently with Soviet consent, actually directed operations in Japan. Attempts were made to organize terrorist violence, and Mao's writings on guerrilla warfare became required reading for all party members. The theoretical basis for the new militancy was provided by the 1951 Thesis, a document which, like the CPJ's original platform, was conceived and written abroad—this time, in Peking. It prescribed the creation in Japan of a "national liberation democratic movement" against American "imperialism" and urged direct action against this enemy. There was no mention of a peaceful path to power. Nosaka himself emphasized "the importance and the need . . . for listening to the words of the peoples of the two countries," *i.e.,* the USSR and Communist China.[9]

As some members of the CPJ expected at the time, the Chinese formula did little to advance the cause of Japanese communism. The government, whose full sovereignty had been restored by the Allied powers, easily withstood the feeble Communist assault, and this venture into revolutionary action cost the Japanese party dearly. Membership dropped sharply, electoral support dwindled, the prewar image of a conspiratorial party controlled from abroad was revived, and the Communists found themselves harassed by the police and politically ostracized by the non-Communist Left.

In the middle of the 1950's the CPJ was allowed to discard this unrewarding strategy, which by then no longer served the needs of Moscow and Peking. Stalin was dead and had been unceremoniously toppled from his pedestal by Khrushchev, while China was displaying the "Bandung spirit" in foreign policy, reassuring her Asian neighbors of her determination to avoid confrontations with the U.S. in the Far East. At this point the Japanese Communists, ideologically and organizationally in disarray, resumed their search for a program appropriate to Japanese conditions while still expressing the party's dedication to the international revolutionary struggle.

## External Pressures

At the outset the CPJ's attempt at reorganization was complicated by conflicting pressures exerted by Moscow and Peking. The late 1950's were years of intensive discussions among Communists everywhere as to the meaning and role of "revisionism" and "dogmatism"; the Sino-Soviet conflict was passing through its initial stages, and the Japanese party was reluctantly forced to take sides and to define its position on a number of issues separating the two powers. Both Moscow and Peking made strenuous efforts to pull the CPJ into their respective orbits, thereby creating tensions within the Japanese organization and accentuating already existing ideological differences. Opinion tended to polarize around two opposing positions. One faction saw the principal enemy as "U.S. imperialism," while the other contended (as did the Japanese Socialists) that the revolutionary movement in Japan should focus its attention primarily—though not exclusively—on capitalism at home. Accordingly, the first group urged a strategy of "democratic revolution for national liberation," while its opponents classified Japan as a fully developed, highly capitalistic society ready for an immediate socialist revolution.[10] As for tactics, the first group wished to retain the option of violent action; the second advocated peaceful methods to lead Japan smoothly from its capitalist present to a socialist future through a gradual, piecemeal transformation of the existing power structure resulting from pressures exerted by the alliance of "progressive forces."

In the ensuing struggle, Peking enjoyed a clear advantage. The two Asian countries had historic and cultural affinities. Furthermore, during the war China had been Nosaka's home base,[11] and later Peking

[9] "My Answer," *Chuo Koron* (Central Review—Tokyo), November 1955.

[10] The question of whether revolution in Japan should be a one-stage or a two-stage process had been the subject of considerable controversy in prewar Japan. Prior to the so-called 1932 Thesis, the CPJ defined Japan as a mature capitalist society ready for a one-stage, proletarian revolution. The 1932 Thesis, which long dominated Communist thinking in postwar Japan, also described the country as a highly developed capitalist society but one which harbored substantial feudal remnants. Thus, a "bourgeois-democratic revolution with a tendency to grow rapidly into a socialist revolution" was held necessary.

[11] Nosaka traveled there from Comintern headquarters in Moscow during World War II in the company of Chou En-lai.



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was the haven to which the exiled Communist leaders fled from Japan. The Chinese Communists had assisted their Japanese friends in many ways during those postwar years, while Moscow seems to have been content to let the Chinese deal directly with the Japanese party, creating a certain remoteness in the relations between the CPJ headquarters in Yoyogi (Tokyo) and Moscow. The Chinese advantage was accentuated by the fact that there had been no change in leadership in Peking, while the familiar Comintern faces had long disappeared from the scene in Moscow. There the Japanese Communists may have felt like strangers; not so in Peking. On substantive issues the Chinese position also appears to have had much greater appeal in Japan. Soviet strategy in the late 1950's, characterized by a willingness to work for understandings with the United States on the nuclear test-ban treaty and other issues, was interpreted in Japan as a *status quo* policy unworthy of a Communist power. It was especially odious to the CPJ, which viewed the U.S. as the principal prop supporting Japan's capitalist system and conservative government.




*Cartoon, captioned "Nothing can stop the friendship between the Japanese and Chinese peoples," proclaims the warm response of the Japanese population to a Chinese trade exposition, claiming an attendance of more than one and a half million. The figures at right represent so-called anti-Chinese "New Opportunists," "Modern Revisionists," Japanese Premier Sato and former US President Johnson.*

**—From *Selections of Afro-Asian People's Anti-Imperialist Caricatures*, Peking, People's Art Publishers, 1967.**

In 1961 the 8th Party Congress was finally able to agree on a program reconciling these sharp differences. Although supplemented and reinterpreted since then, most recently by the 11th Congress, its essential features remain in force to this day. In charting its course, the CPJ has avoided taking extreme positions, either on the right or the left, but its overall strategy owes more to the philosophy of Peking than that of Moscow. The party acknowledges Japan to be a highly developed capitalist society, but the country's heavy dependence on the United States is also stressed. The key question of the exact nature of the relationship between the United States and Japan—and its corollary, the definition of the target of the revolutionary struggle —is answered by the 11th Congress resolution in these terms:

*Despite the rapid advance of the revival of* [*Japanese*] *militarism and imperialism, Japan even now has not regained full independence. Under the San Francisco system* [*i.e., the system established by the San Francisco Peace Treaty*] *it continues to be a semi-occupied, semi-independent country chained to the U.S. imperialist policy of war and aggression. It is, as the party program puts it, a country which is "virtually dependent, being semi-occupied by American imperialism."* [12]

The primary enemy in the eyes of the party is therefore "American imperialism," with Japanese capitalism and imperialism given only a secondary role. Revolution in Japan, according to the program, is to proceed in two consecutive stages, to be initiated by the formation of a united national democratic front under Communist leadership, made up of all but the monopoly capitalists. The party's adaptation to postwar conditions is evidenced in the recommendation that the Communists make full use of existing parliamentary opportunities, although it is conceded that under certain conditions violent methods cannot entirely be ruled out.

The current program thus provides a theoretical framework sufficiently broad and flexible to allow

[12] *Zen-ei*, Special Party Congress Issue, August 1970, pp. 137-38.



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for a variety of tactics and shifts of emphasis. In fact, since these strategy guidelines were first put forth in 1961, the Japanese Communists have worked hard to make them fit the political realities of Japan rather than the requirements of Peking or Moscow.

## Tactical Flexibility

Finally abandoning its long preoccupation with theory, the party has concerned itself more and more with the practical problems of the average Japanese citizen. It has attempted to convince the public that, without abandoning its faith in Marxist-Leninist principles and its hope for the emergence of a socialist world, it is a Japanese political organization with firm roots in the Japanese soil and that it is concerned primarily with the building of the "good society" in Japan. Shunning violence and emphasizing goals which offer a common basis for common action with other opposition parties—"Peace, Independence, and Democracy" is the CPJ slogan—it has made strenuous efforts to gain political leverage through the creation of a broad united front.

So far, however, the obstacles to such a front have proved insurmountable. The conservative Liberal Democratic Party has had an almost uninterrupted monopoly of political power since the war, and the divided opposition forces have made little headway in their efforts to gain a majority in the Diet. At first glance, the largest opposition party, the Socialist Party, would seem the natural ally of the Communists. The Socialists believe in Marxism, view the world as being divided into socialist and capitalist camps (which are equated with peace and war, respectively), and oppose Japan's alliance with the United States. Although there have been numerous cases of local Socialist-Communist electoral alliances (which have proved quite effective), the Japanese Socialist leadership continues to reject the concept of a permanent, nationwide united front. Its reluctance is only partly based on the fear that an alliance would work to the advantage of the Communists, who are better organized and have greater financial resources at their disposal. The Socialist Party is plagued by deep-seated ideological divisions which are not unrelated to the issue of its relations with the Communists. Its right wing has always been anti-Communist and opposes collaboration with the CPJ, while its extreme left wing has fallen under the influence of China's Cultural Revolution and shares Mao's view of the present CPJ leadership as a crew of despicable "revisionists." Any attempt to forge a close alliance with the Communists on a permanent basis would thus risk splitting the Socialist Party. Such a split would benefit the Communists as well as the Democratic Socialist Party, a minor opposition party composed of staunchly anti-Communist moderates.

The second-largest and rapidly growing opposition party, the Komeito (Clean Government Party), has been something of a puzzle to everyone, including the Communists. It is an offshoot of the nationalist Sokagakkai Buddhist movement and serves as its political arm, but one cannot be sure where to place it in the Japanese political spectrum. Well-organized and well-financed like the CPJ, the Komeito is supported by many of the same groups to which the Communists direct their appeal: people baffled by the rapid pace of social and economic change or disgusted with political graft and corruption and those who value the psychological security derived from complete involvement in a purposeful group. In many ways the Communists see the Komeito as their most dangerous rival, one whose further progress might seriously hamper future Communist advances in Japan. Although the cooperation of the Komeito may well be crucial for the formation of a broad anti-government front, the Japanese Communists have gradually given up hope of being able to mobilize this movement for their purposes, and the relationship of the two parties has become one of open hostility. Under the conditions described, the Communists expect to have continued difficulty in bringing together the disparate elements which make up Japan's political opposition and are, therefore, concentrating on expanding their own popular base.

## Adjusting Foreign Ties

The CPJ's relations with the two power centers abroad, like its domestic policies, have gone through a number of adjustments since the 1961 Congress. In 1962 and early 1963, criticism of Khrushchev's ideological and policy positions and sympathy with Peking's orientation began to be expressed, culminating in the party's adoption of a substantially pro-Chinese stance that persisted well into 1965. From that year on, as has been mentioned, the CPJ shifted to an independent stand, with outspoken criticisms of the policy positions of both Moscow and Peking becoming more and more frequent.

In the 1960's Sino-Soviet rivalry over the orientation and allegiance of the Japanese Communists



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caused some organizational splits in the movement. In 1964, the pro-Moscow forces, led by the veteran of the prewar movement Yoshio Shiga, were forced out of the party when they insisted on giving public support to the nuclear test-ban treaty. Shiga thereupon established his own Communist organization, which promptly received Soviet support. Meanwhile, several high party posts were given to men who had either been trained in China or had Chinese sponsorship. Most of these were younger men, militant in the Peking manner.[13]

It was widely assumed when the party's "revisionist" elements were ousted that the organization had come under Peking's control, but from the beginning the majority of the party's established leadership appears to have quietly resisted the adoption of Peking's militant strategy. Memories of the failure of such a strategy ten years earlier no doubt had something to do with this cautious attitude. Finally, this quiet resistance changed into open refusal to allow Peking to dictate the CPJ's behavior when, in 1966, Mao Tse-tung launched his Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and attempted to mobilize the Japanese party for armed struggle against "U.S. imperialism." [14] To the surprise of many, the supporters of Peking's position were easily defeated in a test of strength that took place after the return of a high-level CPJ delegation from a mission to China early that year. At this point the break between Peking and Yoyogi became official.

[13] For some time they held such strategic positions as the editorship of the party organ *Akahata* and the directorships of the personnel and finance sections of the party.

[14] According to Kenji Miyamoto, the Chinese expressed the view that "the military strength of imperialism can be diverted more effectively by tens of thousands of people armed with weapons than by one million party members of mass movements" (*Akahata*, July 28, 1967).

## CHANGING IMAGE OF MOSCOW

As I look back on the past thirty years of our party life, I feel most keenly how absolutely essential it is to observe strictly the guiding principles of the knight of peace, the great leader of the workers, Comrade Josef Vissarionovich Stalin.

**—Secretary General Kyuichi Tokuda, in *Kaiho wo mezasu Nihon no tomo e* (To Our Japanese Comrades Seeking Liberation), Tokyo, Satsuki Shobo, 1952, p. 333.**

[The party] supports to the end the struggles which the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union, the Communists of the whole world, and the masses of all peoples are carrying on for the progress of mankind.

**—CPJ Central Committee, "Program of the Communist Party of Japan," *The VIII Congress of the Communist Party of Japan, July 25-31, 1961*, Tokyo, p. 11.**

Differences of view on a number of problems have once again appeared in the international Communist movement since the end of last year, in connection with the open criticism of fraternal parties at congresses of certain other fraternal parties . . . , [but] our party has consistently . . . adhered to an independent approach of not joining open controversies between fraternal parties.

**—*Akahata* (Red Flag, Tokyo), editorial of Jan. 24, 1963; as translated in the CC-CPJ's English-language *Bulletin—Information for Abroad* (Tokyo), February 1963, pp. 3-4.**

As accepted by every fraternal party, there is no party either to lead or to be led in the international Communist movement. With regard to the relationship between fraternal parties, no party can place itself above any of [the] other fraternal parties. Nor can any party force other parties [to] obey a certain party. . . .

**—*Akahata* editorial of Nov. 10, 1963; in *Bulletin—Information for Abroad*, December 1963, p. 8.**

. . . the cause of the strained relations between the Japanese and Soviet parties lies firstly in the fact that you [the CPSU] have unilaterally brought about an open debate within the international Communist movement and asked our party to follow you uncritically in this debate, and secondly in the fact that you have repeatedly made attacks on us by name, have engaged in unjustifiable interference in our internal affairs and in disruptive activities against our party. . . .

**—CC-CPJ letter of Aug. 18, 1964, responding to a CC-CPSU letter of April 18; in *Bulletin—Information for Abroad*, October 1964, p. 14.**

. . . it is not right to recognize a special position for that particular country and party [CPSU] and to force that party's line upon other parties. . . . To confuse these issues and to insist that since that party has played a great historical role or, objectively speaking, is now playing a big role, it is therefore [in the spirit of] proletarian internationalism to praise that party's actions unconditionally—such a position cannot stand up under scientific scrutiny.

**—CC report presented by Kenji Miyamoto to the 11th Party Congress, adopted on July 6, 1970. *Zen-ei* (Vanguard), August 1970, Special Issue, p. 108.**

. . . the leadership of the CPSU has learned no lessons from history, their "thought" has departed very far from Marxism-Leninism and from the principles of scientific socialism. . . .

**—"New Declaration of Great-Power Chauvinist Intervention," *Akahata*, Aug. 5, 1970.**



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Since then the Communist movement in Japan has been split three ways organizationally: on the right stands Shiga's pro-Moscow group (Voice of Japan), and at the other end of the spectrum, the Peking-supported Communist Party of Japan (Left),[15] both competing with the center, or "mainstream," Communist Party of Japan. But, if anything, the loss of a few thousand members and of some cadres has actually strengthened the CPJ. Having sloughed off its Moscow and Peking wings, it is now more homogeneous and is in a better position to pursue an autonomous course.

Soviet and Chinese attitudes toward these developments in Japan form an interesting contrast, reflecting the different nature of the two regimes. In early 1968, a high-level Soviet delegation under Presidium member Mikhail Suslov arrived in Tokyo to negotiate an understanding with the Japanese party. Until then the CPSU had thought it possible to maintain relations with the CPJ while at the same time encouraging the Shiga group to promote the Soviet viewpoint within leftist circles. The Japanese party, however, had moved a long way since the days of the Comintern and the Cominform criticism of 1950: its leaders adamantly refused to have any dealings with Moscow unless the CPSU pledged to withdraw its support from Shiga's Voice of Japan group. For a while it was believed in Tokyo that the Soviet leaders had accepted these conditions, but to judge by the rash of heated debates between the Soviet and the Japanese parties some months later, the Soviet Union remains reluctant to write off its supporters in Shiga's faction. It seems likely that Moscow de-

[15] Establishment of the "Communist Party of Japan (Left)" was announced in the *Peking Review* only in January 1970, although an autonomous pro-Peking faction had already been active in the CPJ for several years. Both the pro-Moscow and the pro-Peking organizations are numerically insignificant.

## NEW PERSPECTIVE ON PEKING

I feel keenly that the thought of Comrade Mao Tse-tung, who has applied Marxism-Leninism to the Chinese Revolution and has opened up a new path, constitutes also for us an indispensable guideline.

**—Secretary General Kyuichi Tokuda, in *Kaiho wo mezasu Nihon no tomo e* (To Our Japanese Comrades Seeking Liberation), Tokyo, Satsuki Shobo, 1952, pp. 333-34.**

. . . The Chinese Communist Party expresses full support for the just stand of the Japanese Communist Party and expresses boundless respect for the heroic struggle of the Japanese Communist Party and the Japanese people. The struggle which the Japanese Communist Party is carrying on to rid Japan of the domination of US imperialism and build up an independent, peaceful, democratic and neutral country proves that it is the resolute defender of the interests of the Japanese nation and people.

**—From the "Joint Statement by Communist Parties of China and Japan," *Peking Review* (Peking), Oct. 27, 1959, pp. 14-15.**

The strength of the CPJ has been growing rapidly. This is closely related to the fact that the Communist Party of Japan has been holding high the banner of Marxism-Leninism, has implemented a correct policy line, and has firmly stood in the very forefront of the struggle in Japan.

**—From a *Jen-min Jih-pao* editorial of June 16, 1961, translated in *Nihon kakumei no tembo to kokusai kyosanshugi undo* (Prospects for the Revolution in Japan and the International Communist Movement), Tokyo, CPJ Central Committee, 1961, p. 92.**

. . . fraternal solidarity binds the Communist Party and people of Japan inseparably with the Communist parties and peoples of China, Korea, Vietnam, Indonesia and other countries in Asia. This relationship will never change. . . .

**—Resolution of the Fifth Plenum of the CC-CPJ, Feb. 15, 1963, as translated in the CC's English-language *Bulletin—Information for Abroad*, March 1963, p. 14.**

Immediately before the 10th Party Congress [1966], the Mao Tse-tung clique of China started to engage openly in disruptive activities, in interference and subversion directed against our party. . . . Several Chinese delegations visiting Japan began to attack our party's program and policy line. The reason was that our party program does not take the armed struggle method adopted in the Chinese Revolution as a model for the revolutionary movement in Japan. . . . As for the so-called "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," whatever its contents, there would have been no particular need for us to criticize it, if it had remained a Chinese domestic issue. Nor did we intend to criticize it. But in interfering in our party, they tried to force through the proposition—not only within China, but internationally, and as one aspect of this also in our Japanese revolutionary movement—that the so-called Mao Tse-tung thought constitutes the highest principle of world revolution, that the Chinese revolutionary formula should be the revolutionary formula for all countries and that those who do not accept this proposition are nothing but counterrevolutionary elements and traitors. . . . We hope that the CCP will return as soon as possible to the line based on revolutionary spirit and modesty worthy of the history and traditions of the great Chinese Communist Party of the past.

**—CC report presented by Kenji Miyamoto to the 11th Party Congress, adopted on July 6, 1970. *Zen-ei* (Vanguard), August 1970, Special Issue, pp. 96, 105, 107.**



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cided to renege on its promise to the CPJ when the Japanese Communists not only persisted in criticizing openly the "revisionist" proclivities of the Soviet party, but went so far as to incorporate such statements in the major policy documents adopted by the 11th Party Congress.[16] This act provoked harsh attacks from official Soviet sources.[17] Nevertheless, the CPSU and the CPJ have not broken off relations. Communist representatives still visit the Soviet Union; Japanese Communist statements and writings —appropriately edited, of course—continue to appear in the Soviet and Soviet-sponsored press; and the Soviet party sent a congratulatory message to the 11th Party Congress. However, as if to make plain to everyone that relations with the CPSU remained to be normalized and that this normalization could only be effected if the Soviet party would sever its relation with the Shiga group, the CPJ leadership only made passing mention of the Soviet message at the Congress instead of reading it publicly, and when the CPJ published the document in the official party monthly *Zen-ei*, they assigned it a special place among the many congratulatory messages—at the very end.

## Peking Rupture

In contrast to Moscow's rather conciliatory attitude, the more militant Chinese Communist Party has broken off relations with the CPJ and declared open and all-out war on it. What Peking until a few years ago still called the "fraternal party" of Japan is now included among China's "four enemies" (together with US imperialism, Soviet revisionism, and the Sato government's so-called anti-China policies).[18] Presidium Chairman Miyamoto gave the 11th Congress a detailed account of the evolution of the difficulties with Peking. He recalled that when his delegation visited China in early 1966, the bilateral talks had concluded with the drafting of a joint communique supposedly acceptable to both sides. However, Mao Tse-tung, indignant that the proposed statement did not explicitly condemn the Soviet Union and its policies, had insisted on tearing up the document. Ever since this incident, said Miyamoto, the Chinese had mobilized all their resources to bring the Japanese party to heel: physical violence had been used against the party representatives in Peking (who had since been withdrawn); an intensive propaganda campaign had been launched against the CPJ leaders; organizational and financial support had been given to the pro-Peking faction in its fight against "Japanese [Communist] revisionism"; Communist front organizations in Japan had been split by the Chinese party's refusal to be in any way associated with the supporters of the CPJ; trade had been withheld from firms friendly to the party; and the Chinese had not hesitated to stir up the left-wing extremists in the Socialist Party so as to prevent any cooperation between the two Marxist parties.[19]

Despite the pressures described by Miyamoto, the CPJ has not buckled under and, on the contrary, has only reaffirmed more strongly its independence and national character. Soviet and Maoist writings have been removed from the shelves of Japanese Communist bookshops, leaving only the early Marx-

[16] Both Presidium Chairman Miyamoto's report to the 11th Congress and the formal Congress resolution contained sharp criticism of Soviet policies and referred to Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia as "aggression."

[17] The most recent and most severe appeared in *Partiinaia zhizn* (Moscow), No. 13, 1970.

[18] A joint statement issued in Peking on November 1, 1970, by a delegation of the Japanese Socialist Party and Chinese representatives of the China-Japan Friendship Association suggests at first glance a substantial softening of the Chinese anti-Yoyogi line since it does not label the Japanese party an "enemy" of China. A careful reading of the document, however, leaves little doubt that the basic attitude of Peking toward the Japanese party has not yet changed. This is also the CPJ leadership's interpretation, as reflected in a strong attack against the joint statement by the Chairman of the party's Policy Committee. (See *Akahata*, Nov. 3, 1970.)

[19] "Central Committee Report to the 11th Party Congress," *Zen-ei*, Special Party Congress Issue, August 1970, p. 104.

### SOCIALISM OR SOVEREIGNTY?

The situation in Hungary proves that peace cannot be preserved merely by standing on the side lines. Even President Tito, who is frequently critical of Soviet actions, not only recognized the existence of a real danger of counterrevolution in Hungary, but pointed out that the victory of counterrevolution there could lead to the danger of a third world war.

**—Kenji Miyamoto, "How to Evaluate the Hungarian Problem," *Waga to no tatakatta michi* (Our Party's Road of Struggle), Tokyo, CPJ-Central Committee, July 1961, p. 287.**

. . . the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the armed forces of the Soviet Union and the other four foreign powers was carried out without the request or consent of the party or government of Czechoslovakia. It is clearly an act of aggression violating the sovereignty of the Czechoslovak Republic.

**—"New Declaration of Great-Power Chauvinist Intervention," *Akahata* (Red Flag, Tokyo), Aug. 5, 1970.**



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ist classics and Lenin, along with a growing number of indigenous works, especially those written by the present party leadership. The CPJ also does not hesitate to voice open attacks on policies advocated by Moscow or Peking when they conflict with the party's basic line or with its assessment of the situation, domestic or international. Over the past several years, and particularly at the 11th Congress, an effort has been made to spell out the differences between the Japanese party and the two Communist world powers.

The Japanese Communists see the root of Communist disunity in Soviet and Chinese "great-power chauvinism," a term that constantly occurs in recent CPJ literature on international affairs. Many examples of such chauvinism are offered, but CPJ writers dwell in particular on what they call the "anachronistic" effort of the two big Communist powers to establish their hegemony over other Communist parties. Peking's attempts to enforce adherence to Maoist thought everywhere and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia are both held to be manifestations of the same phenomenon. Differences between fraternal parties, it is pointed out, cannot and ought not to be resolved forcibly but only through patient discussion. Khrushchev, the Japanese contend, clearly violated this norm by his public attack on Albania, thereby driving a wedge into the international revolutionary movement, and this act encouraged Peking to respond in kind.

The CPJ has also assailed other, more recent actions of the Soviet leadership as detrimental to the cause of Communist unity. Thus, it claims that Moscow's "arbitrary convocation" of the June 1969 conference of Communist parties only served to deepen the existing divisions in the anti-imperialist camp. The party has further stubbornly accused the Soviet leaders of clinging to the chauvinistic positions they inherited from Stalin in their refusal to return the southern part of the Kurile island chain, annexed by the Soviet Union at the end of World War II, to Japanese sovereignty. This issue was discussed at great length in a major article entitled "New Declaration of Great-Power Chauvinistic Intervention," published in *Akahata* on August 5, 1970. Refuting criticisms of the CPJ which had recently been published in *Partiinaia zhizn*, *Akahata* insisted that the handing over of the southern Kurile Islands to the USSR was "an unfair settlement" which violated the Cairo Declaration, and that its continuation does not reflect the will of the Japanese people.

The Chinese Communists, in the CPJ's view, have been no less guilty of extreme chauvinism than the Soviets and must share responsibility for the present sorry state of interparty relations in the Communist world. The Japanese party claims that "ultra-left opportunism" runs rampant in China, and that its expression in the "anti-socialist" Cultural Revolution has led the "Mao Tse-tung clique of the CCP" into all kinds of excesses, as evidenced by its subversive activity against the Japanese party. CPJ spokesmen have been especially critical of the Chinese party leaders' refusal to recognize the distinct and different situations in which the various Communist parties find themselves in their struggle for power, pointing to Peking's attempt to force a strategy of armed struggle upon the CPJ as evidence of Chinese Communist blindness.

### THE KURILES REVISITED

Thus, from whatever point of view one may choose to look at it, the question of the "northern territories" [Kurile Islands] has been settled.

**—CPJ Central Committee, *Nihon Kyosanto no seisaku* (The Policies of the CPJ), Tokyo, May 1962, p. 47.**

[Moscow] suggests that our party's stand on the Kurile Islands issue is one of the worst manifestations of anti-Soviet sentiments . . . [and] implies that merely to raise the question of a "return" of the islands would mean to make the error of giving support to the Japanese revanchists . . . [but] it is quite clear that the handing over of the Kurile Islands [after World War II] was an unfair act.

**—"New Declaration of Great-Power Chauvinist Intervention," *Akahata* (Red Flag, Tokyo), Aug. 5, 1970.**

## Target--US "Imperialism"

The Japanese further point out that the two major Communist powers have departed from Leninist norms to the point where they have actually engaged in military conflict. Not only, they insist, is such behavior inconceivable for truly socialist states, but, even worse, the Sino-Soviet confrontation diverts the resources of the Communist camp from the struggle against the principal enemy, U.S. imperialism. It is, indeed, on this key issue that the CPJ disagrees most profoundly with Soviet policy, and much of the controversy between the CPSU and the Japanese party in the past decade has centered on it. Ever since adoption of the current party program in 1961, the Japanese Communists, while recognizing the growing strength of "Japanese imperialism," have viewed



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it as subordinate to the power of "US imperialism." The Soviet position, on the other hand, has increasingly tended toward treatment of these two "enemies" as virtual equals as far as the danger they pose to the "forces of socialism" is concerned. Thus, a recent article in *Pravda* went so far as to state that "the Japanese ruling circles will now act not merely as the accomplice of the USA, but as an equal partner in a Japanese-American military bloc directed against the states that are Japan's neighbors, and above all against the countries of the socialist commonwealth." [20] The Soviets accuse the Japanese Communists of "beautifying Japanese militarism and imperialism," while the Japanese counter that the Soviets have played down and "beautified" US imperialism both in Japan and throughout the world. Ever since the days of Khrushchev, the CPJ asserts, the Soviet leaders have pursued an "unprincipled coexistence line," and all their initiatives involving agreements with the United States—particularly the nuclear test-ban and the subsequent nuclear non-proliferation treaty—have been tantamount to "an evasion of the struggle against US imperialism."

While the CPJ is thus very much at one with Peking in its assessment of US-Soviet relations, the party—in addition to its complaints against Chinese "ultra-left opportunism"—strongly disagrees with Mao's view of China as the focal point of the imperialist attack against the forces of socialism. The CPJ contends that the United States is carefully avoiding a direct confrontation with the two great Communist powers and trying to undermine the Communist camp by attacking its weaker members one by one. Herein, as the Japanese comrades see it, lies the significance of the war in Indochina, and Peking and Moscow ought to lay aside their differences at least temporarily in favor of full cooperation to bring about the defeat of imperialism in Vietnam. Accordingly, for some time now the CPJ has been calling for a conference of "all anti-imperialist forces of the five continents" to pave the way for a united front in Indochina—an appeal which, however, has found no response in Moscow or Peking.

The ease with which the CPJ was able to divest itself of its reformist and left-radical wings in the 1960's, despite their support by Moscow and Peking respectively, suggests that conditions in Japan are ripe for an autonomous Communist leadership. Moreover, in the light of the party's recent advances, it is no longer inconceivable that it will eventually supplant the Socialist Party as the major political alternative to the present conservative regime. The CPJ leaders realize, however, that the party's future prospects are closely dependent upon its continued success in adapting to Japanese conditions and maintaining its independence from foreign influence.[21] These conclusions were, in fact, already set forth quite clearly by Chairman Nosaka in 1967, on the occasion of the 45th anniversary of the party, when he declared:

*To hold fast to this autonomous and independent stand is the absolutely indispensable prerequisite for our party. . . . Revolution in Japan is something the Japanese people ought to achieve by themselves. In learning from the experiences and theories of foreign revolutionary movements, we must stand on a basis of independence and critical judgment. To apply foreign experience blindly and mechanically . . . will result in endless evils.*[22]

Only when Moscow and Peking accept this fact—as they are not now doing—will their relations with the CPJ be free of conflict and tension.

[20] "Dangerous Deal," *Pravda* (Moscow), Dec. 16, 1970, translated in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Jan. 13, 1970.

[21] The CPJ's assertion of independence from its traditional sponsors, Moscow and Peking, is also reflected in the intensification and diversification of the party's relations with other independent-minded parties in Asia and Europe, among them the Communist parties of North Korea and North Vietnam as well as the Italian and Romanian Communist parties.

[22] *Akahata*, July 16, 1967.



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# PKI Fortunes at Low Tide

**By Ruth T. McVey**

*In the past year we have fought in many places and are keenly aware that the revolutionary tide is on the ebb in the country as a whole. . . . Wherever the Red Army goes, the masses are cold and aloof, and only after our propaganda do they slowly move into action. . . . We have an acute sense of our isolation which we keep hoping will end.*[1]

Thus Mao Tse-tung, writing from the underground following the massive defeat of the Communist Party at the hands of Chiang Kai-shek in 1927. Today, five years after its equally spectacular collapse, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) could make a similarly discouraging assessment of its prospects. The party's best-known leaders are dead, imprisoned, or in hiding; its forces have been able to establish themselves only in remote rural areas, and there but fleetingly; and the mass of its former adherents desire only to be spared persecution and the horrors of civil war. The New Order government of General Suharto has no effective opposition, and the army presents a formidable threat to any group that would seek to overthrow the regime. From the PKI's viewpoint it is a dark time, and the signs of coming dawn are few.

If to the harried Communists the task of securing the regime's overthrow seems overwhelming, the leaders of the government manifest considerable uneasiness: official accounts of Communist setbacks are balanced by revelations of PKI or "Sukarnoist" penetration of this or that branch of national activity, by descriptions of discoveries of terrorist gangs and secret societies devoted to the revolutionary cause, and by announcements of the purging from this or that army division of members found to be involved in subversive activity. The social and economic problems of the country are huge and, unless solved, might undermine the loyalty of the population. The Communists have risen from defeat before,[2] and each time have grown more powerful. Should control appear to be slipping from the regime's hands at any time, they will surely present themselves as a claimant to power.

## Policy of Order and Growth

In order to understand better the choices open to the government and the Communists, let us first consider the means by which the New Order has sought to attract and control the loyalty of the population. The Suharto regime bases its claim to rule on its ability to preserve internal order, if need

[1] "The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains," November 25, 1928, in Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, Peking, Foreign Language Press, 1965, Vol. I, pp. 97-98.

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[2] The party was founded as the Indies Social Democratic Association (ISDV) in 1914 and became the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in 1920. It was legal until it attempted a revolt in 1926-27. Thereafter the PKI existed as a largely dormant underground movement until regaining legality in October 1945 upon the outbreak of the Indonesian revolution. In the 1948 "Madiun Affair" the PKI revolted against the republican government, which it saw as having sold out to the West, and in the bloody aftermath of the affair most of the party's leaders were killed. The Dutch overran the territory of the Republic shortly thereafter, however, and the PKI earned sufficient credit as a nationalist force in the subsequent independence struggle to be granted legal status when the Dutch were driven out in 1950.



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be by use of massive force, and on its success in fostering economic development. After the inflation, agitation and uncertainty of the Sukarno years, and particularly after the massive bloodletting in 1965 which marked the end of Guided Democracy—the political system which followed the collapse of parliamentary democracy in the late 1950's—there is a genuine desire for general social peace. This is most obvious among those who fear a renewal of leftist agitation, but it is also common among the large number of nonrevolutionary PKI adherents who want, most of all, to be spared any further reprisals. The depoliticization of Indonesia, which has been a major goal of the Suharto regime, is therefore not in itself an unpopular course. Under the New Order, politics has been removed from the mass arena and made the prerogative of select elites, in particular the bureaucratic and military leaders. The two most important potential political channels for the expression of discontent—the PKI and the Masjumi Party—are illegal.[3] Representative assemblies function essentially as advisory councils to the real holders of power, and even legal political activity operates under comprehensive political guidelines. At the same time the government permits criticism by legally recognized groups and by elements—such as students—which are important symbols of the New Order regime's legitimacy but do not posess the kind of mass following that might pose a threat to government control.

The second policy on which the government has staked its survival is economic development, hoping through economic growth to break the perceived link between poverty, communism, and resurgence of the revolutionary left. More immediately, the government needs improved economic performance in order to generate sufficient benefits to satisfy the aspirations and reward the loyalty of those who share power in the New Order—particularly the military and the bureaucracy. The regime is strongly committed to individual enterprise and economic rationalization, and hopes to unleash economic initiative at home while encouraging foreign investment in Indonesia. The socialist, anti-Western slogans of the Sukarno era are no longer heard, but should the New Order's endeavor fall short of the mark, such appeals will doubtless be revived by the radical opposition as it seeks to link its claim to the future with the revolutionary traditions of the past.

An economic setback severe enough to give rise to serious political disaffection is a real possibility. Mismanagement under Guided Democracy was only one aspect of Indonesia's economic predicament in the 1960's; more fundamental trends of rapid population growth and declining world prices for Indonesian export crops have plagued the country's regimes since early in the current century. The New Order has enacted strenuous deflationary measures and enlisted significant foreign aid in order to stabilize Indonesia's currency and lay the groundwork for a cautious program of growth which should stave off major economic trouble in the short term. But the country is already experiencing an explosive expansion of unemployment,[4] and even with the best of luck and management the government will have to employ considerable stringency to maintain a rate of economic growth which can keep pace with Indonesia's burgeoning population. It will be difficult for rulers and ruled alike to maintain such discipline.

In light of these major economic and social problems, it is understandable that the government is quick to perceive signs of disaffection as "guerrilla politics" requiring prompt eradication, and exhibits particular uneasiness concerning the regime's own center of support—the military—which has been subjected to numerous purges since the 1965 coup. Both the government and its foes know that any move to upset the New Order must first destroy the army's unity. Prior to the coup, the number of officers considered to be sympathetic to the PKI was minimal, although many were devoted to Sukarno. By defining Sukarno and "Sukarnoism" as enemies of progress in 1966, the regime widened the circle of potentially disloyal officers. Moreover, the government has to reckon that its economic liberalism and courting of foreign investments will alarm those persons attached to Indonesia's nationalist revolutionary past, an attachment particularly strong in the military. Thus, officers dissatisfied with their place in the New Order find it natural to attack the regime for "deviations from the revolution," for which they, in turn, are attacked as Sukarnoists or Communists. In addition, ambitious officers are

[3] The Masjumi Party, based ideologically on modernist Islam and the only major Indonesian party with massive support beyond Java, was banned in 1960 for refusing to accede to Sukarno's conditions for participation in Guided Democracy. Under the New Order the army has opposed resurrection of the Masjumi Party because of the organization's sympathies with the religious and regional rebellions of the 1950's. As a compromise, an Indonesian Muslim Party (PMI) was legalized, but no prominent Masjumi leaders were allowed to take leading roles in it.

[4] The postrevolutionary "baby boom" is now flooding the Indonesian labor market. From 1970 to 1977 Indonesia must provide an additional one million new jobs a year—unlikely in the face of existing unemployment or underemployment.



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tempted to undermine superiors by charging them with pro-Communist subversive activities.

While purges of the military have produced extraordinary mobility in the officers' corps and thus relieved the frustrations of those long awaiting promotion, the continued branding as Communist of men who have lost out in the intramilitary struggle is likely to have adverse effects. So long as the PKI is perceived as isolated, anti-national, and against the army, an officer will hardly cast his lot with the party. But if communism becomes identified as the only real opposition to the ongoing order, if it is linked with radical nationalism of the Sukarno tradition, and if officers of hitherto unquestioned soldierly reputation are declared to have thrown in with it, affiliation with the PKI becomes more "thinkable." In this regard, it is notable that a number of military men were arrested in recent roundups of PKI underground groups.[5] Although some of the individual charges may have been unjustified, the scale of the arrests indicates considerable contact between army members and the illegal opposition. It seems likely, if ironic, that the government anti-Communist campaigns have contributed more to the image of the PKI as the voice of the Indonesian revolutionary opposition than any efforts which the Indonesian Communist Party itself has been able to muster in the aftermath of the 1965 coup.

## The 1965 Debacle

The circumstances of the October 1965 coup are far from clear, and their obscurity to members of the party itself contributed to post-coup PKI dissension and leaderlessness. What the coup did illustrate was the danger for the PKI of concentrating on aboveground activity and maneuvering within the political elite while at the same time pursuing social revolutionary goals. The first meant that the party had to compromise its class appeal for the sake of political deals, and that it was weaponless and exposed in a time of crisis; the second meant that it was never trusted by the great part of Indonesia's postrevolutionary elite, the conservative elements of which began to unite behind the army as the final bulwark against social upheaval. The rapid increase of social and economic tensions in 1965—the final year of Guided Democracy—made all contestants aware that the existing power balance could not last, and they maneuvered feverishly to secure a favorable resolution of the deadlock.

It is reasonable to suppose that the Indonesian army leaders made plans for their accession to power in case of Sukarno's death or disability, and it is possible—though the evidence for it consists largely of their opponents' accusations—that they also considered plans to depose him, given the insecure state of the nation and Sukarno's increasingly evident intention of making sure his reign was followed by a leftist and not a military regime. But it is by no means apparent that, as the coup leaders proclaimed, they rescued the President from an imminent generals' coup, for those who provided the army's political leadership at that time and who were the targets of the coup group's action were all at home the night of the move and were thus easily seized—an unguarded posture quite uncharacteristic of purported plotters.

Similarly, it is altogether likely that the PKI and Sukarno were considering ways to get rid of the current army leadership, and it is quite possible—though the evidence for this consists largely of testimony sponsored by the post-coup regime—that the Communists thought to hasten the process by encouraging subordinate officers to rebel, for the rejection of unpopular or politically unacceptable superiors was a familiar occurrence in Indonesian military history. However, it is far from clear that the PKI masterminded the move by Lt. Col. Untung's "September 30 Movement," as the army was to claim. For one thing, the Communist Party's response to the coup was completely dysfunctional: party leadership was virtually missing, and the PKI cadres neither backed the affair with massive demonstrations of "the people's will" nor endeavored to keep their skirts clean, but rather varied in their reactions from nervous withdrawal to opportunistic enthusiasm. Secondly, the maneuver centered on presenting Sukarno with the *fait accompli* of a murdered army leadership in the belief that he would endorse the deed and start a Sukarnoist steamroller against the demoralized remains of the military opposition. This expectation did not fit with Sukarno's character or past pattern of reaction to crisis—to which the PKI leadership was naturally well attuned—nor did Sukarno's evident ignorance of the plot square with PKI sponsorship, which, in view of Aidit's close, cooperative relationship to the President, made the surprise approach as unnecessary as it was unwise.

[5] By 1969, the Brawidjaja (East Java) divisional commander estimated some 1,500 soldiers of his division alone had been arrested for involvement in the Communist underground during the previous year (*Angkatan Bersendjata* [Djakarta], May 5, 1969). For other accounts of military involvement in East Java PKI activities, see the sources referenced in footnote 11.



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Finally, most of the coup leaders had served under General Suharto, who commanded troops and communications facilities vital to control of the capital, and they did not interfere in his activities at the time of the coup, evidently assuming he would be friendly to their cause as well as acceptable to Sukarno. In fact, Suharto was too strong-willed for Sukarno, who sought a weak man as army head, a goal which the PKI had every reason to share.

When faced with the crisis, Sukarno endorsed neither the coup group nor Suharto but attempted to make the most of the situation by appointing the more pliable General Pranoto as acting army chief. It was a fatal mistake, for Suharto had military control of the capital; he proceeded to seize the power that had been officially denied him, and control of the country besides. The whole structure of Guided Democracy and the system of protection and patronage under which the PKI had flourished thereupon collapsed like a house of cards. Party leaders urged their following to keep calm and trust Sukarno (who remained in office, if not in power, for five more months) to settle affairs. The inadequacy of this advice in the face of a rapidly developing reaction greatly embittered those PKI cadres who survived. The Communists' opponents, too long used to the party's ability to maneuver out of tight political situations, were determined to eliminate it once and for all, and the high degree of social tension in the countryside made it easy for the liquidation campaign to become a major massacre. Estimates of the dead range from several hundred thousand to a million persons; these were by no means all Communists (though the party claimed over three million members at the time) or even adherents of PKI mass organizations, for much of the violence consisted of communal killings in which Christians, Chinese, members of local minorities, and heterodox Muslims were victims. Most of the Aidit leadership, including the party chairman himself, vanished in the slaughter, but such was the feeling of failure and abandonment among the surviving PKI members that their demise brought little mourning.[6]

## Continuing Disarray

The PKI has not yet shown signs of organizational recovery from the effects of the 1965 disaster. The bulk of its pre-coup leaders have been executed, imprisoned, or driven into exile, leaving authority relationships diffuse and unclear. Those leaders who survived have felt constrained to preside over the renunciation of the Aidit line of peaceful and legal pursuit of power and the adoption of a new, clearly Maoist ideology of armed insurrection, a shift occasioned both by the realities of government repression and by the party membership's natural rejection of a line which had brought disaster. Denied participation in legal political processes, the Communists have been forced into clandestine operations. The extensive and relatively well-organized apparatus maintained by the PKI before the coup has been decimated, its cadres scattered into isolated underground cells and guerrilla movements constantly subject to government discovery and disbandment. Large segments of the party's once massive popular following have drifted away in order to escape reprisals.

### THE AIDIT ERA

. . . if it depends on the Communists, the best way, the ideal way, for transition to the system of people's democratic power . . . is the way of peace, the parliamentary way.

**—D. N. Aidit, "Revolusi Oktober dan Rakjat-Rakjat Timur" (The October Revolution and the Peoples of the East), *Bintang Merah* (Djakarta), October-November 1957.**

The lessons of the recent Brazilian reactionary coup [1964—Ed.] . . . show how dangerous it is to emphasize one-sidedly and give prominence to the "peaceful road," [just] as the experience of the Indonesian people themselves has also proved that only when they do not give up the weapons in their hands, can they carry the struggle against imperialism and old and new colonialism through and win success.

**—Resolution of the First National Conference of the Indonesian Communist Party, in *Harian Rakjat* (Djarkarta), July 15, 1964, as reported in *Peking Review*, July 24, 1964, p. 14.**

The September 30 [1965] event is an internal affair of the army, and the Indonesian Communist Party will not intervene. . . .

**—Letter from D. N. Aidit in *Djalan Rakjat* (Surabaya), Oct. 6, 1965, as reported in *Peking Review*, Oct. 22, 1965, p. 9.**

[6] The author has dealt somewhat more circumstantially with the events of the coup and the background of its leaders in "Indonesian Communism and China," in Tang Tsou, *Ed., China in Crisis*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1968, Vol. II, pp. 377-389, and is preparing a detailed work on the affair. The great majority of the accounts of the coup published thus far follow the present Indonesian government's view, namely, that the PKI was behind the coup. The best presentation of this argument is one sponsored by the Indonesian army itself: Nugroho Notosusanto and Ismail Saleh, *The Coup Attempt of the "September 30 Movement" in Indonesia*, Djakarta, Pembimbing, 1968.



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An important factor in the party's disarray, beyond the heavy toll exacted by government repression, was the painful matter of re-evaluating the leadership and line provided by D. N. Aidit from 1951 to 1965. For those 15 years there was very little outright disaffection within PKI ranks concerning the obvious contradiction between the party's international attacks, in the context of the Sino-Soviet dispute, on the revisionists' (Moscow's) suggestion of the possibility of pursuing a peaceful road to socialism and the fact that the PKI's own pursuit of power by legal, parliamentary means was essentially "revisionist." [7] True, there were indications of strong intra-party objections to Aidit's decision to endorse Guided Democracy in 1959, and, as post-coup detractors within the party have claimed, there were misgivings about the PKI's reluctance to press fully the land reform issue or to attack corruption within the Guided Democracy leadership. But these doubts were offset by the successes, including a major increase in membership, which the PKI scored during a decade and a half of legal existence. The apparent ability of Aidit and his colleagues to divide and outbluff the PKI's enemies, finding room for maneuver in situations offering little visible opportunity for gain, served to allay the reservations of fellow PKI members about the wisdom of relying on a legal mass organization and the peaceful road to power. However, with disaster came disgrace. Although the surviving members of the Aidit leadership tried for a time to preserve some continuity with the past and to ease the revision of course which events seemed to dictate, declarations emerging from the underground soon grew sharply critical of those who had led the party to ruin, accusing them not simply of strategic errors, but of personal corruption, arrogance and overweening ambition.[8]

While it is far from evident that any one particular PKI group has gained broad control over the shattered remnants of the Communist movement in Indonesia, it seems clear enough that the course generally accepted by the post-coup Communists as the road to power is one of preparation for the armed overthrow of the New Order regime. The most authoritative PKI doctrinal statement to appear since 1965 was the "self-criticism" issued in the name of the party Politburo in September 1966. It provided a theoretical grounding for the new line by arguing that the Aidit leadership had collaborated with the national bourgeoisie and Sukarno and had emphasized the international struggle instead of the domestic class struggle; trusting to legality and elite alliances, the Aidit-led party had been unwilling to organize peasant unrest and had been unprepared for counterrevolutionary violence. The only true road to power, the "self-criticism" declared, was to establish a "revolutionary united front" under Communist leadership, which would aim at an agrarian revolution and a people's democratic regime.[9]

## Maoism in Vogue

It is apparent from the analyses presented by the "self-criticism," from the strategy of armed action adopted by the Blitar group (see below), from the statements of assorted captured Communists, and from the overwhelming inclination of Indonesian leftist exiles, that the revolutionary struggle is now conceived in Maoist terms. This is not surprising, given China's relative proximity and the great stress placed on Maoist thought, at least in doctrinal pronouncements, even during the Aidit period. The Soviet Union has sought to discredit Maoism in

[7] For discussion of the strategy and organization of the PKI in the parliamentary period, see Donald Hindley, *The Communist Party of Indonesia 1951-1963*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1964; Guy J. Pauker, "Indonesian Communism's Road to Power," in Robert Scalapino, Ed., *Communist Revolution in Asia*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1965; and the author's "Indonesian Communism and the Transition to Guided Democracy," in A. Doak Barnett, Ed., *Communist Strategies in Asia*, New York, Praeger, 1963.

[8] Several major PKI policy statements after the coup were published abroad in the *Indonesian Tribune*, a journal set up in Albania at the end of 1966. The statements were also circulated in Indonesia, and were apparently considered authentic by the authorities there. The most bitter and thorough attack on the PKI's pre-coup line was the "self-criticism" of September 1966, "Build the PKI along the Marxist-Leninist Line to Lead the People's Democratic Revolution in Indonesia" (*Indonesian Tribune*, Vol. I, No. 3, January 1967, pp. 6-29). A portion of this document is also provided in Herbert Feith and Lance Castles, Eds., *Indonesian Political Thinking*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1970, pp. 270-81.

[9] "Build the PKI . . . ," *supra*. The document appears to have originated in an underground group active in Djakarta in 1966 and centered around former PKI Politiburo member Sudisman. Although Sudisman claimed responsibility for it when tried before a military tribunal in 1967, the bitter references to Aidit in the "self-criticism" contrast sharply with Sudisman's own sentimental courtroom reminiscences about his former leader. (The author is grateful to Donald Hindley for providing her a typescript copy of Sudisman's speech at his trial.) The sharp denunciations of Aidit doubtless reflected the views of more militant members of the Sudisman group. The fact that no major party statement of policy has been published abroad or reported in the Indonesian press since 1966 suggests that either the Sudisman "self-criticism" provided such a clear guideline that successive party high commands saw no need to issue new declarations, or else new leadership groupings have been wary of laying public claim to national command because their leadership might not be widely accepted by underground groups or because their eventual arrest might damage general leftist morale.



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Indonesia by blaming it for the disaster which befell the PKI in 1965, but Indonesian party members have instead denounced Aidit for ignoring the Maoist doctrine which he mouthed while actually pursuing power by peaceful and parliamentary means.

In adopting Maoist strategy, the Communists reject Aidit's view that the Indonesian terrain is ill suited for guerrilla operations; they now seem to concur in the estimate of Aidit's archenemy, General Nasution, who found Indonesia well suited to guerrilla warfare.[10] Nevertheless, it is not clear how faithfully the Maoist doctrine of rural-based armed struggle is to be followed in practice. The Sudisman group—which claimed to have originated the 1966 "self-criticism"—centered its activities in the capital in spite of its doctrinal emphasis on agrarian revolution; likewise, many recent arrests of PKI leaders have taken place in large cities. Closer to doctrinal prescriptions was the Blitar-based rural organization destroyed in 1968. There, the PKI seems to have infused the peasants with remarkable self-confidence, which was first evidenced in increased industry in tilling the fields and then in assassinations of local officials and religious notables. Interestingly, the army claimed that this group had constructed miles of tunnels in Viet Cong fashion.[11] While this report may be dramatization, it would be reasonable to expect the PKI to draw tactical inspiration from the guerrilla struggle in Vietnam, where geographic conditions more closely approximate those of Indonesia than is the case with China.

In spite of the rejection of the former line and leadership, a number of persons identified with the pre-coup PKI Politburo and Central Committee apparently held high places in underground groupings in the first years following the coup. As this estimate is based on army announcements of the activities of well-known PKI leaders still at large and the status attributed to those who have been captured, it may be overstated due to the government's desire to keep reminding the populace of the magnitude of the Communist threat and to claim another victory over the Communist underground. On the other hand, it seems likely that, in a period when no leadership has any particular claim to dominate the party and when communication within party ranks is, at best, tenuous, persons who were widely known would retain a fair amount of leverage, particularly if they were willing to disassociate themselves from the past. Gradually, however, their ranks have been thinned by death or arrest, while the emergence of new cadres—skilled in illegal operations—will inevitably pose a challenge to their position.

Party chiefs of the Aidit era, including former Politburo member Sudisman, played leading roles in

[10] A. H. Nasution, *Pokok-pokok Gerilja* (On Guerrilla Warfare), Djakarta, Pembimbing, 1954, pp. 48-50. Colonel (later General) Nasution headed the Indonesian Army during most of the pre-1965 period.

[11] For accounts of the Blitar insurgency and its suppression, see *Sinar Harapan* (Djakarta), May 10 and Aug. 2, 1968; *Pelopor Baru* (Djakarta), Aug. 2, 1968; *Api Pantjasila* (Djakarta), Aug. 9, 1968; *Kompas* (Djakarta), Aug. 14, 1968; *Berita Yudha* (Djakarta), Aug. 23, 1968; and *Ampera* (Djakarta), Aug. 23, 1968.

## TOEING A MAOIST LINE

The tasks faced by the party for leading the people's democratic revolution to victory are: . . . to be ready to lead a protracted armed struggle which is integrated with the agarian revolution of the peasants in the countryside. . . .

**—From an Aug. 17, 1966, statement of the CC-Politburo of the Indonesian Communist Party, quoted from the *Indonesian Tribune* (Tirana) in the *Peking Review*, July 14, 1967, p. 21.**

Modern revisionism began to penetrate into our party when the fourth plenary session of the Central Committee of the Fifth Congress [1956] uncritically approved a report which supported the lines of the 20th CPSU Congress and adopted the line of "achieving socialism peacefully through parliamentary means" as the line of the PKI. This "peaceful road" . . . was further reaffirmed at the Sixth National Congress of the PKI [1959]. . . . This revisionist line was further emphasized at the Seventh National Congress of the PKI [1962] and was never corrected. . . .

To achieve its complete victory, the Indonesian revolution must also follow the road of the Chinese revolution. This means that the Indonesian revolution must inevitably adopt this main form of struggle, namely, the people's armed struggle against the armed counterrevolution which, in essence, is the armed agrarian revolution of the peasants under the leadership of the proletariat. . . . The experience of the struggle of the party in the past has shown how indispensable it is for the Indonesian Marxist-Leninists . . . to devote special attention to studying the thought of Mao Tse-tung, who has succeeded in inheriting, defending and developing Marxism-Leninism to its peak in the present era.

**—From the "Self-Criticism" of the CC Politburo of the PKI (the Sudisman leadership—Ed.), September 1966, as quoted from the *Indonesian Tribune* in *Peking Review*, July 21, 1967, pp. 14-15, 20.**

The Indonesian Marxist-Leninists accept without the slightest hesitation Mao Tse-tung's thought, the acme of Marxism-Leninism of the present day. . . . The struggle for Indonesia's liberation will inevitably follow the road of people's war charted by Mao Tse-tung.

**—Statement of the CC Politburo of the PKI, May 23, 1967, as reported by exiled Politburo member Jusuf Adjitorop in *Peking Review*, March 1, 1968.**



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a major underground PKI organization centered in Djakarta in the year following the 1965 coup. Just how wide a circle the Sudisman group comprised is not clear. Evidently it included party members from West Java, who strongly supported de-Aiditization in the debates preceding the issuance of the September 1966 "self-criticism." The Sudisman leadership also reportedly sponsored at least four meetings of underground cadres in Central Java.[12] However, its control, and even its contacts, may not have extended much beyond these neighboring areas.

Pre-coup party leaders also figured in the only other major PKI underground group about whose activities we have more than a passing knowledge—the rural-based movement which arose in 1967 near Blitar in East Java and was moving toward armed action when it was discovered and destroyed in mid-1968. The leader of the Blitar movement was reportedly B. O. Hutapea, an important figure from the Aidit leadership, and a number of those actually arrested in connection with the movement had been prominent in pre-coup party organizations.[13] Underground groups have also been reported in Central Java, with leadership sometimes attributed to Rewang, who headed the party organization there until 1965, but who has since been reported killed. In addition, a plethora of smaller groups under less prominent party leaders have been reported.[14] A number of these have been reported outside of Java; indeed, a principal area of guerrilla activity in the first two years following the coup was in West Kalimantan (Borneo), where partisan groups, originally trained by the Indonesian army to carry out Sukarno's former policy of confrontation with Malaysia, engaged in insurrection under PKI leaders after Sukarno's downfall. They gained additional strength from the local Chinese minority, which was subjected to severe persecution initiated by the regional army command and which was therefore more willing than it has been elsewhere in Indonesia to support rebellion. Indonesian and Malaysian troops have cooperated in combatting this movement, but have apparently been unable to totally eradicate it.[15]

## Traditions of the Underground

The reports of post-coup Communist activity portray a dispersed, uncoordinated underground movement. The physical difficulty of carrying on resistance against a regime which is without any effective opposition and which is determined to eliminate forcibly any threat to its security requires localization of efforts and minimization of contact among such illegal groups. This localization is further intensified by the high degree of regional differentiation in Indonesia, where even ethnically homogeneous areas contain diverse social alignments, customs and pressures, and hence provide differing possible bases for guerrilla activity. It should also be noted that reported "Communist armed attacks" may be the work of bandits rather than of guerrillas, the title "Communist" having been either affixed by local authorities to explain their apparent inability to prevent such raids, or adopted by the bandits themselves to attract local sympathy. On the other hand, banditry is a traditional expression of social dislocation in some areas of Indonesia. It was not uncommon for nationalist political organizations to draw support from outlaw bands during the 1945-49 revolution. Likewise today, when they have been driven into an outlaw existence, the Communists can be expected to recruit existing outlaw bands to their cause, as appears to have been the case in Blitar and later in Central Java.[16]

[12] The Sudisman group was broken up by arrests in December 1966 and January 1967, and reportedly included Sujono Pradigdo, Anwar Sanusi, Sukatno, Anwar Nasution, Robbi Sumolang, and B. O. Hutapea. See *Triskati* (Djakarta), June 8, 1966; *Djihad* (Djakarta), June 7, 1966; and *Sinar Harapan,* Jan. 18 and Feb. 12, 1967, for data on PKI activity in the early post-coup period.

[13] B. O. Hutapea, reported killed in the East Java roundup, was a prominent intellectual who in the Aidit era was on the PKI Central Committee, chaired the Aliarcham Academy (the Higher Party School), and served on the editorial board of the party journal *Bintang Merah.* If Hutapea did, indeed, head the Blitar movement, it would be an unusual example of a Sumatran being chosen to lead the struggle in the linguistically and socially different area of East Java in preference to a logical local candidate such as Tjugito.

[14] Among the other groups reported to be engaged in armed action about this time were the November 12 Movement (Gerakan 12 November) in North Sumatra (*Suluh Marhaen,* [Djakarta] Oct. 17 and Nov. 21, 1967); the People's Liberation Army (Tentara Pembebasan Rakjat) in West Java (*Sinar Harapan,* Nov. 4, 1967; *Mahasiswa Indonesia* [West Java edition, Bandung], Nov. 12, 1967; and *Suluh Marhaen,* Oct. 27, 1967); and resistance groups in South Central Java (*Api Pantjasila* Aug. 2, 1968; *Berita Yudha,* Aug. 20, 1968; and *Harian KAMI* [Djakarta], July 18, 1968). The exile publication *Suara Pemuda Indonesia* (Peking) published a map of Indonesia showing areas of resistance in East Java (March 25, 1968, p. 21). For a chronicle of reported PKI underground activities, see Justus M. van der Kroef, "Indonesian Communism Since the 1965 Coup," *Pacific Affairs* (Vancouver), Spring 1970, pp. 34-60.

[15] For accounts of the West Kalimantan insurgency, see *Berita Yudha,* Oct. 9-12, 1967; *Kompas,* Nov. 15, 1967; *Angkatan Bersendjata,* Jan. 30 and 31, 1968; *Merdeka* (Djakarta), Feb. 2, 1968; *Harian KAMI,* Aug. 10, 1968; *Angkatan Bersendjata,* Sept. 13, 1968; *Api Pantjasila,* Nov. 13, 19, and 20, 1969. The party leader of this resistance was reportedly S. A. Sofjan, who had been PKI head of the West Kalimantan region before the coup and a candidate member of the Central Committee.

[16] See *Harian KAMI,* July 18, 1968, and *Sinar Harapan,* May 18, 1968.



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In order to form a picture of the probable situation of the Indonesian Communist underground, it may be helpful to consider the methods of organization and communication commonly employed by illegal Indonesian political movements. It was typical of illegal or hard-pressed organizations of the colonial period (including the illegal PKI) to keep themselves alive in the form of local conspiratorial groups comprising people who had (or who soon developed) close personal ties.[17] Very often these cells were oriented about a particular leader who was as much a spiritual *guru* as a political chief. The groups maintained a loose liaison through members who elected to travel from one town to another, attaching themselves temporarily to local leaders, imparting news of the wider movement, and acquainting themselves with local experience.

The underground groups generally eschewed actual rebellious activity and rarely even developed concrete programs or plans of action. Instead, they engaged in endless studies and discussions concerning the political situation, "gathering strength" for the Day when it would at last be time to move. This contemplation of the revolutionary navel was, in the first place, less dangerous than action, while it provided strongly disaffected people with a feeling of solidarity and participation in a movement aimed, ultimately, at the overthrow of the "intolerable" order. It also fitted the traditional Indonesian view that power is acquired by spiritual preparation, and that momentous change—dynastic overthrow or, in this case, revolution—is an apocalyptic event which programmatic activity can neither hasten nor prevent. While the inward-directed efforts of the underground groups constituted no immediate threat to the established order, their significance was considerable as soon as power came into dispute in the revolutionary period. Their organizational skeleton and the ready-built cadre linked by past loyalties served as the nucleus for the radical parties and movements which began to emerge and to compete for power.

It is probably safe to say that much of the PKI's following today tends to lead an essentially similar existence. Party leaders attempting to establish a revolutionary apparatus today will have to reckon with this proclivity among their potential followers, just as they must cope with the fact that Indonesia, unlike China and Vietnam, has not had a tradition of secret societies, and that it has always been hard for the party to instill in members a proper concern with preserving silence about its affairs. To the government, a loose and incoherent Communist underground mass presents little in the way of an immediate threat, and its manifestations can be dealt with one at a time. On the other hand, headless monsters cannot be beheaded, and the government's concern for cutting off all possible sources of Communist recrudescence has led to the destabilizing practice of constant new arrests.

If, as it appears, the PKI has indeed dispersed into groupings such as those described above, it has undergone a considerable deterioration from the standards the Aidit leadership tried to set in terms of organization and action. In the 1951-65 period the PKI sought to provide its adherents with the ability to deal with their environment through proper education and organization. This is not to say the PKI was a highly disciplined Bolshevik-type organization—as a mass party operating in a largely illiterate environment, it was very far from being a model *apparat*. But the party's emphasis on developing skills in organization, social analysis, accounting, or just plain literacy answered well the need for organizational structure and principles of control felt by Indonesians caught in a disoriented "post-traditional" situation,[18] and was probably a central reason for the PKI's rapid expansion prior to the 1965 coup.

The commitment by PKI adherents to such a disciplined organization was doubtless weakened by the violence of the official and unofficial repression, the reversal of the ideological line, and the general sense of drift in party affairs which ensued from the 1965 setback. Moreover, it is common enough for participants in bureaucratically organized "modern" movements to regress into less coherent organizational patterns when subjected to severe defeat, a tendency which the clientele of Indonesian communism has exhibited throughout its history and which is strengthened by vigorous native messianic traditions. Thus, following the 1965 coup, a number of mystical groupings using Sukarnoist and/or Communist symbols emerged—some of a pronounced millenarian strain. The government, like earlier, colonial regimes, has viewed such mystical movements as veiled expressions of revolutionary intent and has moved strongly against unorthodox religious groups even

[17] The description of underground characteristics provided here is based on the author's interviews in 1964-65 with participants in the illegal PKI, PNI Baru, and Tan Malaka movements of the 1930's.

[18] For a discussion of Javanese society as largely "post-traditional," *i.e.*, a society in which traditional norms and values are no longer adequate but modern equivalents have not been developed, see Clifford Geertz, *The Social History of an Indonesian Town*, Cambridge, MIT Press, 1965, pp. 1-13.



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


when they have not been overtly political.[19] The most spectacular suppression was the violent elimination of the mBah Suro movement by paratroopers in 1967—the severity of the government response due in part to the strong following the movement had in the military.[20]

Such movements may provide a spiritual refuge for disoriented Communist adherents and may supply potential recruits for membership in a more coherent party underground, but their millenarian approach is only of use to dedicated revolutionaries at the moment of revolt. By their very nature—personalistic leadership, semipublic character, and emphasis on spiritual inspiration and quietist mystical speculation interspersed with release through chiliastic violence—such movements run counter to the needs of an organized resistance movement, *i.e.,* discipline, coordination and secrecy. The revolutionary must convince the members of such movements that salvation can be achieved, but only through disciplined, long-term activity; and under Indonesian conditions this is no easy task.

If Communist revolutionaries must worry about the failure of people to respond to their urgings, they must also be concerned lest the response be too enthusiastic, as seems to have been the case in the Blitar movement. According to one of the army officers involved in undoing this enterprise, the authorities were alerted to the effort to establish a Communist "shadow government" in the strategic but isolated East Java area (where the PKI had long had strong peasant support) by the industry which peasants, given new self-confidence by the movement in their midst, began to show in their fieldwork. When the movement turned to assassinations—either at Communist instigation or out of class and communal revenge—the army moved in and, predictably, exterminated the organization. There have been no further major manifestations of rural unrest. This may reflect simple demoralization and lack of leadership, but it also seems likely the PKI cadres heeded the lesson and are biding their time in the hope that the government's unity and grip on the nation may weaken.

## Forging A United Front

The "self-criticism" of September 1966 called for the establishment of a "revolutionary united front" which would enlist the support of the urban petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie, as well as the peasant masses, and other post-coup Communist statements and actions have reflected the desire to win broad popular support for the PKI's insurrectionary policies. In this regard, the New Order policy of treating both Communists and Sukarnoists as enemies of the public has given the PKI an opportunity to exploit Sukarnoist nationalist sentiment rather

[19] For statements of government policy on the issue, see *Sinar Harapan,* May 1, 1968 (General Amir Machmud, military commander of Djakarta); *KAMI,* July 27, 1967 (General Sugih Harto, Attorney General); *Angkatan Bersendjata,* May 27, 1967 (General M. Jasin, military commander of East Java); and *ibid.,* May 17, 1967 (editorial in the official armed forces newspaper).

[20] For accounts of the mBah Suro movement, see *Suluh Marhaen,* March 17, 1967; *Angkatan Bersendjata,* March 16, 1967; *Berita Yudha,* March 18, 20, 22, and 23, 1967; for descriptions of other banned mystical movements—of which the most prominent are Ejang Seno Herutjokro and Adam Makrifat—see *Berita Yudha,* July 24, and June 6, 1967; *Angkatan Bersendjata,* May 17 and Oct. 2, 1967; *Harian Operasi* (Djakarta), June 3, 1967; *Kompas,* May 5, 1967.



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than be a captive of it, as was the case earlier. In the 1950's the Aidit leadership had concluded that the non-Communist Republic was considered legitimate by those population groups from which the PKI drew its primary support and that the party's best chance was to identify with the government in the struggle against religious and regional rebellion, and particularly to identify with the personal leadership of President Sukarno. The PKI thus gained a certain legitimacy, as well as protection from the regime, in return for the party's support. It meant, however, that any separation of the party's image from Sukarno's left the PKI dangerously exposed, as was seen in the immediate post-coup events of 1965 when reports that the PKI had attempted to overthrow Sukarno rendered helpless and confused many would-be protectors of the party in positions of power. Once the New Order regime decided to persecute Sukarnoists—on the ground of an alleged effort by Sukarno to oust the generals—it increased the number of citizens in illegal opposition, facilitated PKI recruitment of army officers and bureaucrats, and opened the way for unabashed PKI utilization of revolutionary nationalist symbols in its underground activities.

Despite this opportunity, the Communists have yet to arrive at a historical interpretation of Sukarno which would allow them to make full use of the late leader as a symbol of the revolutionary left. The 1966 PKI "self-criticism" mentioned above attacked Sukarno as well as Aidit. The most favorable interpretation so far accorded Sukarno by the Communists—as far as one can gather from casual references in PKI exile publications—is to view him as an Indonesian Sun Yat-sen, *i.e.,* a progressive but bourgeois precursor of communism—a view which post-coup radical nationalists find unacceptable despite their willingness to admit Sukarno's failings. Nonetheless, the fact that the PKI can now adopt many of the old national revolutionary symbols, and that the regime feels it necessary to reject them, is of great benefit to the party in its search for recognition as the vanguard of Indonesia's continuing revolution.

The Communists are presented similar opportunities in their relationship with the outlawed leftist segment of the Nationalist Party (PNI) as a result of the ambiguous stance which the New Order regime has adopted toward the PNI. As a secular party dominated by persons of Javanese descent and including a strong conservative element drawn from the bureaucratic and landowning elites, the PNI has seemed more congenial to the army leaders than the Islamic parties which were the other possible source of mass civilian support. However, the PNI also was strongly identified with Sukarno and the Guided Democracy regime and had developed a leftist element which, although it considered itself in competition with the Communists for the loyalty of the masses, cooperated with the PKI on a number of social issues. The army has treated the latter faction of the PNI as if it were one with the Communists, has interfered measurably in the legal PNI organizations to promote candidates favored by the military, and has quietly worked to rehabilitate the PNI as a conservative pillar of the regime. There are still many PNI political prisoners, and PNI people may still find themselves without work, or under arrest on charges of Sukarnoism or even communism. Those too radical to regain the confidence of the authorities, if they maintain faith in politics at all, are likely to look with sympathy on a revolutionary approach. There have been reports of underground groups using the Nationalist label, and a good part of Indonesian exile groups abroad are not PKI but PNI in their formal affiliation. Since their political positions seem to differ very little from those put forward by the illegal PKI, one suspects that variations in label reflect personal and factional, as much as doctrinal, schisms. In some cases dissident Nationalists appear to have joined or allied with Communist groupings—*i.e.,* the principal radical PNI leader of the pre-coup period, Surachman, was reportedly killed during the roundup of a PKI underground unit.

The Communists stand to gain considerable strength if they can absorb such illegal Nationalist elements directly into PKI organizations or control them through some national-front mechanism. Conversely, the government and the leaders of the legal PNI would improve their chances if they could come to terms with the radical wing of the PNI, bring it under the control of the regular organization, and provide reform-minded Nationalists with some prospect of "working within the system." In this regard, we may note that Hadisubeno, who was elected Chairman of the PNI in April 1970 as a result of considerable army pressure, has rehabilitated some colleagues previously identified as Sukarnoists, apparently in an effort to combat charges that he is merely an army puppet. As this maneuver could not have been undertaken without military acquiescence, it may indicate the army is becoming aware of the need to provide an opening to the right for the radical PNI.

Communist efforts to forge a broad revolutionary front against the existing social order face a formi-



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dable obstacle in the deep communal differences—both religious and ethnic—that divide Indonesian society.[21] Long before the 1965 coup, the major Indonesian communal groups had become identified with one or another of the major political parties. By becoming thus embroiled in communal issues—in which it was identified primarily with Javanese of syncretist religious views—the PKI was distracted from its professed revolutionary goal of uniting members of "exploited" social classes, regardless of their communal affiliation, in opposition to the existing order. Relations between communal groups were further embittered by the violence that accompanied the liquidation of the Aidit-led PKI in 1965 and 1966. In the future, the PKI faces the dual problem of convincing members of other communal groups that a Communist victory would not bring them harm and of persuading PKI followers to ignore their own blood debts for the sake of revolutionary unity. As it is, it seems likely that any breakdown of government authority would yield, not a class-based uprising against the postrevolutionary establishment, but a bitter communal war.

## International Connections

Before the PKI can claim hegemony over a national revolutionary front, it must first develop a clear leadership for itself. Communist factions attempting to establish their dominance have typically sought one source of support in international connections, both theoretical and concrete. In the case of the Sudisman group, contact with the outside world—expressed through publications in China and Albania—reinforced its claims to be the new leadership of the PKI and may have gained more publicity for its program than could have been achieved by purely local, domestic efforts. But such ties are a delicate matter in Indonesia, where nationalist sentiment runs high in the Communist movement. Even in the heyday of the Djakarta-Peking axis before the coup, when Sukarno's endorsement did much to allay nationalist objections to the PKI's close relations with China, the party leadership took care to claim a mediating role in the Sino-Soviet quarrel and went so far as to assert that North Korea (not China) was the Asian example to be imitated by the PKI.[22]

On the other side of the coin, it is unclear how vigorously Moscow and Peking have attempted to influence Indonesian underground elements, although both countries have fostered resident Indonesian exile groups. Soviet interest in the fate of the PKI immediately after the coup seemed to have been subordinated to the Kremlin's desire to feel out the Suharto government's political leanings and to ascertain the chances for securing repayment of Indonesia's huge debt to the USSR. As relations with the Suharto regime deteriorated, the Soviet press and Muscovite international journals began to report the massacre and imprisonment of Indonesian Com-

### A MUSCOVITE MINORITY VIEW

Thus, says the policy document, "Urgent Tasks of the Communist Movement in Indonesia," drafted by an underground party group, much work will have to be done to rebuild the party on the basis of Marxism-Leninism, including the all-important organizational and ideological unit of Marxist-Leninists, restoration of popular confidence in the party, action against opportunism, both Right and "Left," establishment of a united front of the Left democratic forces on the basis of an alliance of workers and peasants, resolute struggle to win over the masses through active defense of their interests, and use of all the forms of class struggle, *including legal ones*. . . . [Italics added—Ed.]

We should explain to the masses that the responsibility for past mistakes does not rest with the CPI [PKI—Ed.] and its three million members or with any one person, but with a group of leaders who in point of fact had detached themselves from the party and, willingly or unwillingly, voiced interests alien to the party, objectively opposing themselves to the whole party and the international Communist movement; that the group's political line did not accord with party decisions, but was blindly conducted according to Peking's will and wishes; that the group's actions ran counter to the line of the international Communist movement and that its ideological slogans were not based on Marxism-Leninism but, on the contrary, were in contradiction to its principles and played into the hands of the splitters.

**—*World Marxist Review* (Toronto), September 1969, pp. 64-66: Thomas Sinuraja's discussion of a document issued by a PKI underground group (presumably associated with the pro-Soviet Marxist-Leninist Group of the PKI—Ed.).**

[21] On Java, the principal divisions are related to religion (the extent of commitment to Islam as opposed to earlier traditions); their social dimensions are described in Clifford Geertz, *The Religion of Java*, Glencoe, The Free Press, 1960, and their political appearance is dealt with in Robert Jay, *Religion and Politics in Rural Central Java*, New Haven, Yale University, Southeast Asia Studies Cultural Report Series, 1963. In other areas, divisions are religious and ethnic; for a general discussion see Hildred Geertz, "Indonesian Cultures and Communities," in Ruth T. McVey, Ed., *Indonesia*, New Haven, H.R.A.F. Press, 1964. This author has attempted to discuss the relationship between cultural cleavage and national-level politics in an introductory essay on "Ideological Conflict Management in Indonesia," in the late President Sukarno's *Nationalism, Islam, and Marxism*, Ithaca, Cornell University Modern Indonesia Project Translation Series, 1970, pp. 1-33.

[22] *Harian Rakjat*, (Djakarta) Oct. 4, 1963 (report by Aidit after a trip to Moscow, Peking, and other Communist capitals).



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munists but still avoided direct criticism of the Indonesian military and instead blamed the PKI's disaster on the manipulations of Peking.[23] Moscow also supported the creation of a "Marxist-Leninist Group of the PKI" from Indonesian exiles in the USSR and Eastern Europe, through which the Kremlin urged the PKI to seek legality as soon as possible.[24]

There has been almost no indication of Marxist-Leninist Group activity in Indonesia itself, and indeed, under present circumstances, a Communist faction urging legality would not seem likely to attract many followers. Moreover, the fact that it adopted a splinter-group title rather than advertising itself as the rightful leadership of the whole party indicates its sponsors were unconvinced of its chances. Furthermore, Moscow is apparently hedging its bets in Indonesia by permitting considerable leeway of action to dissident PNI exiles in the Soviet Union, who have been given greater freedom than their PKI counterparts to endorse armed struggle and even to criticize Soviet overtures to the Suharto regime. Moscow may well feel that its interests would be better served, in the eventuality of a collapse of the New Order, by a radical Nationalist leadership than by a Communist one of the sort that has set the tone of the movement since the coup. Both may now urge what is essentially a Maoist line, but at least the PNI exiles in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe do not insist on pointing out the source of their strategic recommendations, and nationalist considerations may cause them to seek greater neutrality than the PKI in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Moreover, Moscow may reckon that the day of radical nationalism is not yet passed in Indonesia, and that a regime of that stripe, whether dominated by soldiers or civilians, would be more kindly disposed towards the USSR—and repayment of Indonesia's considerable past debts—if the Soviets could point to their protection of nationalists in exile.

Chinese interest in the fate of the PKI seems to have proceeded along a different path. The initial concern expressed by the CPR after the coup was over the suffering of the Indonesian Chinese minority. Subsequently, China has become an advocate of the underground party as epitomized by the Sudisman leadership, whose declarations followed Maoist arguments on the subject of revolutionary strategy. However, with the Cultural Revolution, China's activity was directed inward. Occurrences of armed clashes in Indonesia were given great publicity, but only as proof of Maoist contentions about the rising world revolutionary tide. Similarly, during the Cultural Revolution publications of Indonesian exile groups in or allied to Peking became increasingly devoted to statements in support of China rather than to information or opinion on Indonesia—a development only in part due to growing difficulty in obtaining news from the home country. While the experience of the Cultural Revolution doubtless had a considerable impact on the numerous Indonesian leftists in China at the time, one may doubt whether, given Indonesia's great crisis in the same period, these exiles were totally enthusiastic about having to devote so much of their attention to an affair so remote from their own movement's predicament.

Given Indonesia's distance from the major Communist power centers and its strong nationalist traditions, it seems unlikely that foreign endorsement will be decisive (though it would doubtless be helpful) in determining the right of any underground party group to claim leadership over the movement as a whole. Hegemony over the political effort will have to be forged domestically, either through a lengthy process of clandestine organizing and infighting or through the ascendance of a leadership which, as a result of making the right decisions in the course of a revolutionary outbreak, is catapulted, Bolshevik-fashion, into a sudden position of dominance. It is now quite impossible to say which of these alternatives is more likely, or which means, if any, will bring a resurgence of the PKI. As we have seen, the government's power is overwhelming when compared to that of its opponent. However, the social and economic problems facing the New Order are equally formidable, and the government, too, faces a long and bitter struggle to secure its ends. At this stage, one can merely wait and see how the game plays itself out.

[23] The earliest detailed Soviet evaluation of the coup can be found in *Pravda* (Moscow), Nov. 26, 1965. Reviews of the development of of Soviet opinion in the first post-coup years may be found in "The Collapse of the Indonesian Communist Party—A Soviet Analysis," *Mizan* (London), March/April 1968, pp. 60-63; and "Moscow, Jakarta, and the PKI," *ibid*, March/April 1969, pp. 105-118.

[24] The Marxist-Leninist Group initiated its own "self-criticism" of the Aidit period, which ran counter to the one of the Sudisman group. It appeared in the pro-Soviet journal of the Indian Communist Party, *Mainstream* (Delhi), March 11, 1967, pp. 35-36, and March 18, 1967, pp. 26-30; see also Editions Paix et Socialisme, *Bulletin d'information* (Prague), No. 7, 1969, pp. 23-42. According to a 1968 report in *API* (a journal of Indonesian student exiles in Albania), Moscow directly assisted the Marxist-Leninist group in distributing the "self-criticism." *API* also claimed that the Marxist-Leninist Group was responsible for publishing the journal *Tekad Rakjat* and that the Soviet Embassy in Djakarta helped distribute it in Indonesia. (A. M. Sani, "Remo Sovjet dan Kaum Renegat PKI Serta Kegiatanznja" [Soviet Modern Revisionists and PKI Renegades, and Their Activities], *API* [Tirana], Vol. II, No. 2, Jan. 16, 1968, pp. 8-17.)



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# Pyongyang's Search for Legitimacy

By Joungwon A. Kim

A quarter of a century has passed since Kim Il-song returned to Pyongyang with the Soviet occupation forces to become the leader of the northern half of a divided Korea. The long duration of Kim's leadership, the continued Stalinist pattern of the controls he has imposed on North Korean society, and the invariable dullness of the political sloganeering still emanating from Pyongyang twenty-five years later all tend to give the impression of immutability and to obscure the very real changes which have occurred in both the foreign and domestic policies of this isolated half-nation on the eastern fringe of the Communist world.

Externally, North Korea has moved since 1945 from the status of a Soviet satellite to become first an ally of Communist China, next a bitterly antagonistic critic of both the USSR and the CPR, and most recently a wary ally of both Communist giants. Internally, Kim Il-song has relentlessly purged from the Korean Workers' Party and the North Korean government all but those most loyal to him, gradually eliminating the veteran Communist leaders with domestic roots predating Kim's return, as well as the factions with strong ties to either the USSR or the CPR. The North Korean society of some 13 million people has experienced the full effect of social mobilization in the form of agricultural collectivization, rapid industrialization and expanded education, even while the life style of the individual citizen has radically changed as the result of his being inducted into a multitude of state-sponsored unions, associations and groups.

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Behind all these changes there lurks a persistent, compelling motivation—the necessity to establish and substantiate Kim Il-song's claim to be the legitimate leader not only of the North, but of all Korea. The urgency of this aspiration can only be understood in the context of the Korean heritage—the history of a state which enjoyed 13 centuries of undivided, uninterrupted nationhood until subjugated by Japanese imperialism at the outset of the current century. The eclipse of Korean nationhood lasted until the Allies' triumph over Japan in World War II. That victory, however, did not bring unity to the Korean nation; rather it resulted in the division of the Korean peninsula at the 38th parallel into separate Soviet and US occupation zones in which competing North and South Korean states emerged—creating an unstable situation in which both Korean governments feel their existence threatened by the existence of the other. Each must foster and enhance its own self-image as the legitimate ruler of the Korean people or face the threat of extinction.[1]

The legitimacy issue is often overlooked by analysts who view North Korean actions and policies largely in the context of the Sino-Soviet controversy. They tend to see Pyongyang as a victim of geopolitics, caught between two warring Communist giants and forced to frame its policies in response to the

[1] One need not rely alone on Kim's incessant propaganda to judge the continuing urgency of the legitimacy and unification issues in Korea. As reported in *The Economist* (London) of Dec. 5, 1970, p. 39, President Park's recent suggestion that negotiations on reunification be initiated reflects the aspiration of 90 percent of the South Koreans polled. Full results of this poll, undertaken by the National Unification Board, appeared in the *Dong-A Ilbo* (Seoul), Feb. 20, 1970. For an English-language report, see *The Korea Times* (Seoul), of the same date.



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## UNIFICATION THROUGH REVOLUTION

*Comrades, the territorial partition and national split* caused by the US imperialist occupation of South Korea have not only spelled unbearable miseries and sufferings for the South Korean people, but brought great national calamities to the entire Korean people and created a serious obstacle to the coordinated development of Korean society as a whole.

To reunite the divided fatherland is a great national duty of all the Korean people at the present stage. It is our most urgent task, and we cannot forget it even for a moment. The policy of our party for the unification of our fatherland is already known widely throughout the world.

**—Kim Il-song's speech to the Fifth Korean Workers' Party Congress, Radio Pyongyang Domestic Service, Nov. 2, 1970.**

The oppressed and exploited popular masses can win freedom and emancipation only through their own revolutionary struggle. Therefore, the South Korean revolution should, in all circumstances, be carried out by the South Korean people on their own initiative. But the people in the northern half, being of the same nation, have the obligation and responsibility to support and actively encourage the South Korean people in their revolutionary struggle.

**—Summary of Kim Il-song report to the Fifth Congress of the Korean Workers' Party, Pyongyang, Korean Central News Agency, Nov. 3, 1970.**

vicissitudes of that struggle.[2] But, while Moscow and Peking hold overwhelming resources of power with which to threaten or seduce Pyongyang, Seoul holds a far more vital asset in the Korean scheme of things—a strong alternative claim to be the legitimate government of the Korean people.

Kim Il-song initiated his quest for legitimacy from a most disadvantageous position. After the Japanese surrender in 1945, the most prestigious of the nationalist leaders returning to Korea naturally gravitated to Seoul—the national capital—where even the "domestic" Communists (the name generally used to refer to those Communists who had stayed in Korea during Japanese rule) initially endorsed the naming of Syngman Rhee as President of a "People's Republic."[3] Kim's regime in Pyongyang was clearly a puppet of the Soviet occupation forces, to which it owed its existence. The insecurity of the North Korean government was further demonstrated in 1948 when it refused to permit United Nations supervision of elections north of the 38th parallel. In the same year UN-supervised elections took place in the South,[4] and the UN General Assembly recognized Rhee's government in the following words:

*There has been established a lawful government having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the Temporary Commission was able to observe and consult and in which the great majority of the people of all Korea reside . . . the only such government in Korea.*[5]

Disillusioned with Kim's harsh rule and spurred by the growing awareness that Korea was likely to remain divided indefinitely, North Koreans fled southward, their total number reaching two million or more, some 20 percent of the North Korean population, between 1945 and the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950.[6]

## Desperate Gamble

In light of this embarrassing mass emigration, Kim Il-song's attempt to unify the country by force in 1950 appears to have been less a reckless venture than an essential gamble to assure the survival of his regime. The result, however, was nearly disastrous. The United Nations labelled North Korea the "aggressor" in the conflict, and 16 nations sent troops to help in the defense of South Korea.[7] The Pyongyang regime was saved only by the intervention of the Chinese Communist "volunteers," and the war ended in a stalemate.

Rebuffed in its attempt to conquer the South by force, North Korea turned to rebuilding its military

[2] For example, see Roy U. T. Kim, "Sino-North Korean Relations," *Asian Survey* (Berkeley), August 1968, pp. 708-22; Joseph C. Kun, "North Korea: Between Moscow and Peking," *The China Quarterly* (London), July-September 1967, pp. 48-58; and Robert A. Scalapino, "The Foreign Policy of North Korea," *The China Quarterly*, April-June 1963, pp. 30-50.

[3] Dae-sook Suh, *The Korean Communist Movement, 1918-1948*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1967, p. 298.

[4] The United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea supervised elections south of the 38th parallel on May 10, 1948, in which 75 percent of the eligible voters and more than 95 percent of the registered voters participated. The Commission resolved that "the results of the ballots . . . are a valid expression of the free will of the electorate in those parts of Korea which were accessible to the Commission and in which the inhabitants constituted approximately two-thirds of the people of all Korea." (UN Press Release No. 70, June 30, 1948).

[5] UN Document A806, Dec. 12, 1948.

[6] US Department of State, *North Korea: A Case Study in the Techniques of Take Over*, Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961, p. 12.

[7] Nations contributing forces to the UN Command, in addition to the Republic of Korea, were Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, the Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the US. India and Norway provided noncombat assistance.



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and economic might, aided generously in the effort by both the USSR and Communist China. Starting with what remained of the impressive pre-World War II Japanese industrial base in the North, Pyongyang undertook to industrialize at a breakneck pace. In 1958, doubtless influenced by the Chinese Great Leap Forward, Kim launched the "Ch'ollima (Flying Horse) Movement." Like its Chinese counterpart, this movement counted on mass enthusiasm to spur production, but unlike Mao's economically disastrous program, the Korean movement also placed heavy reliance on technical expertise, which may explain its superior results.[8] Successes in internal political mobilization and indoctrination in the North during this period were also impressive. In fact, the gains registered by the North during the second half of the 1950's caused grave concern in Seoul, particularly in view of the difficulties encountered in the last years of the Rhee government.

The 1960's, however, witnessed a shift in the power balance in Korea and a curious countertrend in the legitimacy contest. These developments were triggered by the fall of the government of the aging Syngman Rhee in April 1960—an event which was precipitated by student riots reflecting internal discontent with Rhee's repressive policies, two years of Washington-Seoul friction over these policies, reduction in US aid, and an accompanying sharp downturn in economic growth.[9] Regardless of the merits or failings of his government, Rhee was the nation's most famous independence leader—the man who had formed a provisional government during the abortive 1919 uprising against the Japanese. Thus, when he fell, the South Korean state lost the key symbol of its continuity with the Korean independence movement.

For a little more than a year the successor civilian regime in Seoul grappled ineptly with its responsibilities. But in 1961, the Army of the Republic of Korea seized power in order to put a stop to the chaos and factional infighting in Seoul, which threatened to weaken further the power of South Korea vis-a-vis the North. By imposing firm central control and initiating broad reforms (including the introduction of economic planning and reform of the tax structure), the new military regime made substantial strides towards putting the South in a position to compete, both economically and militarily, with the industrial North.[10] However, these gains were achieved at a significant cost, for the coup which brought the regime to power had clearly broken the continuity of "legitimate" government originally established by the UN-sponsored elections of 1948. In addition, the new South Korean leaders bore the stigma of having received their military training under the Japanese.

Meanwhile, emboldened by North Korea's economic advances in the late 1950's, Kim Il-song moved vigorously during the following decade to demonstrate his independence and to bolster his own claim to leadership of the Korean nation. Although his immediate response to the 1961 coup in the South was to negotiate bilateral mutual-defense treaties with Moscow and Peking, Kim soon showed signs of shifting to a fiercely independent foreign policy, even at the risk of antagonizing both Communist allies and at the cost of losing, at least temporarily, their economic assistance. Pyongyang's assertion of independence first from Moscow and then from Peking, the 1968 seizure of the USS Pueblo and other acts of anti-US belligerency, and the cultivation of an exorbitant cult of Kim Il-song

[8] See the analysis of North Korean economic development during the 1950's and early 1960's in Joungwon A. Kim, *North Korean Economic Progress*, an unpublished monograph reproduced by the US Department of State, 1963; and "The 'Peak of Socialism' in North Korea: The Five and Seven Year Plans," in Jan S. Prybyla, *Comparative Economic Systems*, New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969, pp. 412-28.

[9] For studies of the causes of the student revolution, see C. I. Eugene Kim and Ke-soo Kim, "The April 1960 Korean Student Movement," *The Western Political Quarterly* (Salt Lake City), March 1964, pp. 83-92, and Kim Song-t'ae, "Sawol sipkuilui simnihak" (Psychology of April 19), *Sassanggye* (Seoul), April 1961, pp. 80-81.

[10] See Joungwon A. Kim, "Korean Kundaehwa: The Military as Modernizer," *Journal of Comparative Administration* (Beverly Hills, Calif.), November 1970, pp. 355-71; and Emerson Chapin, "Success Story in South Korea," *Foreign Affairs* (New York), April 1969.

## SOVIET SABOTAGE

The anti-party elements within the party and their supporters abroad, revisionists and great-power chauvinists (*i.e.*, the CPSU—Ed.), lined up as one in opposition to our party and resorted to subversive activities in an attempt to overthrow the leadership of our party and government. . . . The attack of the opportunists on our party became most glaring between 1956 and 1957. . . . The modern revisionists . . . opposed the socialist revolution in our country, prattling that it was as yet premature; they opposed our party's line of socialist industrialization, the line of construction of an independent national economy in particular; and they even brought economic pressure to bear upon us, inflicting tremendous losses upon our socialist construction.

**—Kim Il-song, *Selected Works* (English edition), Vol. II, Pyongyang, Foreign Language Publishing House, pp. 515-16, 579-80.**



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both at home and abroad all appear to have been a direct outgrowth of the contest for legitimacy and survival.

## Pyongyang *vs.* Its Allies

In dealing with the USSR and Communist China, Kim has had to reckon not only with the diverse efforts of the two to interfere in his policies, but also with the reality that neither of them attaches great significance to Kim's goal of unification. In choosing between the two Communist powers at any given moment, the North Korean leader has been swayed by realistic considerations of self-preservation and not by ideological niceties.

Already in 1951, Pyongyang resented the Soviet decision to bring about early Korean armistice negotiations, feeling that the only likely outcome would be an intolerable recognition of the division of Korea, the very situation which Kim had sought to eliminate by his attack on the South. Subsequently (after the Korean armistice) Kim's regime—evidently convinced that the USSR would not support any further unification efforts—set out to build a strong and independent economic, political and military base which would enable it, at some future time, to launch another unification attempt on its own.[11] It was because of these independent policies of North Korea that the Soviet Union in 1956 instigated a "destalinization" campaign in Pyongyang with the goal of undermining Kim's position in the North Korean regime. However, Kim had crushed this challenge by 1958. Because of Kim's insistence on independent policies, relations between Moscow and Pyongyang continued to deteriorate despite the signing of the 1961 mutual assistance pact, and in 1963 the USSR terminated its economic and military assistance to North Korea in retaliation for Kim's independent behavior.

A factor contributing to the Soviet discontent was Kim's growing friendship with Peking. Yet the latter relationship also had its areas of disagreement. Kim Il-song saw the widening Sino-Soviet rift as a threat to the defense capability of the Communist world, and hence of North Korea, and his resentment at Maoist policies grew particularly intense as a consequence of Chinese obstruction of Soviet aid shipments to North Vietnam in 1966. Furthermore, China proved unable to fill adequately the aid vacuum left by the Soviet suspension of assistance to North Korea in 1963—a matter of great concern to Kim as he witnessed the growth of South Korea's military power. Finally, Mao's strident claims to the leadership of the world revolutionary movement conflicted with Kim's own ambitions. When the Soviet Union reversed course in 1965 and restored the flow of economic and military assistance to Pyongyang, the Chinese Communists showed their displeasure by mounting wall posters in Peking denouncing Kim Il-song as a "fat revisionist" (for having sold out to Moscow). By 1966 relations between North Korea and the CPR were so chilly that neither country maintained an ambassador in the other's capital. This estrangement was evident as late as April 1969 when Pyongyang pointedly refused to send a delegate to the Ninth Congress of the CCP.[12]

Since North Korea's troubles with its allies sprang from Soviet or Chinese policies that put restraints on Pyongyang's military and economic capacity, or which cast shadows on Kim's image of independence in formulating foreign policy, and not from basic ideological issues, reconciliation was a relatively simple matter once the objectionable policies were renounced. Thus, when Moscow offered to restore aid to North Korea in 1965, Pyongyang promptly resumed cordial relations with the Soviets. And it was with equal pleasure that Kim accepted China's truce offering when Chou En-lai visited Pyongyang in April 1970 to assure North Korea:

*In the future, we will, as always, support and assist each other and fight shoulder to shoulder.*[13]

The two countries concluded a trade agreement shortly thereafter. Not to be outdone, the Soviet Ambassador to North Korea sought to cement Moscow's renewed ties with Kim by declaring, on the occasion of the ninth anniversary of the Korean-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in July 1970:

*The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government, and the entire Soviet people fully support the Korean people in their righteous struggle to chase the US imperialist aggressive troops out of South Korea and to achieve national unification on a democratic basis.*[14]

[11] See Joungwon A. Kim, "Soviet Policy in North Korea," *World Politics* (Princeton), January 1970, pp. 237-54.

[12] A brief summary of the Peking-Pyongyang feud and rapprochement may be found in L. F. Goodstadt, "Patchwork in Pyongyang," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), July 23, 1970, pp. 6-7, and in Koji Nakamura, "For Chou, a Peking-Pyongyang Detente," *ibid.*, May 7, 1970, p. 18.

[13] *Ibid.*

[14] Korean Central News Agency radio broadcast, July 8, 1970.



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## FRATERNAL TIES CEMENTED

**. . . With Moscow**

*Kim Il-song hosts a May 1969 friendship visit by N. V. Podgorny, Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and member of the CPSU Politburo.*

**From Democratic People's Republic of Korea (Pyongyang), No. 155, 1969.**

**. . . With Peking**

*Kim pictured with Huang Yung-sheng and Li Tso-peng, Chief and Deputy Chief, respectively, of the Central Staff of the People's Liberation Army and both members of the Politburo of the CCP Central Committee, during their 1970 visit to Pyongyang.*

**From Democratic People's Republic of Korea, No. 168, 1970.**

Thus, by the end of 1970, relations between Pyongyang and each of its two major Communist allies seemed reasonably amicable. As far as the Sino-Soviet conflict was concerned, Kim Il-song apparently saw no contradiction in maintaining cordial relations with both countries simultaneously. However, Pyongyang saw fit to exercise caution in making sure the visiting delegations from Peking or Moscow did not cross paths while they were in North Korea.[15]

Kim welcomes the support of the USSR and the CPR because of a genuine fear for the security of North Korea, which seems to him to be threatened both by an increasingly strong South Korea and by a possible resurgence of Japanese militarism. Few Koreans who lived through the trying years of Japanese colonialism and who confronted Japan's highly efficient military rule and (political) "thought" police can dismiss the nagging fear that it could all happen again—however unrealistic this may seem to foreign observers. The recent announcement by the United States of plans to reduce its forces in South Korea has brought forth warnings from Pyongyang that Japan may try to move into the US role in South Korea—warnings which have been sympathetically echoed in Peking.

## Kim and World Revolution

While turning to Moscow and Peking to secure his regime against real or imagined enemies, Kim Il-song has not hesitated to challenge the revolutionary leadership of both major Communist centers. As early as 1965 (prior to the resumption of Soviet aid to North Korea), Kim delivered a thinly-veiled attack against Moscow, accusing the Soviet leaders of being "revisionists" bent on preventing North Korea from securing economic independence and on overthrowing his regime.[16] Kim also seems to be trying to outdo Mao in bidding for leadership of the world's revolutionary movements, basing his appeal on a glorification of the tactics of violent revolution. On the 50th anniversary of the unsuccessful nonviolent anti-Japanese uprising of 1919, Kim stated:

*The greatest lesson of the historic anti-Japanese*

[15] The Chinese (and not the Soviets) on July 25, 1970, attended the commemoration of the outbreak of the Korean War; the Soviets (and not the Chinese) attended the 25th anniversary of Korean independence from Japan. There was no report of either being represented at the Fifth KWP Congress last autumn.

[16] Kim Il Sung, *Selected Works*, English Edition, Pyongyang, Foreign Language Publishing House, Vol. II, p. 513.



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*movement is that the highest form of struggle for freedom is revolutionary violence.*[17]

Thus, Kim has identified himself with the movements of Che Guevara and Ho Chi Minh and apparently seeks to promote himself as their ideological successor. The North Korean leader seemingly strikes a responsive chord among some of the world's new revolutionaries—*e.g.*, the American Black Panther leader Eldridge Cleaver visited Pyongyang in 1969 and voiced praise for Kim's revolutionary leadership.[18]

Kim's appeals to revolution are hardly likely to win recognition of North Korea as a member of the established international community. Ever since the Korean War, the Pyongyang regime has been, in effect, an international outlaw. Only 29 nations recognize Kim's state, compared to 93 nations which recognize the government in Seoul.[19] Kim adamantly refuses to recognize the competence of the UN to deal with the Korean problem. This defiance of the international body—to which the USSR is, at least in part, committed—may explain the visit of the Soviet and Czechoslovak UN Ambassadors to Pyongyang in August 1970.[20] One may surmise that they went to discuss possible new initiatives on behalf of North Korea at the impending session of the UN General Assembly which opened in September. But it would take extreme changes in the UN's position vis-a-vis North Korea to convince Kim Il-song that he could more effectively gain national and international prestige through the world organization rather than by trying to win a following among revolutionaries everywhere.

Closely related to Kim's efforts to achieve stature both at home and in the world revolutionary movement is the cultivation of an extravagant personality cult of Kim Il-song. Advertisements for a recent English-language version of his official biography presumed to call Kim "the Hero of [the] 20th Century."[21] The cult seeks to provide Kim with an impressive set of revolutionary credentials—more impressive, in fact, than the facts would support. His father, Kim Hyong-chik, is now credited by the Pyongyang regime with bringing about the 1919 anti-Japanese uprising.[22] To those who have observed the rapid rise of Kim's younger brother, Kim Yong-chu, in the party hierarchy, this exercise in revolutionary genealogy appears aimed not only at proving the nationalist credentials of Kim Il-song, but also at laying the groundwork for the political succession in North Korea.[23]

To explain why the 33-year old Kim deserved to become the leader of North Korea in 1945, the regime has embellished and distorted the record of his prewar exploits against the Japanese in Manchuria, then under Japanese domination as the puppet state of Manchukuo. It is claimed that when Kim moved to Manchuria from Pyongyang at the age of 14, he organized an independence movement among fellow Korean students at his middle school, joined the Korean Communist Party, and helped found numerous independence organizations, *e.g.*, The Kirin Student-Friends Association and the Fatherland Restoration Association. Further, it is implied that the guerrilla band which Kim came to lead was almost singlehandedly responsible for the ultimate liberation of Korea. All evidence of Chinese Communist or Soviet support for Kim and other Korean guerrilla leaders is passed over.[24]

## FOLLOW COMRADE KIM

The revolutionary ideas of Comrade Kim Il-song, the brilliant Marxist-Leninist, are the great Marxism-Leninism of the present times—an era of great struggle in which a fierce class struggle is being waged on an international scale and all the exploited peoples and oppressed nations on the globe are turning out to participate in the liberation struggle, an era of the great revolutionary storm and an era of the downfall of imperialism and the victory of socialism and communism on a worldwide scale.

**—From speech of Comrade Pak Song-chol at the Fifth Korean Workers' Party Congress, broadcast by Pyongyang Radio, Nov. 5, 1970.**

[17] Pyongyang Radio broadcast, April 17, 1969.

[18] A series of articles on Kim Il-song was published in *Black Panther* (New York), Jan. 3, 10, 17, 25, and March 15, 1970.

[19] *The Economist* (London), Dec. 5, 1970, p. 34.

[20] Pyongyang Radio broadcast, Aug. 4, 1970.

[21] *The New York Times*, Oct. 29, 1969.

[22] *Nodong Shinmun* of March 1, 1970, claimed: "With the March First Uprising as the occasion, the seeds of the anti-Japanese patriotic ideas and revolution sown by Mr. Kim Hyong-chik, an anti-Japanese revolutionary fighter and ardent patriot, kindled violent flames everywhere."

[23] The possibility that Kim Yong-chu (who is 10 years younger than his brother Kim Il-song) might succeed his brother was suggested by the author in the article, "Divided Korea 1969: Consolidating for Transition," *Asian Survey*, January 1970, p. 41. For Kim Yong-chu's rise through the party ranks, see the charts in Joungwon A. Kim, "Soviet Policy in North Korea," *loc. cit.*, pp. 252-54. Among those subsequently agreeing with this hypothesis is Yi Tong-jun, a defector from North Korea: see his "Kwolyok t'ujaeng-ui chinsang" (The Real Power Struggle), *Chungang* (Seoul), June 1970, pp. 67-81.

[24] Baik Bong, *Kim Il Sung Biography*, Tokyo, Miraisha, 1969.



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The true picture of Kim's record emerges in such works as Dae-sook Suh's study of the Korean Communist movement.[25] Kim did, indeed, attend middle school in Japanese-controlled Manchuria, but there were hardly enough fellow Koreans in his Chinese-run school to constitute an "independence movement." Organizations which Kim allegedly founded were, in fact, founded by others; his name does not even appear in accounts of such organizations by former participants or in Japanese intelligence and police records. As a matter of fact, the Korean Communist Party had no organization in Manchuria at the time Kim claims to have joined it. Extensive Japanese records show that Kim Il-song and his companions in the present North Korean regime were only minor participants in the Chinese Communist underground resistance movement in Manchuria. Furthermore, Kim's biography completely omits the four-year period (1941-45) which he spent in training in the USSR, emerging as a major in the Soviet Army.[26]

The fact that his fledgling regime drew insignificant national support in 1945 has also troubled Kim. At the Third Congress of the Korean Workers' Party, held in Pyongyang in 1956, Kim bitterly denounced those Korean Communists who had endorsed the Rhee government in 1945. Immediately prior to the 1956 Congress, Kim purged from the KWP the vast majority of South Korean Communists who had come north prior to and during the Korean conflict (many of whom had joined in the earlier endorsement of Rhee).[27] Kim Il-song also has claimed that prominent Korean independence leaders such as Kim Ku and Kim Kyu-sik had endorsed the Pyongyang regime—significantly, neither man is around to refute it (Kim Ku had shared the limelight with Rhee in Seoul as a leader of the exile Provisional Government established in 1919 and was assassinated in 1949; Kim Kyu-sik was apparently abducted by the North Koreans during the Korean War and is presumed dead).[28]

## Entrenched and Isolated

The ability of the North Korean regime to fabricate and propagate such a fulsome cult of Kim Il-song is itself a symptom of the extreme consolidation of power in Kim's hands. This is a far cry from the situation in the early days of the Communist regime, when North Korea was ruled by a coalition of Soviet-Koreans, Yenan-trained Koreans, domestic Korean Communists, and the Manchurian-Korean partisans centered around Kim Il-song.[29] Step by step Kim eliminated all competing factions, a process which culminated at a leadership conference of the Korean Workers' Party in October 1966, at which Kim succeeded in placing his own followers in every major KWP post. Party organization work was entrusted to Kim's younger brother, Kim Yong-chu. This monolithic control was further tightened in subsequent purges,[30] and was most recently confirmed at the Fifth KWP Congress, held November 2-13, 1970. At this congress Kim Yong-chu was elevated to the Political Committee of the KWP Central Committee as the sixth-ranking party official.[31]

[25] Suh, *op. cit.* (Assessment of the Suh and Baik accounts is provided at greater length in B. C. Koh's review of the two volumes on p. 82 of the present issue of *Problems of Communism*.—Ed.)

[26] Tsuboe Senji, *Hokusen no kaiho junen* (Ten Years of North Korea's Liberation), Tokyo, Nikkan Todotsushin-sha, 1956, pp. 24-26; Kim Ch'ang-sun, *Yoksaui chungin* (History's Witness), Seoul, Hanguk asea pankong yonmaeng, 1956; Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Gendai Toa Jinmei-kan* (Current Biography), Tokyo, Toho Kenkyu-sho 1950, p. 101. Japanese intelligence reports during the war locating Kim's unit (and most of the major current North Korean leaders) in the USSR include "Kyohi Kin Nichisei Kika shiso hancho no kenkyo" (Arrest of a Group Leader of the Thought Section under the Communist Bandit Kim Il-song), *Tokyo gaiji geppo* (Tokyo), February 1943, and "Habarosuku ya-ei gakko no jokyo" (Condition of the Field School in Khabarovsk), *Gaiji geppo* (Tokyo), November 1942, pp. 85-86.

[27] *Choson Nodong-dang chaesamcha munhonjip* (Documents of the Third Congress of the Korean Workers' Party), Pyongyang, Nodong-dang ch'ulp'an-sa, 1956.

[28] *Kim Il-song chochak sonjip (Kim Il-song's Selected Works)*, Pyongyang, Choson Nodong-dang ch'ulp'an-sa, 1968, pp. 87-88.

[29] The Soviet-Koreans were Soviet citizens of Korean descent who had spent the better part of their lives in the USSR, most of whom were members of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)—an affiliation which some retained even after joining the Korean Workers' Party in North Korea. This group was distinct from the Manchurian-Koreans around Kim Il-song, who had spent most of their lives in Manchuria and only resided in the USSR in the 1941-45 period. The Soviet-Koreans originally endorsed Kim Il-song as leader of the North Korean party, but it was on Soviet orders, and Kim had no control over this group. The Yenan Communists were those who had spent their exile in China, most recently in Mao Tse-tung's Yenan stronghold. The "domestic" Korean Communists were those who had remained in Korea and had suffered persecution and imprisonment under the Japanese—a factor which prevented any effective organizational development. Kim Il-song refuses to credit any of the other three factions for their pre-1945 independence efforts.

[30] Among high-ranking party and military leaders purged since the Kim group completed its consolidation have been Pak Kum-ch'ol, Kim Chang-bong, Ho Pong-hak, Kim Chong-t'ae, Kim To-man, Yim Ch'un-ch'iu, Ko Hyok, and Ho Sok-san. See Yi Tong-jun, *loc. cit.* For information on earlier purges of the regime, see *Pukhanui papol t'unaeng-sa* (Factional Struggle in North Korea), Seoul, Naeoe munje yonguso, 1962.

[31] Members of the new Political Committee of the KWP Central Committee were listed as follows: Kim Il-song, Choe Yong-gon, Kim Il, Pak Song-chol, Choe Hyon, Kim Yong-chu, O Chin-u, Kim Tong-gyu, So Chol, Kim Chung-nim, and Han Ik-su (North Korean radio broadcast, Nov. 14, 1970).



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While consolidating his personal control of the party, Kim Il-song has also tightened the regime's controls over North Korean society to ensure that no voice of dissent can be raised against his leadership. Collectivization of agriculture was completed in 1958. By 1970 nearly 50 percent of the population of 13 million lived in urban areas (compared to about 20 percent in 1945), and illiteracy had been virtually eliminated—both developments facilitating political mobilization of the population. Some 40 percent of the population is employed in the industrial sector of the economy,[32] as compared with 12.5 percent at the end of 1946. Through party membership, employment in the bureaucracy, and membership in the many diverse and overlapping state-sponsored mass organizations, a very large proportion of the population has been absorbed into roles which commit the individual to active support of the Kim leadership and thus link his personal destiny with that of the regime. Nearly 14 percent of the population are members of the KWP; 1.3 million citizens serve in the "Workers' and Peasants' Red Guard" (a nationwide mass militia, organized into self-contained armed regiments); and 10 to 15 percent of the working population are bureaucratic employees of the regime.

The Communists have also sought to differentiate and isolate society in the North from that in the South—this despite the professed goal of unification. Nearly three-fourths of the 13 million North Koreans have spent all but perhaps their preschool years under Communist rule and indoctrination. The only information they have about possible alternatives comes covertly from their elders, and as in any society undergoing rapid modernization and change, the relevance of the views of the older generation is generally felt to be marginal. Few people in the North, moreover, have any firsthand knowledge of life below the 38th parallel since 1945—not only has the refugee flow been almost unilaterally toward the South, but most of the South Korean Communists who went to the North prior to or during the Korean War were purged during the 1950's.

In another move clearly designed to ensure that the populace was insulated from undesirable outside influences, Kim eliminated the Chinese writing system soon after gaining power, replacing it with the Korean phonetic alphabet. Consequently, few North Koreans could even read the South Korean press (which employs the mixed Chinese-Korean writing system) if it suddenly were made available.

This insulation of North from South has made it easier for the regime to forge ahead with its policy of giving top priority to heavy industrial development at the expense of consumption. By and large, this policy has produced impressive results, although the temporary suspension of Soviet economic assistance from 1963 to 1965 forced Pyongyang to abandon annual targets of the 1961-1967 Seven Year Plan.

Following the resumption of Soviet aid in 1965, Pyongyang reactivated the plan and extended the target date for its completion to 1970. The recent Fifth KWP Congress announced the successful completion of the plan and promulgated a new Six-Year Plan for the 1971-76 period, with continued emphasis on heavy industry (although there was new emphasis on light industry, mechanization of agriculture and technological development). Despite the dip in performance in the mid-1960's, North Korea has built up a formidable economic potential. It produces most of the rifles, mortars and ammunition required by its army, and it also outproduces the South in electricity, coal, steel, chemical fertilizer, and cement.[33]

Two and a half decades after its creation, the Pyongyang regime appears to be politically stable and militarily and economically strong. Nevertheless, it continues to face the same critical questions of how Korean nationalism, communism, and a divided Korea can be reconciled. How can a viable political system be maintained over 13 million Koreans in the North while the remaining two-thirds of the nation (31 million) continues to flourish under an alternate regime in the South? It is not so much the peculiar personal predilections of North Korea's strong-arm ruler as it is the pressures arising from these ineluctable circumstances that have transformed North Korea into what has appropriately been termed a "garrison state,"[34] with its leader advocating revolutionary violence and constantly trumpeting invective against enemies and allies alike. So long as a genuine aura of national and international legitimacy continues to evade Kim Il-song's regime, these pressures will continue.

[32] See *Pukhan isipnyon* (North Korea's Twenty Years), Seoul, Kongbobu chosaguk, 1965.

[33] *Ibid.*; and Kim Un-hwan, "Tongnan ishipnyonhuui pukhan silchong: Kyongjeui hyonhang kwa chonmang" (Economic Situation and Prospects: North Korea's Situation Twenty Years after the Korean War), *Chungang*, June 1970, pp. 80-88. Statistics on the economy of South Korea may be found in *Korea Annual 1969*, Seoul, Hapdong News Agency, 1969.

[34] See B. C. Koh, "North Korea: Profile of a Garrison State," *Problems of Communism*, January-February 1969, pp. 18-27.



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# Conflict on the Ussuri: A Clash of Nationalisms

By Harold C. Hinton

The armed clashes which took place between Soviet and Chinese border troops on a small disputed island on the Ussuri River boundary between the Soviet Union and China in March 1969 unquestionably marked the most serious escalation to date of the conflict that has been going on between the two major Communist powers ever since the late 1950's.

The fact that the clashes occurred on an island claimed by both sides necessarily related the crisis to the controversy growing out of the demands that China has put forward from time to time since 1963 for a revision of the territorial boundaries fixed by the so-called "unequal" treaties of the 19th century between the decaying Manchu Empire and the Western "imperialist" powers, including Tsarist Russia.[1] Yet, as the present article will endeavor to show, the sequence of developments that led up to the border crisis of 1969 suggests that the motivations of both parties were concerned not merely with the territorial or boundary issue as such, but even more with the global power struggle that has been gathering momentum between the two powers under the impetus of a growing Maoist nationalism on the one hand and an answering Soviet nationalism on the other.

So much has already been written about the earlier phases of the Sino-Soviet conflict that there is no need to review them here. Suffice it to say that by the time of Khrushchev's overthrow in late 1964, what had started out as essentially a dispute in the ideological sphere had spilled over into virtually every aspect of Sino-Soviet relations to the point where Peking was denouncing Soviet "social imperialism" as just as dangerous an enemy as "US imperialism." The advent of Khrushchev's successors, moreover, did little—except very briefly—to mitigate Sino-Soviet tensions. In 1965, the rival nationalisms played out their antagonism mainly against the backdrop of the struggle in Vietnam, with each seeking to counteract or obstruct the influence of the other.

Then, in 1966, even this important issue was overshadowed by the eruption of the Maoist Cultural Revolution in China. This upheaval evoked sharp antagonism in the Soviet Union, mainly because, as it unfolded, it became an all-out assault on the Leninist principle of the supremacy of the party apparatus. In addition, however, a salient feature of the behavior of the Maoist revolutionaries and Red Guards was the manifestation of intense hostility towards the Soviet Union, as well as towards Soviet nationals in China, and there were occasional violent anti-Soviet demonstrations by Red Guards and soldiers along (and sometimes even across) the Manchurian frontier.

The Soviet response took several forms, including a vigorous propaganda campaign against Mao and the Cultural Revolution. More importantly, the Soviet military buildup in areas contiguous to the Chinese frontier, which had already begun in the early

[1] The most important 19th-century boundary treaties between China and Tsarist Russia were those of Aigun (1858) and Peking (1860), whereby China relinquished to Russian sovereignty all territories north of the Amur River and east of the Ussuri River. The latter treaty also ceded the Ili region of Chinese Turkestan to Russia. On the background of the Sino-Soviet boundary dispute, see Dennis J. Doolin, ed., *Territorial Claims in the Sino-Soviet Conflict: Documents and Analysis*, Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1965.

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1960's,[2] was accelerated, and there were indications that the Soviet leadership, at a Central Committee plenum in December 1966, even gave serious consideration to the feasibility of some form of military intervention in China. If indeed this was the case, the Kremlin must obviously have decided against intervention, probably because there seemed to be slight possibility of the emergence of an anti-Maoist coalition in China that would accept Soviet support.[3]

## Impact of the Czech Crisis

If China's Cultural Revolution marked a new stage in the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations, the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 ushered in another and more serious one. Implying as it did Moscow's readiness to intervene militarily against any "fraternal" socialist regime not to its liking, the invasion startled and alarmed Peking. The initial Chinese reaction was to voice loud "support" of the Czechoslovak "people" (although not of the "Czechoslovak revisionist leading clique"), as well as of Albania, Rumania, and Yugoslavia, which also appeared threatened by possible Soviet military action.[4] In mid-September, perhaps with a view to distracting Moscow's attention from anti-Soviet manifestations by China's ally, Albania, Peking charged the Soviet Union with violating Chinese airspace during August.[5]

During the autumn, further Soviet military moves in Eastern Europe seemed increasingly improbable, but Peking was nevertheless perturbed by the vagueness of Soviet statements regarding the applicability of the "Brezhnev doctrine." Might not China—whose Maoist regime was regarded by Moscow as just as great an offender against orthodox Marxism-Leninism as the Dubcek regime in Czechoslovakia, although in a different way—be the next victim of Soviet intervention? Moreover, since the Soviets had invaded Czechoslovakia in time to forestall a party congress that was expected to bolster the Dubcek leadership, might they not be contemplating a similar move against China, which was then preparing to convoke the Ninth Congress of the CCP? Chinese nervousness on this score may well have been partly responsible for Peking's repeated postponements of the Ninth Congress in late 1968 and early 1969, as well as for the absence of any advance publicity concerning the draft of the new CCP constitution to be acted upon by the Congress. This document, including as it did such unorthodox oddities as the naming of Lin Piao as Mao's successor, could hardly have been expected to please the Russians.

From mid-November 1968 to mid-January 1969, Mao made no public appearances, suggesting that he was either ill or spending the winter in a more salubrious climate than that of Peking. In either case, it seems likely that during this period he was not fully in charge of state affairs, creating a situation in which Premier Chou En-lai's moderate group of government administrators were apparently able to grasp the initiative. At any rate it was significant—in the light of Chou's evident inclination to bring about a normalization of China's foreign relations—that Peking invited the United States in late November to resume bilateral ambassadorial talks in Warsaw.[6] Peking sought to rationalize this move by simultaneously republishing a March 1949 statement by Mao, in which he had referred not only to the permissibility of negotiations with the "enemy" but also to the "world anti-imperialist front headed by the Soviet Union." Thus there is reason to believe that the effective leadership in Peking at this time contemplated a reduction of tensions on at least one and possibly both fronts of the dual-adversary strategy that Mao had advocated with increasing insistence since about 1960—that is to say, the strategy of simultaneous struggle against American "imperialism" and Soviet "revisionism."

Before Chou's move toward conciliation got off the ground, however, Mao returned to the political scene in mid-January 1969.[7] This was followed by a month of increasingly bitter anti-American polemics,[8] culminating in Peking's abrupt withdrawal, on February 19, of its earlier offer to resume the Warsaw talks, which were scheduled to recommence the following day. At the same time, in keeping with

[2] See William Whitson's statement in *United States-China Relations: A Strategy for the Future*, Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., US Government Printing Office, 1970, p. 144.

[3] For an analysis of Soviet efforts to foment internal opposition to the Mao regime during the period of the Cultural Revolution, see Maury Lisann, "Moscow and the Chinese Power Struggle," *Problems of Communism*, No. 6, 1969, pp. 32-41.

[4] *E.g.*, see Chou En-lai's speeches of August 23 and September 30, 1968, as reported by the New China News Agency (hereafter, NCNA) on those respective dates.

[5] See Chinese note of September 16, 1968, as published by NCNA on the same date.

[6] Chinese note of November 25, as published by NCNA, Nov. 26, 1968.

[7] Mao, Lin Piao, and other Chinese leaders attended a rally of 40,000 "revolutionary fighters" on January 25, 1969 (NCNA dispatch, Jan. 25, 1969).

[8] *E.g.*, the central party daily, *Jen-min Jih-pao*, and the CCP theoretical organ, *Hung Ch'i*, simultaneously published a vitriolic attack on President Nixon's inaugural address on January 27, 1969.



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Mao's dual-adversary strategy, Peking directed a parallel series of somewhat less intense propaganda attacks against the Soviet Union. As a rule, these attacks did not raise the sensitive issue of the border, although a Soviet military buildup along China's northeastern frontier was reported.[9]

With tensions between the two Communist powers thus remaining at a high level, developments on both sides in early 1969 seemed to be moving toward some form of confrontation. For some years China had resorted to occasional demonstrations on the Sino-Soviet border as a means of expressing defiance of Soviet "revisionism," and Mao and Lin Piao may have calculated in early 1969 that certain specific Chinese aims could be served by the staging of another series of border demonstrations. For one thing, the Chinese were concerned over the intensified activity of Soviet military patrols along China's northern frontier and may have hoped to deter a possible escalation of Soviet action by striking a warning blow. Such action also might help to create an appropriate psychological climate for the approaching Ninth Party Congress and to reinforce the image of Lin Piao and the armed forces as the indispensable guardians of the fatherland; and at the same time it would serve as a timely riposte to a scheduled visit by Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Andrei Grechko to India on March 2.

## Ambush on the Ussuri

The Chinese apparently were already aware that sometime after mid-February the Soviet Union had placed its forces along the Amur-Ussuri frontier on No. 1 combat alert and altered their rules of engagement to permit firing in disputed areas.[10] Nevertheless, they evidently discounted the likelihood of a major Soviet response to a Chinese demonstration of force on the border, probably because they believed that Moscow was then preoccupied with a new "minicrisis" over West Berlin and would not want to risk a simultaneous confrontation in the Far East. They may also have thought that the recent return to Peking of dependents of Soviet embassy personnel after about two years' absence lessened the likelihood of strong Soviet retaliation.

As the locus for their new demonstration, the Chinese chose the disputed island of Chenpao (known to the Soviets as Damansky) in the Ussuri River, which had already been the scene of similar demonstrations in the past. According to the Soviet version of the incident (which has won widespread acceptance outside China and is probably not far from the truth), Chinese border troops laid an ambush for an outnumbered Soviet patrol on Chenpao/Damansky in the early hours of March 2, the ensuing firefight resulting in heavy casualties on the Soviet side (and probably the Chinese as well).[11]

Even if the Chinese had not initiated the Chenpao incident, however, it seems probable that an armed clash would eventually have taken place anyway in view of a marked stiffening of the Soviet international posture. Early in 1969, a "hawkish" grouping—perhaps taking advantage of Premier Kosygin's prolonged absence because of illness—appears to have formed within the Soviet leadership around General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev and pressed for a harder line on a number of issues including Berlin and China.[12] This group was sharply antagonistic towards the Mao regime both because of Peking's ultra-left domestic policies, particularly the flouting of Leninist principles in the Cultural Revolution, and because of China's aggressively anti-Soviet international behavior, extending—according to Moscow—even as far as the shipment of arms to Peking's East European protege, Albania.[13] As long as the new crisis over Berlin continued, Moscow probably remained reluctant to become involved in any major confrontation with China.[14] However, about the beginning of March, the Soviet leaders decided to withdraw from the Berlin confrontation,[15] and once this decision was taken, the way was clear for more forceful action in the Far East to teach Peking a lesson and force Mao to back down from his "adventurist" anti-Soviet policy. The Kremlin leaders may also have calculated

[9] See, *e.g.*, "Shameless Claque," *Jen-min Jih-pao*, Jan. 22, 1969. On the alleged Soviet military buildup, see *ibid.*, Jan. 23, 1969, and report in *The New York Times*, Jan. 24, 1969.

[10] A Chinese note to the Soviet Union on May 24, 1969 (published the same day by NCNA) claimed that the Soviet frontier forces had been placed in "No. 1 combat readiness" sometime "following" February 16.

[11] The Soviet version was set forth in a diplomatic protest made to China on March 2, 1969, and made public by TASS News Agency, March 3, 1969. See also "A Provocative Sally of the Peking Authorities," *Pravda* (Moscow), March 8, 1969.

[12] One indication of a stiffening Soviet posture vis-a-vis Peking was a Radio Peace and Progress broadcast of January 24, 1969, which denounced both Mao and Lin Piao and assailed China's plans for the Ninth Party Congress.

[13] See V. Shelepin, "Albania in Peking's Plans," *New Times* (Moscow), Feb. 19, 1969, pp. 19-20.

[14] *Kommunist* (No. 2, January 1969, pp. 3-12) published a "rediscovered" Comintern document dating from 1936 on the danger of a sudden outbreak of world war. The intended message seems to have been that simultaneous tension in Europe and the Far East creates a risk of general war and is therefore undesirable.

[15] See David Binder dispatch from Bonn, *The New York Times*, March 4, 1969.



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that such a course would help to cover up their retreat from Berlin, as well as to divert world attention from Soviet actions in Czechoslovakia and reinforce Moscow's position vis-a-vis its Warsaw Pact allies, while at the same time creating a popular issue at home. It was probably with these considerations in mind that Moscow issued the previously mentioned new rules of engagement for Soviet border forces in the Far East.[16] In any event it seems clear that the Soviets were themselves girding for some sort of display of force in the Far East when the Chenpao clash occurred.

On the very day of the incident, both sides presented each other with diplomatic protests and began publicizing their respective versions of the clash.[17] Several features of the ensuing controversy suggest that the Soviet side not only had better communications with the scene of the fighting but was better prepared, politically even if not militarily, for an incident—a conclusion that reinforces the hypothesis that hostilities had been intended not merely on one side but on both. For one thing, Moscow began airing its version of the incident via radio broadcasts a few hours earlier than Peking. Moreover, the Soviet propaganda campaign that followed far surpassed its Chinese counterpart in intensity, seeking to offset the evident success of the Chinese attack by playing up the heroic conduct of the Soviet border guards, and to stir up anti-Chinese feeling among the Soviet people by charging the Chinese with atrocities against wounded Soviet soldiers. Again, while massive anti-Soviet demonstrations were mounted in

[16] Paul Wohl, "Is Moscow Overplaying Its Rift with Peking?" *Christian Science Monitor*, June 2, 1969. (Wohl gives March 2 as the date of the change in the rules of engagement and gives the Soviet motive as a desire to cover the retreat from the Berlin crisis.)

[17] For the Soviet note, see fn. 10. The text of the Chinese protest was published by NCNA on March 3, 1969.




*The Amur-Ussuri boundary between China and the USSR and (inset) detailed map of the riverine islands involved in the 1969 border conflict.*



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various parts of China, including Peking, these were nowhere near as violent as the obviously staged attack on the Chinese embassy in Moscow on March 7 by a rock-throwing "mob." [18] Nor was there anything on the Chinese side comparable to the Soviet Union's highly unusual move, via diplomatic channels, to explain its case against Peking to the West German government in Bonn, and presumably to other governments as well.[19]

There is little doubt that, even in the absence of immediate Soviet military reprisals extending beyond Chenpao Island itself, the Chinese were startled and alarmed by the magnitude of Moscow's response. Peking was reported deeply concerned for the security of the remote northwestern border province of Sinkiang—site of the main centers of Chinese nuclear weapons development—which was obviously vulnerable to Soviet retaliatory action from neighboring Kazakhstan.[20] There may also have been an acute—albeit unarticulated—fear that Moscow might even resort to large-scale military intervention to forestall the Ninth Party Congress, just as it had intervened in Czechoslovakia to forestall the 14th Congress of the CPCS. In characteristic Maoist fashion, however, Peking decided to put on a bold face in the hope not only of deterring the adversary but also of using the affair to promote domestic political mobilization. Accordingly, a major editorial published simultaneously in the army organ *Chieh-fang Chun Pao* (Liberation Army Daily) and *Jen-min Jih-pao* on March 4, under the title "Down with the New Tsars," raised the issue of the Sino-Russian treaty of 1860 defining the boundary along the Ussuri—a subject which the initial Soviet statements on the March 2 clash had left unmentioned, treating Chenpao/Damansky as obviously Soviet soil. Peking's position was that the island was Chinese under the 1860 treaty because it lay on the Chinese side of the river's main channel. On March 13, a further Chinese note to Moscow alleged a series of Soviet "encroachments" on Chenpao/Damansky since March 2.[21]

At this point, various considerations appear to have spurred the Soviets to prepare another firefight on Chenpao/Damansky, this time under conditions of superiority sufficient to guarantee a Soviet victory. Apart from a natural desire to exact revenge for the humiliation suffered by the Russians in the March 2 affair and to punish Peking's recalcitrance, the Soviets may have hoped to influence the deliberations of the Ninth Party Congress, which seemed likely to open about March 15, and to pressure Peking towards a renunciation of its contention that the boundary treaties were "unequal" and therefore should be considered open to revision. Moscow may also have felt that a Soviet display of strength was necessary in order to impress an important meeting of the Warsaw Pact powers scheduled to take place in Budapest on March 17.[22]

## Second Clash on Chenpao

The bulk of available evidence (except, of course, from Soviet sources) points to the conclusion that the clash of March 15 on Chenpao/Damansky—which was much more serious than that of March 2—was initiated by the Russians and resulted in a clear-cut Soviet victory. Both sides immediately lodged diplomatic protests accusing each other of a fresh act of aggression.[23] A Soviet Chinese-language radio broadcast the same day reminded Peking in strong terms of the USSR's immense superiority to China in strategic weapons.[24] Meanwhile, the Soviet press proceeded to revive its periodic charges of Chinese collaboration with West Germany in a number of fields, including nuclear weapons technology—apparently with a view to convincing the USSR's Warsaw Pact allies that fighting Peking was an effective way of struggling against Bonn without incurring the excessive risks involved in a confrontation over Berlin. Undoubtedly worried and frightened by the vigor of the Soviet action of March 15, Peking for its part began to tone down its propaganda exploitation of the Ussuri crisis.[25]

Fortunately for the Chinese, a shift of thinking in favor of the "doves" appears to have occurred in Moscow at about this time. Several possible causes

[18] See Henry Kamm dispatch from Moscow, *The New York Times*, March 8, 1969. The Chinese embassy in Moscow protested the incident the same day; see text of note released by NCNA, March 10, 1969.

[19] See Dan Morgan report from Bonn, *The Washington Post* (Washington, D.C.), March 12, 1969.

[20] Stanley Karnow, "China Worried by Possible Soviet Threat to Vital Province," *The Washington Post*, March 11, 1969.

[21] Text released by NCNA, March 13, 1969.

[22] The Warsaw Pact meeting did in fact see an attempt by Brezhnev to exploit the Chinese issue (see Anatole Shub dispatch from Budapest, *The Washington Post*, March 19, 1969).

[23] Text of Soviet note released by TASS on March 15, 1969; text of Chinese note released by NCNA, same date (both notes reprinted in *The New York Times*, March 16, 1969). A separate NCNA report of March 15 referred to the 1860 Sino-Russian treaty, whereas the Soviet statements after the clash did not.

[24] Radio Peace and Progress broadcast, March 15, 1969.

[25] See Stanley Karnow, "China Tones Down Trouble on Border," *The Washington Post*, March 22, 1969.



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for the shift can be suggested.[26] One possibility is that the Ussuri clashes may have led Peking to obstruct transhipments of Soviet military equipment bound for North Vietnam, prompting Hanoi to urge Moscow to ease its pressure on China. Another consideration may have been the fact that many in the international Communist movement were plainly dismayed by the spectacle of the two major socialist states engaging in armed conflict and were calling on both sides to compose their differences.[27] At the same time, the crisis with China was not having the effect Moscow had hoped it would toward inducing the Warsaw Pact powers—particularly Rumania—to tighten their security ties with the Soviet Union. But the most important factor of all—at least in the writer's view—was probably Moscow's concern over the possibility that excessive Soviet pressure on China might impel the Mao regime to seek a rapprochement with the United States. No doubt the Kremlin leaders took due note, in this connection, of an important speech delivered by US Senator Edward M. Kennedy in New York on March 20. Advocating better Sino-American relations, Kennedy stated:

*Even now, the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations in the wake of the recent border clashes may be stimulating at least some of the leaders in Peking to re-evaluate their posture toward the United States and provides us with an extraordinary opportunity to break the bonds of distrust.*[28]

Given Moscow's extraordinary sensitivity (since about 1966) to any hint of a possible improvement in Sino-American relations, it is perhaps not surprising that on March 21 Premier Kosygin tried to telephone Peking to discuss means of easing the border crisis. But the Chinese, perhaps sensing a sudden improvement in their bargaining position and very likely divided as to the best course to take, refused to talk with Kosygin beyond insisting that he communicate with them through regular diplomatic channels.[29]

[26] On the atmosphere of concern in Moscow at this time, see Charlotte Saikowski, "Kremlin Alarmed," *Christian Science Monitor*, March 22, 1969. On divisions of opinion within the Soviet military, see Christian Duevel, "Disarray Among the Soviet Marshals," Radio Liberty *Dispatch*, May 22, 1969.

[27] See, *e.g.*, statement by Japanese party Chairman Sanzo Nosaka, headlined "Chinese and Soviet Governments Should Settle Border Dispute Through Talks," published in *Akahata* (Tokyo), March 18, 1969.

[28] Text in A. Doak Barnett and Edwin O. Reischauer, Eds., *The United States and China; The Next Decade*, New York, Praeger, 1970, p. 155.

In retrospect, the Kosygin telephone call of March 21, 1969, appears to have marked a major watershed in Soviet management of the Sino-Soviet border conflict. To be sure, the Soviets continued to apply various forms of military pressure after that date, as they had before, but with an important difference. In the earlier phase, in which Brezhnev had figured conspicuously, Moscow appears to have been motivated largely by a desire to teach the Chinese a lesson (and to derive ancillary benefits from doing so) without any serious effort to move toward a border settlement, at least on any terms that Peking could be expected to find acceptable. In the second phase, in which Kosygin seemed to assume the leading role, military and psychological pressures were accompanied by diplomatic offers of—or demands for—talks aimed at resolving the border issue, preferably (from Moscow's viewpoint) through Peking's agreement to abandon its sweeping claim that the border treaties were "unequal" and therefore open to revision. At the same time, of course, efforts to exploit the continuing border crisis for the furtherance of other Soviet objectives were by no means abandoned. At the international Communist conference of June 1969 in Moscow, for example, Brezhnev again attempted—and once more with little success—to use the China issue to mobilize support for the Soviet party, and he also seized the occasion to float his famous proposal for some sort of Asian collective security organization, presumably with an anti-Chinese orientation.[30]

## Diplomatic Jockeying

The inauguration of the new phase of Soviet policy was signaled by a Kremlin note of March 29, transmitted to Peking—whether by accident or by design—almost on the eve of the opening of the Ninth Party Congress on April 1. After recapitulating briefly Moscow's version of the two Ussuri clashes, the note, for the first time on the Soviet side, took up the issue of the treaties that formed the basis of the Sino-Soviet boundary. It of course defended their validity and denied that they were "unequal"

[29] The only published source for Kosygin's telephone call and the Chinese response is Lin Piao's report of April 1, 1969, to the Ninth Party Congress (text released by NCNA, April 27, 1969), but there appears to be no reason to doubt the accuracy of Lin's statement.

[30] For Brezhnev's speech at the conference, see *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, July 2, 1969, esp. pp. 10-12. See also Charlotte Saikowski, "Russian Flurry: Kremlin Leaders Scout Asia for Friends in Border Dispute," *Christian Science Monitor*, May 20, 1969.



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in any significant sense. It also made clear that the Soviet Union would defend the territories acquired under the treaties with whatever force might be necessary. In conclusion, the note proposed the earliest possible resumption of Sino-Soviet border talks, which had been started in 1964 but discontinued with Khrushchev's fall.[31] Although no reply could reasonably be expected while the Ninth Party Congress was in progress, the Soviet Foreign Ministry followed up its note of March 29 with another two weeks later proposing specifically that talks be reopened in Moscow on April 15 or at "another time in the near future convenient to the Chinese side." [32]

Implicit in the Soviet handling of the border dispute during this period appears to have been a belief —quite consistent with Premier Kosygin's leading role in the affair—that Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao were basically opposed to border talks, and that therefore an effort should be made to check their influence and enhance that of the relatively moderate Chinese Premier Chou En-lai. It may have been with this objective in mind that *Pravda* on May 3 published an article by the well-known Soviet writer, Konstantin Simonov, flatly charging Lin Piao with personal responsibility for the first Ussuri clash.[33] Whether or not the *Pravda* attack had any political effect in Peking, the period following the Ninth Party Congress was marked by Chou's resumption of a leading role in the shaping of Chinese foreign policy. Chou's position as third-ranking leader in the Peking hierarchy had been called into question at the Congress but was now reconfirmed, although perhaps on condition that he confine his major activities to the diplomatic field.[34]

On May 11, Peking accepted a Soviet proposal of April 26 to reconvene the joint Sino-Soviet commission charged with regulating navigation on border rivers (*i.e.*, the Amur and Ussuri).[35] The commission met on June 18 at Khabarovsk and after some vicissitudes concluded its work successfully in early August.[36] Although these normally routine discussions assumed more than their usual significance in the context of the border crisis, they fell far short of meeting Moscow's demand for comprehensive talks on border issues.

On May 24, the Chinese at last sent a lengthy reply to the Soviet note of March 29, which had proposed the immediate opening of such talks. The reply insisted that Peking's policy sought the avoidance of border incidents and the settlement of disputes through diplomatic negotiation. On the other hand, it charged the Soviet Union with responsibility for the March clashes on Chenpao/Damansky, as well as for other border incidents; reaffirmed that Chenpao/Damansky was Chinese territory even under the "unequal" treaty of 1860; and claimed that the Soviet Union had illegally occupied territory beyond what China had been forced to cede under the 19th-century treaties, not only in the Amur-Ussuri region but also in the Pamirs, on the western frontier of Sinkiang province. The note went on to propose a cease-fire along the "line of actual control" on the Amur-Ussuri frontier, demanded the annulment in principle of the "unequal" treaties as a preliminary to a comprehensive border settlement, but agreed that these treaties might be taken as the basis of such a settlement subject to "necessary adjustments at individual places." The note rejected the April 15 date (already past) proposed by Moscow for the opening of full-fledged "boundary negotiations" and suggested that another date be agreed upon through diplomatic channels.[37]

The Soviet answer was sent to Peking on June 13. It insisted on the continued validity of the treaties denounced by China, reasserted the Soviet claim to ownership of Chenpao/Damansky Island, and again alleged Chinese responsibility for all border incidents. Nevertheless, it welcomed Peking's agreement in principle to the holding of border talks and proposed that they be resumed in Moscow within two to three months. In concluding, the reply assumed a peremptory tone closely approaching that of an ultimatum, stating that "the Soviet Government expects the Chinese Government to inform it shortly whether the above proposals on the dates and place for the continuation of the consultations are acceptable to it." [38]

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union had already started orchestrating a concert of military and psychological pressures designed to force Peking into a hard and

[31] Text of Soviet note released by TASS, March 30, 1969.

[32] Text of note broadcast by Moscow Domestic Service, April 12, 1969.

[33] For comment on Simonov's article, see Bernard Gwertzman dispatch from Moscow, *The New York Times*, May 4, 1969.

[34] Whereas Chou's name had usually been listed third among the top Chinese leaders at major party gatherings, official reports of the Ninth Congress proceedings departed from past practice in listing all the top leaders below Mao and Lin in the Chinese equivalent of alphabetical order (*i.e.*, according to the number of brushstrokes in the Chinese character for their surnames). This displaced Chou from the third position. However, beginning with a rally held on May 19, 1969, Chou was once more listed directly after Mao and Lin.

[35] For comment, see Stanley Karnow, "China Agrees to Soviet River Talks," *The Washington Post*, May 13, 1969.

[36] NCNA dispatch, Aug. 11, 1969.

[37] Text released by NCNA, May 24, 1969.

[38] Text released by TASS, June 14, 1969.



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fast commitment to renew the 1964 talks. Early in June, for instance, Soviet diplomats were reported taking soundings in Western capitals to ascertain their probable reaction in the event of a Sino-Soviet war in which either side might resort to nuclear weapons.[39] These pressures were intensified following the Soviet note of June 13. On July 10, Foreign Minister Gromyko included in his report to the Supreme Soviet a lengthy and sternly-worded denunciation of Peking on a number of issues, including the border dispute.[40] Much more threatening was the steady strengthening of Soviet forces and dispositions in the Far East. About the beginning of August, Moscow announced the appointment of a new commander of the Soviet Far Eastern Military District, Colonel General V. F. Tolubko, whose position in the Soviet Army's missile forces was not likely to be overlooked in Peking. Shortly thereafter, in an article commemorating the 40th anniversary of the 1929 outbreak of a brief undeclared war between the Soviet Union and China over ownership of the Chinese Eastern Railway in Manchuria—a conflict which resulted in a Soviet victory—General Tolubko pointedly recalled that after "all efforts to settle the conflict by peaceful means had failed," the Soviet side had struck a "sudden and decisive blow." [41]

During this period relatively minor clashes continued to occur at scattered frontier points. For example, Moscow charged the Chinese with firing on Soviet transport workers on the Amur River near Khabarovsk in early July.[42] But probably the most serious incident occurred on August 13 along the border between northwestern Sinkiang province and Soviet Central Asia. Although both sides presented conflicting versions of the incident, the most plausible version appears to be that Soviet forces occupied a hill two kilometers on the Chinese side of the border and for a time successfully defied the Chinese to dislodge them.[43] Assuming this to be correct, the Soviets may well have staged the incident deliberately to remind the Chinese of the vulnerability of remote and thinly defended Sinkiang to Soviet conventional attack, just as Tolubko's appointment had perhaps been intended to underline China's vulnerability to a Soviet "surgical strike" using nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, both the Soviets and the Chinese were beaming propaganda broadcasts across the border in an effort to stir up unrest among each other's ethnic minorities.[44]

Up until this time, notwithstanding Chinese press reports of "war preparations," there had been few signs of any serious alarm or defensive mobilization, at least in Peking.[45] Following the August 13 border incident, however, Chinese statements about Soviet preparations for war began to take on a more urgent tone,[46] and for the first time since the start of the border crisis there were reports of significant northward movements of Chinese troops from South

[39] See Paul Wohl, "Peking Softens Its Line," *Christian Science Monitor*, June 5, 1969.

[40] *Pravda*, July 11, 1969 (trans. in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Aug. 1969, pp. 4-11).




*The disputed frontier between China's westernmost province of Sinkiang and Soviet Central Asia. "X" indicates the area where an armed clash took place on August 13, 1969.*

[41] V. Tolubko, "The Glory of Heroes Lives," *Krasnaia zvezda*, Aug. 6, 1969.

[42] Soviet protest reported in *Pravda*, July 9, 1969. See also Charlotte Saikowski, "Moscow and Peking Both Tell of New Clash," *Christian Science Monitor*, July 10, 1969.

[43] See Bernard Gwertzman dispatch from Moscow, "Soviet and China Fight New Battle in Central Asia," *The New York Times*, Aug. 14, 1969. The text of China's diplomatic protest on the incident was released by NCNA, Aug. 13, 1969; the Soviet protest of the same date was published in *Pravda*, Aug. 14 (trans. in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Sept. 10, 1969).

[44] John Gittings, "Guessing with Guns," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), Aug. 21, 1969, p. 443.

[45] Agence France-Presse dispatch from Peking, in *The New York Times*, Aug. 5, 1969.

[46] Tillman Durdin dispatch from Hong Kong, *The New York Times*, Aug. 16, 1969.



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China.[47] By the end of the month, Western as well, probably, as Chinese observers were beginning to take the possibility of Soviet military action against China—whether a "surgical strike" or the occupation of Chinese border regions—still more seriously following press reports that Moscow had been asking East and West European Communist leaders what their reaction would be in such an eventuality.[48]

With the three-month deadline set by Moscow for the start of border talks approaching and no reply yet forthcoming from Peking, *Pravda* on August 28 published an editorial denouncing in unusually strong language China's "adventurist course" both on the Sino-Soviet border and in world affairs generally. After noting Peking's failure to reply to the Soviet proposal of June 13 and reiterating Moscow's desire for peace and good relations with China, the editorial went on to warn that "if war were to break out under present conditions, with the armaments, lethal weapons, and modern means of delivery that now exist, not a single continent would remain unaffected." Quite obviously, Moscow wanted to cow Peking into thinking that the two countries stood on the brink not just of war, but of nuclear war.

## The Kosygin-Chou Meeting

However, Moscow, too, found itself under certain restraining pressures. One was its own concern—stimulated by the action of the Nixon administration to relax US restrictions on trade with and travel to the Chinese mainland—that excessive Soviet pressure on China might drive Peking into the arms of the United States.[49]

Moscow also faced pressure from Hanoi, which saw the threat of Sino-Soviet hostilities as gravely prejudicial to its hopes of victory in the Vietnam struggle in view of North Vietnam's dependence not only on Soviet arms shipments but also on their unhindered movement by rail through Chinese territory. Following the death of Ho Chi Minh on September 3, 1969, North Vietnam took advantage of the visits of the Soviet and Chinese premiers to Hanoi for Ho's funeral to impress upon both parties to the dispute the urgent desirability of steps toward a negotiated settlement. While Kosygin was still in Hanoi, Moscow evidently decided to renew an offer that it had reportedly first made to China near the end of August to dispatch the Soviet premier to Peking for talks with Chou En-lai. No answer had yet come from Peking by the time Kosygin left Hanoi on September 10, however, and he therefore flew to Calcutta en route homeward. At Calcutta, he received word, probably sent directly from Peking, that a visit would be in order, but that he could meet with Chou only at the airport, without the protocol that would attend a drive into the city itself. By the time he reached Dushanbe, in Soviet Central Asia, Kosygin was informed by Moscow that these conditions, though not ideal, were acceptable, and he accordingly flew to Peking on September 11.[50]

A communique issued by the Chinese stated that Chou and Kosygin held a "frank conversation" lasting several hours.[51] The Soviet premier apparently uttered no threats, and for a few weeks thereafter the Soviet press suspended all anti-Chinese polemics. According to information leaked a few days later by North Vietnamese sources, who presumably were eager to show the effectiveness of Hanoi's conciliation efforts, Kosygin had presented broad proposals for a normalization of inter-governmental (but not inter-party) relations, including the holding of discussions on border issues at the Deputy Foreign Minister level, mutual resumption of ambassadorial representation, and talks looking toward a restoration of economic relations.[52]

Proposals of such importance obviously could not be accepted or rejected before they had been discussed by the top Peking leadership. For the time being, therefore, Chou merely repeated to Kosygin China's earlier demand for a cease-fire and mutual disengagement along the "line of actual control."[53] It seems quite likely that the ensuing deliberations within the leadership found the Maoist faction still adamantly opposed to any broad accommodation with the hated "revisionists" in Moscow. At any rate, when the slogans for the October 1 celebration of the 20th anniversary of the Chinese People's Republic were made public on September 16,[54] their tone conveyed no hint of any intent to compromise with Moscow. The twenty-second slogan contained

[47] Tilman Durdin dispatch from Hong Kong, *ibid.*, Aug. 30, 1969.

[48] Chalmers M. Roberts, "Russia Reported Eying Strikes at China Nuclear Sites," *The Washington Post*, Aug. 28, 1969; Anthony Astrachan, "Western Envoys Differ on Soviet Threat to China," *ibid.*, Aug. 29, 1969.

[49] See Bernard Gwertzman dispatch from Moscow, *The New York Times*, Aug. 18, 1969.

[50] See Christian Duevel, "Kosygin's Surprise Visit to Peking," Radio Liberty *Dispatch*, Sept. 12, 1969; also, Bernard Gwertzman dispatch from Moscow, *The New York Times*, Sept. 12, 1969.

[51] NCNA, Sept. 11, 1969.

[52] Kyodo News Agency report from Tokyo, Sept. 12, 1969. See also Harrison E. Salisbury, "Kosygin's Offer to Chou Detailed," *The New York Times*, Sept. 25, 1969.

[53] Chinese official statement released by NCNA, Oct. 7, 1969.

[54] NCNA release, Sept. 16, 1969.



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the thoroughly Maoist exhortation, reminiscent of the language used by Lin Piao in his report to the Ninth Party Congress, to "unite and oppose any war of aggression launched by imperialism [*i.e.*, the United States] or social-imperialism [*i.e.*, the Soviet Union], especially a war of aggression in which atom bombs are used as weapons!"

That the absence of any conciliatory response from Peking to Kosygin's proposals deeply annoyed Moscow was suggested by the fact that the London *Evening News*, on September 16 (the same day that the Chinese anniversary slogans were announced), published an article by Victor Louis, a notorious Soviet journalist known to have close official connections in Moscow, that was highly threatening towards China. Louis warned that the Soviet Union had the capability to apply a wide variety of pressures to China, including a "surgical strike" or even an invasion, clearly implying that such extreme options might yet be exercised.

## Agreement on Border Negotiation

What part, if any, Louis' warning may have played in influencing Peking is open to conjecture, but it does appear that the Chinese leaders became convinced about this time that the situation was becoming too risky and that Peking had better soften its stand vis-a-vis Moscow.[55] In any event, on September 18 the Chinese government reiterated its earlier proposal to Moscow for a cease-fire and a mutual withdrawal of forces from disputed border areas, and when no Soviet reply was forthcoming, it sent another message to the same effect on October 6. This time a prompt reply apparently came from Moscow, and Peking was able to announce the following day that "the Chinese Government and the Soviet Government have now decided through discussion that negotiations are to be held in Peking between the Chinese and Soviet sides on the Sino-Soviet boundary question at the level of vice-minister of foreign affairs. The date for starting the negotiations is now under discussion." [56]

Having agreed to negotiations, however, the Chinese quickly made it clear that they had no intention of retreating on the substantive issues in dispute. On October 8, the Chinese Foreign Ministry made public a lengthy "refutation" of the Soviet note of June 13, strongly denouncing both historic and recent Russian policy toward China, particularly on the border question, and affirming the existence of "irreconcilable differences of principle." The statement reiterated the "unequal" character of the boundary treaties and contended that any "overall settlement of the Sino-Soviet boundary question" ought to recognize that fact, but it made plain that "China does not demand the return of the Chinese territory which Tsarist Russia annexed by means of these treaties." At the same time, the statement again accused the Soviets of claiming territory in the Pamir and Amur-Ussuri regions *beyond* the line established by the treaties and declared that either side occupying territory in violation of the treaties "must, in principle, return it unconditionally to the other side," although "necessary adjustments" could be made by common consent. The statement concluded that a new Sino-Soviet boundary treaty should be negotiated on this basis, and that in the meantime both sides should withdraw their troops from all disputed areas and observe a cease-fire.[57] A comparison of this position with the one enunciated by Peking in its May 24 note to Moscow reveals no essential differences—except, of course, for the newfound willingness of the Chinese to discuss a specific date for the start of border negotiations.

[55] Peking's decision to ease the border crisis may have been influenced by a speech delivered by US Undersecretary of State Elliott Richardson on September 5, in which he refrained from supporting either side and declared that the United States "could not fail to be deeply concerned with an escalation of this quarrel into a massive breach of international peace and security" (*The New York Times*, Sept. 6, 1969).

[56] Chinese official statement of October 7, 1969 (see fn. 53).

[57] Released by NCNA, Oct. 8, 1969.

### TROUBLED FRONTIER

*1—Chinese fishermen tangling with a Soviet gunboat on the Ussuri River, not yet icebound. The Chinese accused the Russians of using their patrol craft to harass and intimidate Chinese fishing boats.*
*2—A new use for the Thought of Mao. Members of a Chinese border patrol on the frozen Ussuri reading from their little red books of Mao's teachings to members of a Soviet patrol.*
*3—A unit of Soviet frontier troops, with armored vehicles, allegedly moving toward Chenpao Island. The Chinese claim Chenpao on the ground that it lies on the Chinese side of the main river channel.*
*4—Soviet frontier guards (in white uniforms) allegedly obstructing a Chinese patrol off the shore of Kapotzu, one of the disputed islands in the Ussuri.*
*5—Chinese winter fishermen defying a Soviet armored car on the ice.*

**—Photos reprinted from a Chinese English-language propaganda pamphlet entitled *Down with the New Tsars*, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1969.**



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

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## A PLEDGE UNKEPT

The government of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republics declares as void all the treaties concluded by the former government of Russia with China, renounces all the annexations of Chinese territory, all the concessions in China, and returns to China free of charge, and forever, all *that was ravenously taken from her by the Tsar's government* and by the Russian bourgeoisie.

**—Karakhan Manifesto, Sept. 27, 1920.**

Following the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution *in Russia, the Soviet Republic solemnly renounced the un*equal and secret treaties with China, Tsarist Russia's spheres of influence in China, extraterritorial rights and consular jurisdiction. . . . The nullification of the above-mentioned treaties was made official by the Agreement on General Principles . . . of May 31, 1924. This agreement did not *consider Russian-Chinese treaties defining the state border* to be among the unequal or secret agreements. There was no talk of their being annulled or revised.

**—USSR government statement of March 29, 1969, in *Pravda*, March 30.**

Moscow, too, was making concessions in agreeing (1) to "negotiations" rather than mere "consultations," as had been proposed in the Soviet note of June 13; (2) to Peking rather than Moscow as the locus of the negotiations; and (3) at least implicitly, to the premise that the border treaties were indeed "unequal" and therefore might be open to some minor adjustments. These concessions did not come easily and were not in fact openly avowed. Nor did the Soviets make any favorable response to reported urgings by the Italian and Japanese Communist Parties that Moscow and Peking should compose their party as well as their state differences. Indeed, the publication in *Kommunist* (No. 15, October 10, 1969) of a strongly anti-Chinese theoretical article by Mikhail Suslov attested to Moscow's unwillingness to go this far.

## The Peking Talks

It was in these somewhat ambiguous and none too promising circumstances that the Sino-Soviet border talks finally opened in Peking. The Soviet delegation, led by Deputy Foreign Minister V. V. Kuznetsov, who had served as the first Soviet ambassador to China after the death of Stalin, reached Peking on October 19 and began talks the following day with a Chinese delegation headed by Deputy Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua. From the outset, a deep official silence settled over the negotiations on both sides. It was not long, however, before press reports indicated that the talks were stalled over China's insistence that Peking's demand for a cease-fire and troop withdrawal be put at the top of the agenda—a demand which the Soviets were understandably reluctant to concede since a mutual withdrawal of forces would take away their main bargaining advantage.[58]

This was presumably where matters stood when Kuznetsov and his military deputy returned to Moscow on December 14, officially to take part in a session of the Supreme Soviet but undoubtedly also to report to the party leadership on the progress (or lack of it) of the talks and to receive fresh instructions.

Peking was evidently very concerned that Kuznetsov's departure might mean the breakdown of the talks or his replacement by a lesser figure, and it was probably not purely coincidental that Peking was reported at this time to be showing fresh interest in a resumption of ambassadorial talks with the United States, presumably as a means of exerting pressure on Moscow.[59] However, in spite of the pessimistic report Kuznetsov must have given his superiors on the Peking parley,[60] and notwithstanding an occasional reversion by the Soviets to the psychological warfare tactics of the previous summer,[61] it is clear in retrospect that Moscow decided to continue the talks and to give Kuznetsov somewhat more flexible instructions. Some of the probable reasons for this decision will be suggested in the concluding section.

Kuznetsov returned to Peking on January 2, and the talks resumed shortly therefater. During the next few weeks, the Soviet negotiator apparently agreed in principle to concede Chinese sovereignty over some of the disputed islands on the Amur and Ussuri Rivers and to discuss the status of the Pamir region, but he reportedly continued to hold out for a time against the Chinese demand for a cease-fire

[58] The Hong Kong Communist newspaper *Ta Kung Pao* reported (Nov. 6-10, 1969) that the talks showed "no signs of progress." See also Stanley Karnow, "Sino-Soviet Talks Stall on Troops," *The Washington Post*, Nov. 7, 1969, and "China, Russia Appear Stalled in Border Talk," *ibid.*, Nov. 21, 1969.

[59] See Stanley Karnow, "China Sees Leverage in US Talks," *The Washington Post*, Dec. 14, 1969.

[60] See Bernard Gwertzman dispatch from Moscow, *The New York Times*, Dec. 21, 1969.

[61] *E.g.*, see V. Tolubko, "The Will to Victory," *Krasnaia zvezda*, Dec. 7, 1969; for comment, see Paul Wohl, "Soviet Nuclear-Arms Practice Seen as Warning to Peking," *Christian Science Monitor*, Feb. 6, 1970.



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and mutual troop withdrawal.[62] Meanwhile, the Soviet press kept up its psychological pressure on China, publishing a number of stern articles by Soviet military experts and others warning that Peking's bellicosity and stubbornness were creating serious risk of a Sino-Soviet war, even nuclear war.[63] The force of these warnings was weakened, however, by a *Pravda* article (February 15, 1970) written by S. L. Tikhvinsky, a China specialist and member of Kuznetsov's delegation, who denounced US journalist Harrison E. Salisbury's newly-published book, *War Between Russia and China* (New York, W. W. Norton, 1969), and explicitly denied that Moscow was contemplating an attack, especially a nuclear attack, on China. Peking, although reportedly somewhat perturbed by the possibility that talks currently under way between Moscow and Bonn might produce an understanding that would free Soviet hands for stronger action in Asia, seemed disposed to take Tikhvinsky's assurance at face value and was reported to be somewhat less tense over the border situation.[64]

## Effect of Cambodian Events

The Cambodian crisis precipitated by the overthrow of Prince Sihanouk in March 1970 had the effect of further easing Sino-Soviet tension since it drew the urgent attention of both powers to the new situation in Southeast Asia. Indeed, Moscow was reported in mid-April to have come to some sort of agreement with Peking, although a secret and possibly informal one, on a cease-fire and at least a partial troop withdrawal.[65] Following a visit by Kuznetsov to Moscow between April 18 and May 3, the negotiators were even reported to have discussed possible Sino-Soviet cooperation in the Cambodian crisis, but with Soviet military pressures reduced, Peking reportedly showed no interest.[66]

In fact, anti-Soviet ideological polemics had already resumed in the Chinese press,[67] and once it was clear that no cooperation was possible regarding Cambodia, Moscow also took up the ideological battle once more—though still insisting on its intention to continue seeking a normalization of intergovernmental relations with Peking.[68] In this atmosphere the Peking talks obviously could not be expected to make any real progress, although Premier Kosygin indicated in a speech on June 10 that the Soviet government, despite its frustration, intended to continue the negotiations.[69] A couple of weeks later, it became known that Kuznetsov, because of ill health, would be replaced as Soviet chief negotiator by Deputy Foreign Minister L. F. Ilichev.[70]

In the second half of June, there were again indications of an easing of tensions between Moscow and Peking. Sino-Soviet press polemics virtually ceased, and by mid-July two modest but real steps forward had been achieved. The Sino-Soviet joint commission on border river navigation resumed discussions,[71] and the two governments reportedly agreed to resume ambassadorial-level representation for the first time since 1966, with Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Liu Hsien-chuan to become Peking's ambassador to Moscow.[72] Former Soviet propaganda chief V. I. Stepakov was reported initially designated as Soviet ambassador to Peking but—either because of ill health or because he was unacceptable to the Chinese—was later replaced by V. S. Tolstikov, formerly Leningrad party first secretary. (Tolstikov took up his post on October 10, and Liu left Peking for Moscow on November 22.) China's agreement to restore ambassadorial representation after a lapse of four years seemed at least to signify a desire to avoid a new escalation of tension as serious as the border crisis of 1969.

Despite this conciliatory gesture in the diplomatic sphere, however, there was no sign of any abandon-

[62] Bernard Gwertzman dispatch from Moscow, *The New York Times*, March 1, 1970.

[63] *E.g.*, V. Korionov, "The Highway," *Pravda*, Jan. 6, 1970; V. Shelepin, "China: Militarist Intoxication," *New Times*, No. 3 (Jan. 20, 1970), p. 14; Yu. Andreyev, "Militaristic Fever in Peking," *Krasnaia zvezda*, Jan. 21, 1970; Aleksandrov (pseud.), "To Imperialism's Advantage," *Pravda*, March 19, 1970; and I. Makarov, "Militarist Hysteria in China," *Krasnaia zvezda*, March 31, 1970.

[64] Norman Webster dispatch from Peking, *The Washington Post*, March 1, 1970.

[65] Murray Marder, "Moscow and Peking to Pull Back Troops," *The Washington Post*, April 16, 1970.

[66] See Anthony Astrachan dispatch from Moscow, *The Washington Post*, May 10, 1970.

[67] See joint editorial entitled "Leninism or Social-Imperialism?," published in *Jen-min Jih-pao, Hung Ch'i*, and *Chieh-fang Chun Pao*, April 22, 1970.

[68] "Pseudo-revolutionaries Unmasked," *Pravda*, May 18, 1970. See also M. Ukraintsev (pseud.), "Asia and the Peking Empire-Builders," *New Times*, June 9, 1970, pp. 14-15.

[69] TASS dispatch, June 10, 1970. Kosygin again expressed the same attitude in an interview with the editor of the New Delhi *Patriot* (TASS dispatch, Aug. 10, 1970), as did Brezhnev in a speech on August 28 (Moscow Radio, Aug. 28, 1970).

[70] Chalmers M. Roberts, "Sino-Soviet Negotiator Goes Home," *The Washington Post*, July 2, 1970. Ilichev arrived in Peking on August 15.

[71] "China and Soviet Renew Talks on River Shipping," *The New York Times*, July 11, 1970.

[72] "China Envoy Said to Get Moscow Post," *The Washington Post*, July 16, 1970.



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ment by Peking of the Maoist dual-adversary strategy in the realm of political propaganda. On the occasion of Army Day (August 1), the major editorial published in *Jen-min Jih-pao, Hung Ch'i,* and *Chieh-fang Chun Pao* attacked the Soviet Union in these uncompromising terms:

*Social-imperialism greedily eyes Chinese territory. It has not for a single day relaxed its preparation to attack China. In words, it claims that it poses no threat to China. Why then does it mass its troops in areas close to Chinese borders? Why has it dispatched large numbers of troops into another country which neighbors on China [i.e., Mongolia]? Why does it frenziedly undertake military deployments to direct its spearhead against China? It is clear that social-imperialism, like U. S. imperialism, says that it poses no threat to China only to weaken our vigilance [and] to fool the people of its own country and the world.*

The context in which this alarmist passage appeared, however, strongly suggested that its main purpose was to promote domestic political mobilization rather than to express genuine concern over an imminent Soviet attack.

## War or Peace?

Surveying the troubled course of Sino-Soviet relations over the last few years, one cannot doubt that Chinese leaders recognize the existence of powerful disincentives to any major war with the Soviet Union, whether over territorial boundaries or anything else. In addition to the obviously great superiority of the Soviet Union in military-industrial strength and strategic weapons, the Chinese realize that they would face serious logistical difficulties in any Sino-Soviet conflict, as well as the risk of renewed political discord at home. On the other hand, Peking appears convinced that its international political and ideological position is sufficiently strong to permit it to manage the border dispute without incurring excessive risk of war. Although perhaps to a lesser extent than before the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Maoist leadership still seems to view the Soviet Union as a kind of "paper" bear immobilized, in the last analysis, by fear of Communist China and her ponderous defensive strength, and by general clumsiness and irresolution.

Accordingly, Peking's approach since September 1969 has been to avoid major frontier incidents while keeping the Soviet Union politically in play through protracted discussions in which the Chinese keep pressing for a cease-fire in return for only minor substantive concessions on their own side. In addition to a cease-fire, Peking appears genuinely desirous of gaining at least some prestige items from the border talks, such as Soviet recognition in principle of the "unequal" character of the original boundary treaties and some minor border adjustments in China's favor in those areas (principally, the Amur-Ussuri and Pamir regions) where Soviet forces have occupied or intruded upon territory claimed to be Chinese under the treaties.

Meanwhile, for the sake of ideological consistency and domestic political effect, Peking continues to adhere, at least outwardly, to the Maoist dual-adversary strategy by giving vent to occasional outbursts of polemics against Soviet "social-imperialism" and shunning "united action" with the Soviet Union on such issues as Cambodia. At the same time, the Mao regime seeks to mend its political and diplomatic fences elsewhere, notably in its relations with North Korea and North Vietnam—and even, to a limited extent, in its relations with the United States.

On the Soviet side, too, there are powerful disincentives to war. From the military standpoint, major Soviet offensive operations on Chinese soil not only could be expected to encounter numerically superior Chinese forces in most areas, and probably a militantly hostile local populace, but also would entail serious logistical problems. China's defensive preparations, moreover, have been extensive, reportedly including the reorganization for military purposes of the sprawling Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region so as to place most of it under the Mukden, Peking, and Lanchow Military Regions, thereby improving the possibilities for a coordinated defense in depth.[73]

The political deterrents are as cogent as the military. To begin with, there is no persuasive evidence to indicate that Moscow would be capable of establishing or calling into being any Chinese collaborationist regime, except perhaps on a localized scale in border regions with large non-Chinese populations. Such being the case, for the Soviet Union to attempt a Czechoslovakia-type military intervention in China to enforce the Brezhnev doctrine would, in all probability, be futile; and more than that, the end result would be to intensify traditional Chinese hatred of the Russians and thus to render illusory any Soviet

[73] Tillman Durdin dispatch from Hong Kong, *The New York Times,* June 21, 1970.



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hopes of reestablishing the unity of the Communist world under Moscow's leadership.

In addition to these arguments, the "doves" in Moscow—who are believed to include some highly-placed military figures[74]—can point to still other considerations supporting their position. Among these are China's recently enhanced political standing in Asia, the inadvisability of driving China and the United States together, the probable alienation of foreign Communist parties if the Soviet Union were to go to war with China, and the need to give higher priority to the solution of persistent economic problems at home as well as to the protection and strengthening of the Soviet position in Europe and the Middle East.[75]

Thus, at least from the viewpoint of the Moscow "doves," the balance of political advantage appears to lie on the side of avoiding a major conflict with China and waiting out Mao's' death in the hope of working out an accommodation with his successors. With that eventuality in mind, Moscow seems to nourish some slight hope that the recently revised (July 1970) Soviet treaty of alliance with Romania, providing for common defense against "any state or group of states" (Article 8), might serve as an acceptable model for a viable future Sino-Soviet relationship—at least in the eyes of the military element in the Chinese leadership.[76]

On the other hand, there are some factors that might, under certain conditions, become powerful enough to swing the balance in Moscow in favor of stepped-up military pressure, or possibly even a major attack, on China. For one thing, the nature and scope of the Soviet military buildup in Asia are such as to suggest that Moscow is determined to command a full range of conventional and nuclear options up to and including a nuclear first-strike capability, whether preemptive or as the prelude to all-out attack.[77] Obviously, the availability of these options tends to create, under conditions of tension, the temptation to use one or another of them.

Meanwhile, there is little question that Peking, by dragging its feet in the border negotiations and in the matter of normalizing Sino-Soviet intergovernmental relations, and by continuing to display uncompromising political and ideological hostility toward Moscow, is sorely taxing the patience of the Soviet leaders and tempting them to bring increased military pressure on China in order to force a retreat. Also, the recent trend toward improved Soviet relations with the West—evidenced by the SALT talks, the Soviet treaty with West Germany, the Middle East truce, and the absence of a Soviet-US confrontation over Cambodia—tends to ease Moscow's fear of a two-front war and thus to heighten the temptation to teach China a lesson while conditions are favorable. Given, in addition to all this, Moscow's long-range fear of a historically hostile China which is well along the road to acquiring a thermonuclear force capable of striking the Soviet Union, the temptation to launch a preemptive attack—rationalized, of course, as a defensive measure— must be considerable. It may be partly with this eventuality in mind that Moscow has been endeavoring to broaden the scope of its alliance system in Eastern Europe to cover an attack by "any state or group of states."[78]

In short, the possible courses that Sino-Soviet relations may take in the foreseeable future cover the full spectrum of alternatives, ranging from peace to war—including, of course, the classic Communist condition of neither war nor peace.

[74] Soviet Army Chief of Staff M. Zakharov is believed to be among those opposed to war with China (see Christian Duevel, "Marshal Zakharov's Position on the Sino-Soviet Conflict," Radio Liberty *Dispatch*, Feb. 10. 1970).

[75] It is perhaps indicative of Soviet military priorities that the massive "Dvina" winter maneuvers of the Red Army in 1970 were held in Byelorussia rather than in Soviet Asia (see Charlotte Saikowski, "Moscow Escalates War of Words with Peking," *Christian Science Monitor*, March 21, 1970).

[76] Such a hope seems indicated by a Radio Moscow broadcast (in Mandarin) to the Chinese People's Liberation Army, July 9, 1970, publicizing the Soviet-Romanian treaty.

[77] See William Beecher, "Russia *vs.* China Along Their 4,500 Mile Border," *International Herald Tribune*, July 22, 1970.

[78] See R. Waring Herrick, "Brezhnev Builds a Bilateral Treaty Bulwark Against China," Radio Liberty *Dispatch*, May 20, 1970.

## TWO VIEWPOINTS

About a hundred years ago, the area to the east of [Lake] Baikal became Russian territory, and since then Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, Kamchatka and other areas have been Soviet territory. We have not yet presented our account for this list.

**—CCP Chairman Mao Tse-tung, in an interview with a Japanese Socialist Party delegation, *Sekai Shuho* (Tokyo), Aug. 11, 1964.**

I would like to quote our Premier [Khrushchev], who has said that the borders of our country . . . are sacred. We are prepared to handle all border problems calmly. But one should also know that on the Soviet borders not only our entire military power but also the hearts of all our people stand on guard, in the west as in the east.

**—Alexei Adzhubei, then editor of *Izvestia*, in an interview published in *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), Aug. 2, 1964.**



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The many faces...



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# Is China Expansionist?

EDITORS' NOTE: China's possession of a growing nuclear weapons system and of a developing delivery system has given new impetus to speculations about her foreign policy objectives and intentions. Because China's record in this field, as in many others, has been ambiguous since the inception of the Great Cultural Revolution, Western observers have been widely divided in their interpretations—particularly on the question of whether China's foreign policy is expansionist or not. We present below two contrasting views and cordially invite our readers to send in brief comments, which we will endeavor to publish in the correspondence columns of subsequent issues.

## A Design for Aggression

**By Franz Michael**

Commentators who talk about Communist Chinese "expansionism" tend to approach the subject in terms of the 19th- or early 20th-century concept of the game of international power politics played among nation-states. "What will *China* do next?" is the issue often posed, as if in our time international relations could still be described in terms of the actions taken by individual states. Too little attention is paid to the fact that since the establishment of Communist power in the Soviet Union in 1917, a new dimension has been added to world politics—a unique Communist policy, known in doctrinal terminology as "socialist internationalism." After the Communist seizure of power in China in 1949, this new dimension, related as it is to the drive for a worldwide Communist revolution, became an integral factor in Chinese Communist foreign policy. In the writer's view, it promises to assume an even larger role in the aftermath of the GPCR—China's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of 1966-67.

This ideological dimension is of major importance in the foreign policy of all Communist countries. When the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was first founded, Lenin and his colleagues envisioned the new polity as the nucleus of a world structure, to be joined by "soviets"—that is, victorious revolutionary governments—from all continents of the globe. The first military force in the USSR was recruited not only among Russians but from German and Austrian prisoners of war and other nationalities; it was meant to be a truly international army, fighting for the goal of world revolution.

That phase ended within a year, when the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk forced the revolutionary movement to assume the functions of a state and introduced Leninist communism to the rules of international conduct which had evolved among nation-states over several centuries. When other Communist governments were formed after World War II, they too took their place in the traditional state system.

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However, the principal aspect of communism—its identity as an international movement—was not abandoned. Rather, it formed the basis for a new type of international system in which all Communist parties participated then and still participate today. The initial institutional form of this Communist internationalism, Lenin's Comintern, was abandoned in 1943; its lesser successor, Stalin's Cominform of 1947, was dissolved in its turn in 1956. Since that time, the formal instrument for coordinating Communist strategy and formulating the international party line has been the occasional interparty conference, in which allegedly equal and independent Communist parties have participated. In the conflicts arising within the Communist movement, such conferences themselves have become a subject of argument.

Despite the several shifts in—and progressive weakening of—the institutional forms, the basic conceptual approach to international affairs has remained the same among all Communist parties. This approach distinguishes between traditional interstate relations and a modern form of international relations expressed in the broad interaction of Communist parties, revolutionary movements, classes, and social groups as interpreted by Communist doctrine. The doctrine thus serves as a framework in which all international development is to be understood and utilized. The clearest expression of this world view can be found in discussions of the two forms of international law—the "capitalist" and the Communist. In both Chinese and Soviet writings, the thesis has been advanced that a gradual transformation of traditional "capitalist" international law into new forms of Communist law is taking place. While "capitalist" law is still in use—and will be as long as the world order contains "capitalist" states—Communist international law is claimed to be in the ascendancy. The latter represents the rules of "socialist internationalism" and covers relations within the Communist movement as well as within the Communist commonwealth. It also applies to relationships between the Communists and disaffected groups in any society, supplying justification for the support of revolution in non-Communist countries and in particular for the support of "national liberation movements." Thus, in law as in fact, Communist foreign policies are conducted on two levels—traditional state-to-state relations, and direct contact with and backing of militant movements and social groups, revolutionary actions, and "national liberation wars." When we speak of Communist aggressiveness we must therefore think not only in terms of traditional state relations and traditional military attacks, but also—and primarily—in terms of Communist revolutionary strategy, backed by military power.

## Two Kinds of Expansionism

In terms of the traditional concepts of what constitutes aggressive international behavior, it can be argued that Communist China is *not* an expansionist power. In the writer's view, the Chinese Communist regime has demonstrated no territorial ambitions beyond its present borders—though within the latter it does, of course, lay claim to the lands of certain non-Chinese peoples who were part of the former Chinese empire. The maltreatment of minority groups within China proper, the swamping of the Turki tribes in Sinkiang by government-enforced migration of ethnic Chinese into that province, the genocide committed by the Communist Chinese in Tibet—all can be explained within the framework of a ruthless internal communization and Sinification policy which does not respect ethnic or cultural autonomy. But—with the exception, perhaps, of Chinese action in the Himalayas—this policy stops at the present border. The Chinese Communists' military aid to North Korea in 1950 and more recent assistance to North Vietnam help to demonstrate the nature of Peking's objectives—which are confined to support of Communist policies or regimes and pursuit of certain limited frontier goals, stopping short of any attempt to conquer new colonies or to extend Chinese rule over new peoples.

Peking's disinterest in old-style empire-building has deflected Western attention from the far more important form of "expansionism" that it practices—the spread of Communist world revolution. Comprehension of this phenomenon is crucial since we live in a revolutionary epoch and since today, more than ever, Communist China plays a special part in Communist revolutionary strategy.

Briefly described, Chinese communism has been both the test case and the proclaimed model for the strategy of creating "national liberation movements" and promoting "national wars of liberation." This strategy was originally conceived and directed by Lenin and his Soviet successors. Following the initial heady months of the Bolsheviks' seizure of power in 1917, after the Communists lost hope that the wave of revolution would spill over into Central Europe, Lenin began to look eastward. The new strategy he developed called for the formation of national libera-



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tion movements based on an alliance, or "united front," of Communists and "bourgeois nationalists" in the colonial world of Asia, with the aim of promoting anti-imperialist revolution as part of the Communist world revolution. This second strategy was to tie in with strategy number one, the promotion of "proletarian revolution" in the industrial countries of the world. Whether strategy number two was to play a secondary, equal, or even a primary role in world Communist revolution remained a moot point. What differentiated the strategy of "national liberation movements" from the strategy of proletarian revolution was its military character. In place of urban uprisings, the general strike, and conspiratorial and open activities of Communist parties, the new Communist strategy assigned a special role to revolutionary armies. In fact, Mao's slogan that "power grows out of the barrel of a gun" specifically derived from a reference made by Stalin in 1925 to the Chinese "revolutionary army's" special role in contrast to civilian uprisings elsewhere.[1] Prolonged warfare and a party-army structure distinguished this type of Communist strategy from that developed in the Soviet system.

In the institutional structure that emerged under Chinese communism, the relationship of party to army differed from that in the Soviet Union or in other Communist countries. The Soviet Red Army, which was Leon Trotsky's personal creation, was established *after* the Bolsheviks' seizure of power. It remained under the control of civilian party leaders, and its professional military generals, with one exception, never rose to the top level of political leadership. By contrast, the protracted civil war in China led to the virtual fusion of the Communist political and military leadership; the party was in effect imbedded in the army. Mao started his career as political commissar in the Chu-Mao forces in the Chingkang mountains and rose to a leading position in the party through military backing. Military commanders and commissars were all part of the party leadership and were vitally concerned with overall policy as well as with military matters.

The party-army structure prevailed through the early phase of civil war in the mid-1920's, the Kiangsi and Yenan periods, the war with Japan, the 1945-49 period, and the first years after the Communist victory in 1949. In all these stages of Chinese communism the military was the dominant factor; whatever party and administrative structure existed was attached to the military. The military, however, had its own political infrastructure; in stating that "the party controls the gun," Mao made it clear that the party element within the army had authority over the military command.

Although the fusion of party and army was designed for the conduct of the civil war, it continued to have an impact on the political structure after the Chinese Communists' conquest of power. When separate party and government structures were formed in 1953 in a trend towards civilian control, the Chinese military man remained much more influential in the party and government structure than was his counterpart in the Soviet Union. The trend was in any event reversed after 1959, when Mao, with the support of the newly-appointed Minister of Defense, Lin Piao, began to use the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to buttress his power and propagate his cult.

During the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the military provided the logistics for the Red Guard rallies in Peking, supported the Maoist "Left" in its drive against the party leadership in the provinces, and helped promote the so-called "seizure of power" by the Maoists. When the "revolutionary rebels" were in turn discarded, the military itself assumed ruling authority. As a result of the Cultural Revolution, the military has thus come to resume its civil war role and once more predominates in the reorganized government structure and in the new party apparatus.

Over the years the Chinese "model" for revolution has been widely heralded in Communist propaganda and its importance keenly debated in the West. Mao's writings on guerrilla warfare have been used as texts for this kind of strategy by many aspirants to revolutionary leadership, from insurgents in a number of Asian and African countries to Che Guevara and other insurrectionists on the Latin American continent.

In the writer's view, however, the essence of Mao's revolutionary strategy has been misunderstood by its imitators and its adversaries alike, leading to classical failures like Che's fiasco in Bolivia. Where the strategy has had success, the explanation has lain not so much in the alleged utilization of popular issues or in the application of phased stages of warfare—which in fact proved counterproductive in the case of the 1968 Tet offensive in Vietnam (although highly successful as a propaganda issue in

[1] See, J. V. Stalin, *Works*, Vol. 8, January-November 1926, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1954, p. 379. In "Problems of War and Strategy," *Mao's Selected Works* (Vol. 2, 1937-38, New York, International Publishers, 1954, pp. 268-70), Mao quotes Stalin and develops at length the idea of the role of the army for which he later coined this well-known phrase.



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the United States)—but rather in its reliance on special institutionalized methods of attack and on the weapons of terror and intimidation. What has emerged is a new kind of organized warfare in which, conceptually and practically, a Communist infrastructure, combining military with political leadership and planning, plays a crucial part.

If the importance of this institutional factor has escaped the Guevaras, it is no wonder that the new warfare is also little understood in the West. Some of the debates in the United States about Vietnam and Cambodia have concentrated on the problem of the constitutionality of an undeclared war; yet to pose the issue in these terms is to apply to the present military action a conceptual approach that was designed for conventional wars between states. This tradition-bound thinking is simply inapplicable to the problem of aggression as it is waged by today's insurgent forces, backed up by the supportive efforts of the Communist epicenters.

## A New Course

As the major adaptor of the new revolutionary strategy, the Chinese Communist regime has assumed a special role in championing "wars of liberation." Even at the height of the Cultural Revolution, when the regime's attention was primarily focused inward, it did not abandon its support of insurrectionary activity abroad. And lately, it has become increasingly clear that Peking intends to adopt a more activist role in the international arena.

In recent moves initiated by the Communist leader Chou En-lai, China has clearly broken away from its relative isolation in the years of the Cultural Revolution. Under the new policy, the Communist leadership in Peking not only has renewed diplomatic relations with certain countries in the noncommitted world and in the West but—more significantly—has resumed an active part in promoting Communist advances in Asia.

This new militancy has been embodied in what the Chinese Communists call their Asian United Front. The major targets at present are South Korea and the countries of Indochina. During a visit to Pyongyang by Chou En-lai in early 1970, the unity of the Korean and Chinese Communist leaderships was proclaimed in statements resorting to the most bitter and strident language used in years to attack "American imperialism" as the main enemy, along with the United States' "lackeys" in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Indochina and Israel. Chou's visit was followed by an exchange of visits between Chinese Communist and North Korean chiefs of staff and top military leaders, resulting in prolonged discussions whose contents at this time can only be surmised. A similar indication of a more aggressive approach on China's southern flank was provided by Chou's participation in the Indochina Conference, held somewhere in South China in late April 1970, resulting in pledges of support for Sihanouk's attempt to re-establish his rule over Cambodia with the aid of Hanoi's troops.

The militancy recently displayed by Peking is obviously related to Peking's acquisition of a nuclear deterrent. Its new position as a nuclear power—albeit a lesser power—has clearly played a part in Peking's decision to engage in more vigorous sponsorship and support of "wars of liberation" in Asia. The statements and agreements between Peking and her North Korean and Indochinese allies underscore this point in advertising China's position as a "reliable rear area" for such wars. Backing up their words, the Chinese Communists have made disproportionately heavy investments in the field of nuclear weapons and missiles as compared to other economic and military expenditures.

This enunciation of a policy of aggression makes it necessary to take new stock of Chinese aims, techniques and tactics, and to find ways to counter them. The clear intent of current Chinese policy is to promote, foster and support Communist revolutions. In this respect there is no reason why we should not accept the words and actions of the Chinese Communist leaders at face value—yet it has been fashionable for some time to refuse to do just that. A good deal has been written in the pages of this journal and elsewhere about the myth, now almost universally repudiated, that communism in the Stalin era represented a monolithic system. As much has been written about the more recent, reverse tendency to assume that since communism is *not* monolithic but in fact defines and embraces various conflicting trends, it does not constitute either a real movement or a real menace to the non-Communist world. This, too, is a myth—but all too often the fact is not recognized. Indeed, multi-centered communism can be perceived as a vastly more effective entity than a monolithic system, insofar as it existed, ever was.

Quarrels within the Communist movement can, of course, hamper the effectiveness of the overall strategy to enhance Communist power. Obviously the most important issue in this regard has been the Sino-Soviet conflict. For several years this con-



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flict has been a crucially divisive factor in the Communist world with respect to a whole range of issues involving strategy, ideology and leadership.

## The Sino-Soviet "Debate"

Just how seriously the Sino-Soviet conflict has handicapped the promotion of broad Communist aims could, however, be made a matter of argument. A strategy directed from two centers, each of which must concentrate part of its propaganda and its military force against the other, obviously weakens efforts toward the common goal of spreading communism. The Sino-Soviet conflict has thus reduced the pressure which both contenders might apply to the outside world. On the other hand, it has also made possible the simultaneous pursuit of the overall goal by two different tactical approaches, permitting the use of soporific propaganda under the strategy of peaceful coexistence, and the use of force and terror under the strategy of revolutionary warfare. In light of Peking's militant pronouncements supporting "national liberation movements" and revolutionary violence, Moscow has appeared peaceful indeed, while to young radicals the Maoist image has become a revolutionary idol far more attractive than Moscow's "revisionist" policy, believed to be outdated and futile. The practical effect of promoting Communist policy with two differing accents, respectively articulated by Moscow and Peking, has been well defined by a Chinese military leader, the former chief-of-staff Lo Jui-ch'ing, in comments on what he called the "debate" between Moscow and Peking. In Lo's words:

*One aspect of the historic significance of the debate of the last few years between the two lines in the international Communist movement is that it has enabled Marxism-Leninism to spread on an unprecedented scale and has promoted the integration of the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the people's revolution in every country.*[2]

There has been no clearer statement describing the advantage to communism of applying simultaneously two differing strategies from two world centers.

While quite a case could be made in support of this point of view, it is the writer's judgment that on balance the Sino-Soviet conflict has been detrimental to the Communist cause. Thus it seems clear that the effectiveness of Peking's, as well as Moscow's, policies for advancing the Communist cause may well depend on the future course of Sino-Soviet relations.

During 1969 the Sino-Soviet conflict reached its maximum danger point. The buildup of massive Soviet forces of well over 30 divisions along the border of Manchuria, in Outer Mongolia, and along the Sinkiang border indicated the serious possibility of Soviet military action against the maverick Chinese Communists. The example of the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia and the ominous implications of the "Brezhnev Doctrine" similarly shook the Chinese leadership, which had felt previously that it could safely insult the Soviet leaders and with impunity conduct frontier probes in a war of nerves and propaganda. The great shift launched under Chou En-lai's direction, initiating a new phase of Chinese foreign policy, was obviously related to this Soviet threat. In brief, it combined a defusing of the Sino-Soviet conflict with a new aggressiveness towards the West. This policy constituted *"eine Flucht nach vorne"*—a flight forward, to use a German idiom, rushing away from the Sino-Soviet conflict into a new course of militancy against the United States and its allies.

A number of factors can be cited as indications that the issues and manifestations of the Sino-Soviet conflict have lost a good deal of their acerbity. Since April 1970 no frontier clashes have occurred, a navigation agreement has been reached, a new Soviet ambassador has arrived in Peking, a new Chinese ambassador has been sent to Moscow, and Sino-Soviet negotiations continue in Peking.

The recent trend toward closer Chinese cooperation with North Korea and North Vietnam could be interpreted as a policy designed to break out of Soviet containment; but since neither Pyongyang nor Hanoi has permitted a decline in its relations with Moscow as a result of negotiations with Peking, another interpretation of the new Chinese moves suggests itself: once, in the earlier stages of their conflict, Moscow and Peking attacked one another by proxy, through Yugoslavia and Albania. Now, one could contemplate a Sino-Soviet rapprochement by proxy. At the very least, the sharp lines of controversy have been blurred.

More important still, the cult of Mao has clearly declined; and so has the challenge to the Soviet Union formerly implied in the claim of Mao's personal leadership of the world revolution. For instance, in recent statements containing an exchange

[2] See *Peking Review*, No. 36, Sept. 3, 1965, p. 34.



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of felicitations between North Korea and Peking, Mao, as leader of the Chinese people and Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, shared equal status with Kim Il-song, as leader of the North Korean people and Chairman of the Korean Workers' Party.[3] Such hints of new "ideological modesty," as it were, on the part of Peking are of greater import than might be apparent to a reader uninitiated in the sign language of the Communists.

At the same time, there has been an obvious decline of Sino-Soviet name-calling since April of last year. It may well be that Peking now speaks with more than one voice. The crucial point here, however, is that reciprocal accusations have been reduced to a level that both sides appear able to tolerate. If the newly emerging political-military structure in China is acceptable within a Communist order directed, though not dominated, by Moscow, the possibility of a withering away of the conflict—through the adoption of parallel policies or even genuine rapprochement—must certainly be taken into consideration. Such a shift in intra-Communist relations would vitally affect the potential threat and aggressiveness of either Communist center vis-à-vis the non-Communist world. Even without full reconciliation, a lessening of the conflict would strengthen the effectiveness of Chinese pressure in Asia.

## The Global Perspective

Those in the United States who belittle the danger of Communist victories in the small countries of Southeast Asia and who favor a US retreat from Asia often argue that the US mainland is itself safe from attack. Such views are based on the concept of a half-world centered around Europe and America and isolated from outside pressure; they ignore the effect that a shrinking of the area occupied by free nation-states outside the Communist orbit would have not only on power relations in Asia but on the security of the whole pluralist world system, including the United States—in short, they disregard the global scope of the strategic problems posed by communism. To deny the importance of the Indochinese peninsula—which, as has already been pointed out, is one of the two main targets of Peking's current policy to promote political-military warfare—is to forget some lessons of the past. In World War II, when the Japanese penetrated Indochina, the defense of that area became a crucial issue in the final confrontation between Japan and the United States. A frequent topic of discussion at that time linked the Nazi movement against the Suez Canal and the Japanese strike against India as two arms of a global threat. Today, Moscow's attempts to gain the use of the Suez Canal as a channel for the Soviet fleet (which is already in the Indian Ocean), the respective tactics of Communist China and the USSR to secure footholds on the African Coast, on the Arab peninsula, in Ceylon, and in Singapore, and finally the support given by both Communist powers to guerrilla wars in Southeast Asia, combine to represent a global potential reminiscent of the past. The wars in Indochina are a part of this global strategy.

The methods used to support these wars of subversion are multi-faceted. On Peking's part, in addition to the protection provided by the Chinese nuclear deterrent (supplemented, of course, by the Soviet deterrent), direct aid is offered in the form of equipment, manpower, and technical know-how. Peking also helps to train cadres in the skills of guerrilla warfare. A division of labor between China and North Vietnam appears to have assigned the training of cadres for South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia to Hanoi, while Peking conducts insurgency schools for revolutionaries from Malaysia, Burma and Thailand. In the area of manpower, the Chinese have contributed large numbers of soldiers and laborers to perform production and defense tasks in North Vietnam; while at present it seems unlikely, the possibility cannot be precluded that under certain conditions Peking might some day send "volunteers" to engage in direct fighting in Indochina, as it did in North Korea.

Perhaps the most crucial supportive service provided by Peking lies in the area of psychological warfare. The success of insurrections carried out by revolutionary infrastructures depends not only on the weakening of the target country by tactics of terror and intimidation but also on the waging of psychological warfare to create an impact on the rest of the world. Thus the strategy of "national wars of liberation" relies heavily on an intensive propaganda effort to characterize the goals, motivations and techniques of the revolutionary as highly moral, not only in terms of Communist values but also in terms of Western ethics and ideals of social justice. At the same time, a constant attempt is made to discredit the side of the defenders. The making and breaking of images is one of the most vital functions involved in the conduct of "wars of national libera-

[3] For joint statements and speeches by Chou En-lai and Kim Il-song, see *Peking Review*, No. 15, April 10, 1970.



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tion." The defamation of antirevolutionary regimes, the exploitation of their structural weaknesses, and the sowing of suspicion between them and their allies constitute very effective means of undermining resistance. Such propaganda operations are not restricted to the issues involved in the "liberation" struggle but rather attempt to undercut general morale in any way possible.

In the conduct of psychological warfare, the Chinese Communists issue an incessant barrage of political propaganda which is the more dangerous in that it often sounds crude and obvious to non-Communist ears, obscuring the fact that it is highly effective in advancing Peking's objectives. Depending on the audience, China's propagandists are quite able to pursue a militant line supporting revolutionary activity in neighboring countries while simultaneously endorsing the principles of peaceful coexistence and noninterference in other nations' affairs.

In short, Peking's is an elastic stance that pushes as far as opportunity permits. It is in this sense unremittingly "expansionist"—and any real or imagined weakness on the side of the free world tempts the Communists to respond with pressure. In the mix of military and political tactics that make up this strategy of expansionism, military activity could become the more dominant feature should the Communists' chances of effective aggression seem to increase. The credibility of the United States' commitments in Asia thus becomes a major factor in the current phase of psychological warfare, and US efforts aimed at building up the strength of its allies to defend themselves must be meticulously defined in terms that will avoid the impression that Washington is veering toward isolationism. It is one thing to talk with Peking; it would be another to assist Peking in its political warfare by propounding policies which could be exploited in hostile propaganda as a sign of weakness.

In the writer's view, it is vital that more be done to define and publicize the nature of the psychological warfare being waged not only by Communist China but also by the USSR. In particular, representatives of the communications media should be alert to expose the goals and methods of hostile propaganda and to transmit to their audiences a clearer understanding of the Communists' psychological offensive. Most important, the United States and its allies must develop more effective psychological operations of their own. The world is moving into a phase in which the term "cold war" may well yield to the term "psywar," and non-Communist societies have yet to shape the tools they need to give force to their beliefs in an age of revolution.

# Mao Tse-tung and Revolutionary "Self-Reliance"

**By Peter Van Ness**

Powerful states will seek to expand and enhance their power—this historical truism seems to hold across time and in spite of differing political philosophies. Militant nationalism in the present era only appears to reconfirm the validity of the generalization. Yet, power has been perceived and applied differently by the leaders of powerful states, depending among other things on the domestic dynamic of the state, its relative capabilities as compared with other states, and the ethic—the code of morality or social philosophy—which provides the ideological foundation and legitimacy for political rule. Philosophy may have great impact on political behavior (as analysts of Marxist-Leninist ideology have often demonstrated); and philosophy becomes particularly significant for international re-

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lations, I submit, through its influence on perception —how political leaders think, how they view the world, and, perhaps most importantly, how they perceive and evaluate themselves and their own actions.

In presenting an answer to the question posed in the title—is China an expansionist power?—this essay considers "expansionism" to mean a sustained effort to exercise direct control over people and territory beyond a nation's own borders. Most analysts would agree that China unquestionably seeks greater power and influence in world affairs. But, the question remains, do Chinese actions aimed at gaining greater *influence* constitute *expansionism?* My answer is no.

## The Historical Record

China is a revolutionary power. Its ultimate global objectives call for a complete transformation of the existing international system. From its founding in 1949 to the present day, the People's Republic of China, the government of the world's most populous country and third most extensive territory, has verbally assaulted the international status quo, denouncing the major world powers as oppressive regimes and transitory historical relics, and calling at different times for the immediate overthrow of various foreign governments. Also, China's military capabilities are hardly negligible. Peking maintains one of the world's largest standing armies (some three million men) and is rapidly developing both nuclear weapons and a missile delivery capability. A recent example of the advanced state of Chinese rocket technology was the launching last April of the first Chinese earth satellite, sent orbiting around the globe broadcasting "The East Is Red."

Yet, despite Peking's inflammatory rhetoric and its formidable military power, Chinese behavior in foreign affairs has been perhaps surprisingly circumspect. In the 21 years since the establishment of the People's Republic, Chinese military units, with the exception of the Korean War, have rarely, and then only briefly, engaged in combat operations beyond or adjacent to China's borders. Let us look at the record.

Chinese military activity over the last two decades can be readily classified into three categories: 1) internal actions—specifically, the re-establishment of China's borders in 1949-50, the suppression of domestic opposition, and the continuance of the civil war with the Nationalists; 2) conflict over disputed territorial boundaries—principally with India and the Soviet Union; and, 3) military initiatives taken in support of the defense of neighboring Communist states—namely, North Korea in 1950-53 and North Vietnam in 1965-68.

Fundamental to an understanding of Chinese international behavior is the distinction between internal affairs and foreign relations. Clearly, the periodic military conflicts (especially in 1954 and 1958) with the Chinese Nationalists over the offshore islands, as well as the entire issue of the political future of Taiwan, are internal Chinese affairs—remnants of an uncompleted civil war (in which the United States intervened in June 1950 after the outbreak of the Korean War). Both Chinese governments see this to be the case, and both remain publicly committed to resolving their differences by force. Similarly, the invasion of Tibet by the People's Liberation Army in the autumn of 1950 and the PLA's subsequent suppression of rebellions in that area (particularly in 1959, when the Dalai Lama fled to India) were also operations carried out within boundaries recognized by both Nationalists and Communists as the proper limits of Chinese domain. (Moreover, the region of Tibet has never gained general recognition as an independent country.[1]) To classify these conflicts as international events and to point to them as evidence of an expansionist Chinese foreign policy is to distort and to misunderstand their significance. No matter how repugnant the use of force may be in any context, these events have to do with China's domestic affairs, and are viewed as such by both Chinese governments.

More controversial for purposes of interpretation are armed conflicts arising from disputes over China's territorial boundaries. Analysis of this second category of Chinese military activity principally relates to border conflicts with India and the Soviet Union. In both cases, the location of the border line became an issue after other differences had arisen between China and the two countries, both of which had earlier been friendly with Peking. One possible inference from this fact is that territory *per se* may not have been so important to China as other questions.

With respect to India, relations between Peking and New Delhi began to deteriorate drastically following the 1959 uprising in Tibet and India's decision to provide the rebels with sanctuary and material assistance. Subsequently, military probes

[1] Arthur Huck, *The Security of China: Chinese Approaches to Problems of War and Strategy*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1970, p. 42.



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were initiated by both sides along the contested border, and finally, in the autumn of 1962, Chinese forces launched an attack into the Northeast Frontier Agency area in Assam and badly defeated the Indian Army. Shortly thereafter, however, the Chinese troops withdrew. Both before and since the 1962 battles, the Chinese have appeared less interested in Assam than in Ladakh to the West, through which they have built a strategically vital highway linking Tibet and Sinkiang. Peking has seemed willing to settle the border dispute by trading concessions regarding Assam for Indian agreement to the status quo in Ladakh.

The story of the Sino-Soviet conflict is well known to readers of this journal and does not bear repeating. Suffice it to say that in this case, as in the Sino-Indian dispute, hostilities regarding boundary questions followed the emergence of profound political differences between the two governments. China's particular case is based on a denial of the legitimacy of the so-called "unequal treaties" between China and Russia, which were concluded before Communist governments had come to power in either country.

Analysts differ in their assessments of the relative merits of the Chinese legal position compared with those of India and the Soviet Union regarding their border differences; however, a general conclusion seems to be that there is merit on both sides, and that the Chinese have been no more aggressive in pressing their demands than has the other party.[2] It should be added that during the same period in which conflicts have occurred with India and the USSR, China has signed formal treaties delineating common boundaries with five other neighboring countries (Burma, Nepal, Mongolia, Pakistan and Afghanistan) and has often made rather generous concessions in the process of negotiating the agreements.[3]

The final category of Chinese military activity—initiatives taken in support of the defense of neighboring Communist states—constitutes the only use of Chinese military units in the history of the People's Republic in combat operations occurring in territory clearly outside China's borders. In both cases, in Korea in 1950-53 and North Vietnam in 1965-68, Chinese troops were used to defend established governments under attack by American-supported offensives arising out of conflicts in the southern half of divided countries (initially begun, respectively, by the North Korean invasion and by the Vietcong insurrection). Both times Peking's intervention was characterized by the prompt withdrawal of Chinese forces as soon as they were no longer required, and no Chinese political control has resulted from the intervention.[4]

Obviously, the extent to which Chinese forces were actually engaged in combat varied greatly in the two cases. With regard to North Vietnam, Chinese troops were presumably requested by Hanoi to relieve Vietnamese forces for combat in the South and to serve as a deterrent to an American invasion of North Vietnam. Apparently, no more than 50,000 Chinese troops at most were ever stationed in North Vietnam, and the vast majority of these were engaged in rebuilding bombed-out railway lines and other facilities, while some played a role in the air defense of the country.[5] In Korea, the situation was very different indeed. Chinese troops intervened in that conflict in the fall of 1950, after United Nations forces—ignoring warnings from Peking—crossed the line which had earlier divided North and South. The existence of the Communist government in Pyongyang was unquestionably at stake as American and South Korean forces sought to unify the country by force, and it was only intervention by the Chinese which prevented this rollback operation from attaining success. Chinese involvement in the Korean War constitutes the most significant case of Chinese military activity since 1949; some 300,000 troops were engaged in combat for almost three years.[6]

Common to all the cases of Chinese military activity having to do with border disputes or assistance to neighboring Communist governments is a pattern of military involvement for limited objectives; cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of troops when these objectives were attained; and virtually no gain for China in terms of expanded territory or political control as a result of its military actions. Indeed,

[2] See, for example, Robert C. North, *The Foreign Relations of China*, Belmont, Calif., Dickenson, 1969, pp. 92-94; Gregory Clark, *In Fear of China*, Melbourne, Lansdowne, 1967, especially Ch. V; and Harrison E. Salisbury, *War Between Russia and China*, New York, Bantam, 1970.

[3] Douglas M. Johnston and Hungdah Chiu, Eds., *Agreements of the People's Republic of China 1949-1967: A Calendar*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1968.

[4] In fact, North Vietnam and North Korea are presently two of the most independent countries in the Communist world, despite the fact that the Korean government was originally put in power by the Soviet army and was for several years unquestionably a Soviet dependent state.

[5] *The New York Times*, Sept. 3, 1969, p. 1.

[6] Allen S. Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1969, especially Ch. VII.



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many analysts have inferred an essentially defensive motivation from the various Chinese uses of military force in the international arena.[7]

## Revolution

Often allegations of Chinese expansionist designs are most closely associated with Peking's support for foreign revolutions. I have tried to explain the significance of revolution for Chinese foreign relations elsewhere,[8] but here let me relate support for revolution to the issue of Chinese expansionism.

China, like virtually all major powers, seeks to influence the internal politics of other countries from time to time by providing moral and often material support for individuals and organizations which it favors in those countries. In China's case, many of these organizations are engaged in making revolution against established governments. However, Chinese policy regarding revolutionary movements—as is clear from both public statements and 20 years of history—calls for revolutionaries to rely principally on their own efforts and resources to gain power. The most comprehensive articulation of this concept of self-reliance appears in Lin Piao's variously-interpreted "Long Live the Victory of People's War!" [9] In a discussion of this statement and an analysis of Peking's support for revolutions, Arthur Huck, writing in a study done for the Institute for Strategic Studies, concludes: "Far from being a *blueprint for the direct expansion of Chinese influence*, it argues that revolution cannot be exported and that the people's forces must be almost entirely self-reliant." [10] In the same vein, a recent empirical study of actual Chinese international behavior in support of revolutions finds that the Chinese have been true to the principle of self-reliance in practice and concludes that Chinese support "is most certainly not a recipe for direct CPR involvement or control of revolutionary movements." [11]

The self-reliance doctrine is apparently derived from a combination of philosophical principle and hard practical experience. The Maoists argue that it is the duty of all peoples to liberate themselves (not to be "liberated" by foreign armies) and that, in fact, reliance on one's own efforts is the only possible way to achieve real self-determination. Similar conclusions have been inferred from the Chinese Communists' own experience and from the revolutionary successes and failures of others. To have any hope of winning power, a revolutionary movement must have the support of the people; foreign armies are hardly likely to help the movement win popular support, and the involvement of such outside forces in a revolution may drastically distort its purpose. Moreover, history has also shown that successful Communist-led revolutionary movements are virtually impossible to control from abroad after they have attained power (witness the cases of Yugoslavia, North Vietnam, Cuba, and China itself). And even those Communist governments originally placed in power by foreign armies have progressively forged a wider degree of independence from their "liberators" (particularly the regimes in Romania, North Korea, and Czechoslovakia before the Soviet-led invasion).

Over the years, the Chinese have restricted their assistance to foreign revolutionaries primarily to vocal moral support broadcast by the Chinese radio and published in the official press. In some cases, significant material assistance has been rendered and training for combatants provided, either in China or abroad. There have also been stories claiming that Chinese advisors have been discovered working with revolutionaries in the field, but these reports have proven difficult to confirm.[12] In any event, apparently for reasons of both practical politics and moral principle, Peking has consistently refrained from committing Chinese military units to fight on the side of foreign revolutionaries.

If, as the record shows, China has not behaved in a manner indicating expansionist intent, why not? What factors have constrained what might be seen as a natural expansionist tendency on the part of an emergent international power? In my view, the explanation lies partly in the area of comparative economic resources and military capabilities—but

[7] See, for example, *ibid.*, Ch. VIII; Clark, *op. cit.*; North, *op. cit.*; and Huck, *op. cit.*

[8] See my *Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking's Support for Wars of National Liberation*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1970.

[9] *Peking Review*, Sept. 3, 1965.

[10] Huck, *op. cit.*, pp. 50-54. Huck also quotes at length from an interview given by Ch'en Yi to an Australian, John Dixon, in which the principle of not using Chinese troops to support foreign revolutions is discussed in detail.

[11] Daniel Lovelace, *"People's War" and Chinese Foreign Policy: Thailand as a Case Study of Overt Insurgent Support*, unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School, 1970, especially pp. 215-18.

[12] Reports have been confirmed of Chinese construction troops helping to build roads in Pathet-Lao-held areas of northern Laos. However, the same accounts indicate that the Chinese have not been involved in combat operations. See, for example, *The New York Times*, Sept. 14, 1969, p. 7; Oct. 16, 1969, p. 13; and Dec. 15, 1969, p. 4.



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perhaps equally in the realm of what might be called moral constraints on international behavior. Let us deal with capabilities first.

After an early period of indecision in 1949 and 1950, the United States adopted a position of unequivocal and adamant opposition to the People's Republic of China following the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 and the Chinese intervention in that conflict in October-November. These were the days of a considerably greater solidarity and organizational unity within the Communist world under the authority of Joseph Stalin, and China was seen by most American policymakers as but a single component of a bloc of hostile Communist states. The American position formulated on the basis of the Korean conflict has remained the foundation of US policy vis-à-vis China to the present, only superficially modified by recent changes having to do with trade and travel. Military containment has been and continues to be a basic principle of this policy, and a system of military bases has been erected throughout Asia to provide the staging areas to affirm this commitment.

More recently, the world's second superpower, the Soviet Union, has evolved an adversary relationship with China: at first, Moscow withheld support for certain Chinese foreign policy initiatives (in the late 1950's); later it increasingly opposed Peking's policy and actually competed for influence with China in certain areas; and eventually things reached a point of such mutual enmity that each of the two Communist giants, China and the USSR, came to view the other as its most fearsome world enemy.

Hence, virtually since its founding, the Peking government has faced an international situation in which its enemies—first the United States and later both the US and the USSR—were countries which enjoyed a staggering superiority in economic resources and military capabilities. Comparisons with the United States alone are overwhelming. Peking has not published statistics on Chinese economic performance for a decade, but even optimistic estimates of China's present level of GNP would still leave the US with at least a 6-to-1 superiority. Comparative population figures (roughly 200 million Americans and 800 million Chinese) place China at an obviously greater economic disadvantage. Considering military power, the United States holds the advantage in virtually every category, from an immense superiority in nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems,[13] naval and air power, and modern weaponry in general, to a lead even in the comparative number of men under arms (both the US and the USSR have larger standing armies than China's).[14] The addition of the total capabilities of America's allies—not to mention the Soviet Union's power—makes for an extremely intimidating profile of military might arrayed against the People's Republic of China.

Moreover, it is clear that China's principal adversaries are committed to a military containment of Chinese power within China's borders, if not to the overthrow of the Peking government itself. To this end, both the United States and the Soviet Union have separately sought to build diplomatic alliances composed of China's Asian neighbors. Whether for "the defense of the free world" or for "collective security in Asia," [15] the purpose of these diplomatic initiatives has amounted to the same thing—containment of China.

Confronting this vast array of military might, Peking has chosen to invest its limited resources largely in two kinds of military capability: a nuclear-weapons/missile-delivery system and a large conventional army. Chinese national security strategy is founded on an effort to create as soon as humanly possible a nuclear deterrent to the American and Soviet threat,[16] and in the meantime to organize the defense of Chinese territory on the basis of the Maoist conception of "people's war"—*i.e.*, to draw an invader deep into Chinese territory and destroy him largely through guerrilla tactics. As a result of this strategic conception and these resource-allocation priorities, Peking has invested very little in the modernization and mechanization of the People's Liberation Army. Compared with most conventional armies of the day, the PLA is equipped with little in the way of heavy artillery, tanks, or transport capability; and it includes only a minor air force and almost no navy.

Thus, not only is Peking lacking in comparative military capabilities, but also it has chosen not to invest its scarce resources or to organize its military forces in a manner appropriate for offensive military

[13] To date, China has not yet tested an ICBM and has only tested one shorter-range missile/atomic warhead combination.

[14] Huck, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

[15] For a report on the initial response to Moscow's collective security conception, see Hemen Ray's article, "Soviet Diplomacy in Asia," in the March-April 1970 issue of this journal.

[16] For a thoughtful discussion of the question of a Chinese nuclear deterrent, see Huck, *op. cit.*, pp. 75-77. David Mozingo argues that the principal significance of the American ABM is to prevent, or at least to postpone, the establishment of a Chinese nuclear deterrent, hence continuing the credibility of an American first-strike capability against China: *China's Foreign Policy and the Cultural Revolution,* Interim Report, No. 1, Cornell University International Relations of East Asia Project, Ithaca, 1970, p. 60.



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action. In fact, China today has no real offensive capability in the sense of being able to launch an effective attack on a major power.[17] Should Peking decide to assault a lesser neighboring country, one or the other of the superpowers would very likely intervene.

## Maoist Morality

Maoist philosophy and the Chinese conception of proper political action, including the use of military force, make for additional constraints on a possible expansionist design.

One of the most neglected areas in Western studies of communism is the role of morality in Communist political behavior. Many studies have treated "ideology" as a factor, but few have explored the possible moral ramifications of Communist ideology: as a philosophy, as the value foundation for a nation's self-image and world view, as a definition of the good society and proper social behavior, or as a basis for distinguishing right from wrong. This is not surprising because Communists in practice have often subjugated ideal ends to cynical political means, implying by their actions that there were no moral limits to their choice of tactics. Moreover, for the Western analyst, communism has been the enemy; and there is a natural tendency in analyzing one's political adversaries to infuse one's own ideology into the analysis—that is, to confuse analysis with moral denunciations of the enemy, thereby ignoring or at least denigrating the possible influence of some moral code on the actions of the "evil" adversary.

Regarding China, the point is simply that for its leaders, as for other state policymakers, choices for action are not entirely value-free. Policymakers are not as Machiavellian as is often thought; even for veteran manipulators of power, certain choices are to some extent "unthinkable."

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution provides an excellent example of the influence of Maoist values on crucially important policy decisions. The Cultural Revolution was not simply a struggle for power, as many analysts would have it; it was also a struggle for the attainment of the Maoist conception of the good society. Moreover, the means—revolution from below—was seen as fundamental to the likelihood of success. Had Mao's objectives simply been to purge some of China's top leaders, presumably the army under the Maoist Lin Piao could have provided sufficient power to do the job. But individual leaders were not the principal target of the Cultural Revolution. Rather, the object of attack was the whole way of life which had been developing in China, characterized by bureaucratization, materialism, self-interest, and an elitist style of party rule. Hence, the purge was indeed directed at leaders responsible for such developments; but, more importantly, Mao's intent was to purge the entire system through a process of challenge from below aimed at virtually every social institution in the country. The means seemed as important to Mao as the ends, and apparently it was his judgment that a less risky method would not prove sufficient to attain his desired objectives. The risks were great (including the prospect of domestic dissension and production losses, the danger of intervention by foreign enemies in a divided China, and the possibility that profound doubts might be raised about the entire future of party rule); but the stakes were high—the Cultural Revolution was a life-or-death struggle, as Mao saw it, for the ideals of the Chinese Revolution.

Similarly, Maoist thinking conceives of only certain proper means for the attainment of the Chinese international objective of world revolution. Revolution abroad, as in China, must not be imposed from above; and there is certainly no proper role for Chinese or any other foreign military forces in revolutions abroad. To quote Lin Piao, "Revolution, or people's war, in any country is the business of the masses in that country and should be carried out primarily by their own efforts; there is no other way." [18]

The Maoist philosophical commitment to nonintervention by Chinese troops and to the self-reliance of foreign revolutionaries relates directly to Peking's basic view of the world and China's role

[17] See, for example, the analysis by Frank E. Armbruster of the Hudson Institute, "China's Conventional Military Capability," in Tang Tsou, Ed., *China in Crisis: China's Policies in Asia and America's Alternatives*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1968.

[18] "Long Live the Victory of People's War!" *loc. cit.*, p. 19. In the same article, Lin Piao states further: "In order to make a revolution and to fight a people's war and be victorious, it is imperative to adhere to the policy of self-reliance, rely on the strength of the masses in one's own country and prepare to carry on the fight independently even when all material aid from outside is cut off. If one does not operate by one's own efforts, does not independently ponder and solve the problems of the revolution in one's own country and does not rely on the strength of the masses, but leans wholly on foreign aid—even though this be aid from socialist countries which persist in revolution—no victory can be won, or be consolidated even if it is won." *Ibid.*, p. 22.



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and influence in it. Daniel Lovelace, in a study of Sino-Thai relations, finds the Maoist conception of influence in international affairs to be largely one based on virtuous example or model effect. Somewhat like their Confucian predecessors, the Maoists seek to exert a moral influence. Lovelace argues that it is self-reliance in each country (*i.e.,* revolutionary success *without* Chinese involvement or control) which constitutes proof of the universal validity of Maoist doctrine.[19] Hence, one might say that the Maoist philosophical concept of international influence is not of the expansion of Chinese state power, but rather one of the successful diffusion of Maoist political virtue.

From this perspective, for China to invade and seek to control neighboring countries would constitute a flagrant violation of the very principles which Peking has so vigorously propagated. Also, Peking has not been insensitive to world opinion in its search for national dignity and international respect. Policy alternatives which involve actions in violation of principle must appear to Chinese policymakers both personally repugnant and also costly in terms of ideological influence at home and abroad. Thus, Maoist philosophy itself works as a constraint on possible Chinese expansionist tendencies.

## The Future

The future, as always, is not clear. The political outcome of the Cultural Revolution is still in doubt; it is by no means certain that Maoism will prevail in China. Not all of China's leaders in the past have agreed with Mao on questions of principle and strategy. For example, Lo Jui-ch'ing, former PLA Chief of Staff and one of the first major victims of the Cultural Revolution, is said to have favored a much more interventionist foreign policy and the resumption of a close working alliance with the Soviet Union, both of which would have enhanced the possibility of China's implementing an expansionist policy in Asia.[20] Future changes in Chinese leadership may bring men holding such views to power in Peking.

Moreover, there are patterns discernible in the history of Soviet international relations which could possibly provide insights into China's future. In his *The New Class,* Milovan Djilas speaks of two distinct periods in the history of Soviet foreign policy: the first, a "revolutionary" phase, primarily defensive and rather like Chinese foreign policy today; and the second, an "imperialist" phase, aggressive and expansionist, which emerged after the USSR had developed resources and capabilities sufficient to support a more interventionist posture.[21]

Is it inevitable that a more technocratic, less philosophical leadership will come to power in China, which will create the economic and military capabilities essential for vast state power and then use them to support an expansionist policy abroad? No one knows for sure. But it is strange by contrast, I think, that we have taken so long to initiate a meaningful dialogue with the aging visionary in Peking, preoccupied as he is with trying to create his conception of the good society in China, adamantly opposed to reconciliation with the heretics in Moscow, and firmly committed to realizing world revolution only by means of self-reliance.

[19] Lovelace, *op. cit.* especially pp. 199-201 and pp. 215-18.

[20] Donald S. Zagoria, *Vietnam Triangle,* New York, Pegasus, 1967, Ch. III.

[21] Milovan Djilas, *The New Class,* New York, Praeger, 1957, pp. 178-79.



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# Books

# A Probing Policy

**By G. F. Hudson**

HAROLD C. HINTON: *China's Turbulent Quest: an Analysis of China's Foreign Relations since 1945.* New York, Macmillan, 1970.

PETER VAN NESS: *Revolution and China's Foreign Policy: Peking's Support for Wars of National Liberation.* Berkeley, University of California Press, 1970.

THE PUBLISHER'S NOTICE on the jacket of Professor Hinton's book on Chinese Communist foreign policy refers to China as "a vastly important and puzzling country," a comment reminiscent of Gen. George C. Marshall's remark in 1948 that "the problem of China has passed altogether beyond my comprehension." The idea that there is something essentially mysterious and incomprehensible about contemporary China is indeed very widespread; it recalls the common nineteenth-century characterization of the Chinese as "inscrutable," which was the converse of the Chinese view that "the barbarian mind is unfathomable." But the careful and thorough analyses of the foreign policy of the CPR (Chinese People's Republic) in the two recently published books of Professors Hinton and Van Ness go a long way to dispel the mystery, perhaps not so much because of the explanations they offer as because of the record of Chinese word and deed they present. This is not to deny that much in Chinese policy remains opaque, or to suggest that the difficulty of understanding the politics of contemporary China has not been enormously increased by the obstacles to information gathering put in the way of those foreigners allowed into China. There is, nevertheless, a pattern which emerges from the known historical record, and which, when studied with an adequate knowledge of both the Chinese ethnic background and the general ideas and institutions of communism, permits one to draw conclusions which make sense in terms of normal international political experience; they do not require any assumption that in the Communist Chinese we are dealing with an entirely different political species.

The book by Van Ness is consciously narrow in scope, concentrating on the theme of Chinese Communist support for "wars of national liberation." The author limits his study to revolutionary uprisings that are publicly endorsed by Peking. He does not try to trace secret encouragement of or assistance to such movements, believing that information about covert incitements, even if it were available on a sufficient scale, would not greatly alter the picture he presents, and that "when they [the CPR] are actively seeking to overthrow a foreign government they generally make their position quite public and explicit."

From the record of public support Van Ness demonstrates that, far from proffering aid indiscriminately to all insurrections which fall within the theoretical category of wars of national liberation, Peking has been carefully selective. In spite of the Maoist claim that the CPR remains loyal to the cause of world revolution, a cause which "revisionist" Russia is charged with having abandoned, Peking's support for revolutions abroad has been strictly subordinated to state-power interests, just as was the case with Soviet policies in Stalin's time. The countries chosen as targets for subversion by China have been those which have continued to maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan, or those which, even though recognizing the CPR, have close ties with either the United States or the Soviet Union. Thus a rising in



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French Somaliland, which certainly qualified for support on grounds of principle, did not receive Peking's support, due, the author convincingly explains, to the CPR's reluctance to offend General de Gaulle at a time when his antagonism towards the US had provided the Chinese with a most hopeful opportunity of encouraging dissension within the Western alliance. The extent to which the CPR has been willing to renounce aid to revolutionaries in favor of supporting an established government — even an old-fashioned monarchy—has been most clearly shown in Nepal, where the overriding purpose of the CPR has been to keep Nepal independent of India. In India itself—a country where the USSR supports and has strong influence with the established government—revolutionary Maoism is preached, with the result that the Indian Communist movement has been split into two, and recently three, divergent factions.

Both Van Ness and Hinton discuss Chinese involvement in the affairs of Vietnam, a country which for reasons of geography and history is of great concern to China but of little direct importance to Russia. This involvement has clearly been highly significant in the development of the Sino-Soviet conflict—one need only contrast the Soviet airlift to Laos in the last months of 1960, when the Russians had free access to Chinese airfields, to the obstruction encountered by the massive Soviet shipment of arms to North Vietnam in 1966, when China forced the USSR to divert much of the aid flow to sea routes rather than use Chinese overland routes.

The linkage between the Vietnamese conflict and the Sino-Soviet controversy also figured in one of the most interesting episodes of recent Chinese politics—the purging of Lo Jui-ch'ing, Chief of Staff of the Chinese People's Army. As Hinton points out, Lo published an article in May 1965 which seemed to favor a reconciliation with Russia in order that China might have protection in a possible clash with the United States over Vietnam. This article was indirectly contradicted in September of the same year by Lin Piao, and Lo was removed from his post at the end of the year, subsequently figuring as one of the villains in the Maoist indictment of the "black gang." It may be inferred that Lo's attitude about foreign policy brought his downfall. It does not follow that Lo's concern was common to all of Mao's political opponents, for the evidence indicates that the struggle for power in China during the past few years has turned mainly on domestic policy issues. Nevertheless, it is a question of paramount world importance whether the leaders of the CPR, whoever they may be, seek in the next three or four years a real settlement with the Soviet Union, and on what terms.

Van Ness concentrates on an analysis of past events; for the future, he contents himself with the observation that "by the end of 1969, it was still unclear what new directions Chinese foreign policy might take." Hinton is more inclined to predict. He declares:

**Maoism is presumably about to become a declining force in Chinese politics and foreign policy.**

But he nevertheless anticipates—as if it were something beyond human prevention—China's

**. . . impending emergence as a thermonuclear power armed with intercontinental missiles.**

It is indeed of the essence of Maoism to attain such a capability at whatever cost to the Chinese economy and to make China a third superpower. But if Maoism is in fact a declining force, as Hinton thinks, might not China be content with merely a token nuclear capability and renounce the ascent to superpower rank with all the risks that the enterprise entails?

If, on the other hand, China continues its full nuclear program, will Russia remain inactive until it is too late to stop it without incurring an "unacceptable" retaliation? It may be that China will attain an effective intercontinental nuclear capability with the passive consent of both the United States and the Soviet Union. But it would be unwise to assume that it must be so. The Chinese may be brought to see the error of their ways and yield to persuasion from the Kremlin, for which they could be consoled with substantial favors. Or alternatively, Mao, or his successor, may join Nagy and Dubcek in the company of those who have gone too far in defying Russia.



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# Asian Mode of Marxism

**By J. Bandyopadhyaya**

ROBERT A. SCALAPINO, Ed.: *The Communist Revolution in Asia* (Second Edition). Englewood Cliffs, N. J., Prentice-Hall, 1969.

RICHARD LOWENTHAL, Ed.: *Issues in the Future of Asia: Communist and Non-Communist Alternatives.* New York, Praeger, 1969.

MARXISM BEGAN ITS CAREER as an ideology for application in industrial societies. But for a variety of reasons, including the fact that the social model utilized by Marx, in its two-class and even in its three-class variant, is more relevant to pre-industrial than to more complex industrial societies,[1] Marxism has proved itself effective as an ideology only in predominantly agricultural societies. In Russia, the Leninist version of Marxism performed the historical function—unforeseen and unintended by Marx—of industrializing and modernizing the society, after which its utility as an ideology appeared exhausted. In Asia, Marxism has gained strength primarily as an agrarian ideology, as manifested in China by Maoism—a primarily agrarian movement based on a peasant army and displaying a peasant outlook and orientation. Despite the fact that Mao's attempt to harness Marxism to the tasks of industrializing and nuclearizing the Chinese People's Republic gave rise to serious dilemmas and internal contradictions in Chinese Communist strategy, agrarian communism remains a force to be reckoned with in the nations of Asia, all of which (with the exception of industrial Japan) are basically agricultural societies bent on political and economic modernization. The outcome of communism's quest to become the ideology of modernization in Asia may well have a decisive impact on the political future of mankind. It is for their insights into Asian communism and the political context in which it operates that we are indebted to the authors of the two volumes under review.

In *The Communist Revolution in Asia,* Prof. Scalapino has assembled a broad, up-to-date survey of the origins, development, structure, and functioning of the Communist parties of China, Japan, India, Mongolia, North Korea, North Vietnam, Laos, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Burma, Nepal, and Ceylon. In a penetrating editorial essay, he offers a comparative analysis of the Communist movements in Asia, the leadership of which he finds to be consistently elitist in character—either from the bourgeoisie or petty bourgeoisie. There is a growing tendency for members of such elitist groups in Asia to become "activists," although they were initially drawn to communism by its powerful intellectual appeal. Prof. Scalapino now detects in all Communist parties of Asia a commitment to a revolutionary strategy based on five successive growth stages: 1) party emergence; 2) broadening of the base of the party; 3) mounting a challenge to the ruling party; 4) People's War; and 5) establishment of a People's Democracy. This model has clearly been borrowed from Chinese experience and is, according to Prof. Scalapino, most applicable "where economic development is least advanced, where political control by 'bourgeois-democratic' forces is most precarious, and where conditions are most suitable for the exploitation of the nationalist issue, preferably in the form of a 'national liberation movement.' " Hence, it is less applicable to countries such as India, Japan, and Ceylon.

The intellectual appeal of communism in Asia, Prof. Scalapino avers, lies in its claim to be: 1) a "progressive, *avant-garde* theory" through which Asians can express their resentment against and move

[1] Marx's two-class model, consisting of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, or his three-class model, in which the petty bourgeoisie is included as a somewhat unreliable ally of the proletariat, is not applicable to industrially developed societies, because functional differentiation resulting from technological progress has led to the development in such societies of a whole spectrum of social categories which bear very little resemblance to the Marxian model. It is in the pre-industrial or early industrial societies that the conflict between the landless laborers and small peasants on the one hand, and the rich peasants and landlords on the other, in the villages, and that between the industrial workers and business interests in the towns can be likened to the Marxian, or at any rate Leninist, form class struggle, with the relatively small middle class of shopkeepers, artisans, *etc.*, playing an intermediate role.



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a step ahead of the West; 2) a "new democracy" which promises to eliminate the imperfections of traditional democracy; 3) a workable technique for nation-building, "an instrument for the swift, thorough and purposeful creation of a nation-state where none previously existed"; 4) a science for the rapid modernization of traditional societies; 5) an ideology in harmony with certain aspects of Asian traditionalism, most notably "elitist tutelage and the educative state;" 6) a philosophy of optimism in the midst of poverty, backwardness and stagnation; and 7) an "advanced, scientific methodology" which, for the first time, offers Asian intellectuals (hitherto accustomed to the "baldly factual chronicle, the textual exegesis, or the legalistic tome") a grand, cosmic theory of human behavior and social evolution apparently buttressed by a vast array of socio-economic data.

Although the "seven pillars of wisdom" outlined by Prof. Scalapino do illuminate certain basic aspects of Asian communism, they leave much to be desired. In the first place, both the editor and the other contributors in their essays fail to provide a proper theoretical framework, particularly with respect to precedents for applying Marxism to the agrarian societies of Asia. They would have facilitated the reader's understanding of Asian communism by examining the Marxian concept of the "Asiatic mode of production" and Marx's own attitude toward the peasantry, as well as subsequent modification of this position by Lenin, Stalin and Mao. The individual studies of Asian communism also give inadequate attention to economic, social and cultural phenomena—*e.g.*, the system of land tenure, religion, language, racial and communal sentiments, parochialism, or the caste system—which, in the essentially pluralist Asian societies, are likely to have more bearing on the fate of communism than the ideology's oversimplified theory of class struggle. As a result, the book fails to examine certain important aspects of Communist strategy in Asian countries: for example, the exploitation of sub-national sentiment in India and certain Southeast Asian countries. Finally, one would have welcomed an assessment of the relative strengths and weaknesses of communism vis-à-vis competing ideologies and political systems of Asia and some prognosis for the future. It is only in the conclusion of his essay that Prof. Scalapino poses the question of crucial importance to Asian countries seeking to modernize within a non-Communist political framework: "Have these backward societies, which are forced by their circumstances to undergo rapid modernization, a suitable alternative to communism?"

IT IS TO SOME of the implications of this question that the contributors to Richard Lowenthal's *Issues in the Future of Asia: Communist and Non-Communist Alternatives* have addressed themselves, dealing with the issues in a broad sociological context without attempting to offer definitive answers. In his essay "Development versus Anti-Westernism," Editor Lowenthal presents the politico-economic dilemma facing Asian states today: although the national movements in Asia have been broadly anti-Western, the independent states created by such movements have been compelled to commit themselves to Western-style modernization with Western economic aid—the Soviet Union being unable to meet the requirements. Furthermore, these countries have discovered that "the obstacles to a concentration on rational economic effort that derived from the inherited social structure and cultural attitudes proved in many cases immensely strong, and the struggle against them, difficult and time-consuming at best."

In his excellent contribution, "The Agrarian Question in Asia," Werner Klatt analyzes the Soviet and Chinese models of land reform and the major obstacles hindering the spread of these models in Asia. Of greatest interest is his account of the frustrating experience of land reform in India, where the future of Asian politics is now being decided. However, the author mistakenly sets up the postwar land reforms in Japan and Taiwan as examples for the rest of non-Communist Asia, apparently ignoring the facts that these reforms were largely inspired, financed and even administered by the Americans; that Japan was already an industrial, technologically developed country before World War II; and that Taiwan is a highly artificial and heavily subsidized state.

Among the other contributors to the Lowenthal volume are Donald Zagoria, who examines the social factors that obstruct economic growth and thus indirectly promote communism; G. Kinderman, whose rather sketchy and superficial essay on Sun Yat-senism fails to analyze either the factors contributing to the demise of Sun Yat-sen's ideology in China or the problems and prospects of sister ideologies elsewhere in Asia, such as the ideology of Nehru; and E. Sarkisyanz, who has broken fresh ground in his study of Buddhism as a political factor in Southeast Asia. A similar study of the role of Islam in Indonesia, Pakistan



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and other Asian countries would have further enriched our understanding of the cultural aspects of ideology and politics in Asia.

A surprising feature of both these volumes dealing with Asian politics and ideology, particularly Mr. Lowenthal's, is the absence of any discussion of the major experiments by Gandhi in sociopolitical reconstruction through nonviolent direct action (the Constructive Program and Satyagraha) within the framework of democracy. Gandhi and Mao number among the great mass leaders of this century, and they represent two alternative models of political action for the transformation of Asiatic society. Mao's military and political successes are no proof of the nonrationality of the Gandhian technique of sociopolitical change. In fact, the only viable non-Communist model of development for Asia would seem to be a combination—within a framework of constitutional democracy—of initiative by the state in social and economic modernization and nonviolent direct action by the masses against all traditional vested interests.

# Protracted War, Elusive Victory

**By Melvin Gurtov**

GENERAL VO NGUYEN GIAP: *Banner of People's War, The Party's Military Line.* Introduction by Georges Boudarel. New York, Praeger, 1970.

PATRICK J. McGARVEY, Ed.: *Visions of Victory; Selected Vietnamese Communist Military Writings, 1964-1968.* Stanford, Hoover Institution, 1969.

ROBERT J. O'NEILL: *General Giap: Politician and Strategist.* New York, Praeger, 1969.

SINCE ITS FOUNDING in December 1944 the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) and its allied insurgent forces have been almost constantly engaged in military operations of one sort or another in Indochina. Today, in pursuit of the North Vietnamese Lao Dong Party's professed goal of reunifying Vietnam and ridding Indochina of hostile foreign and indigenous forces, the PAVN has broader military responsibilities than ever before. With roughly 85,000 soldiers in South Vietnam, 50,000 to 60,000 in Laos, perhaps 40,000 in Cambodia, and 250,000 regulars still in North Vietnam, it must be one of the busiest armies in the world for its size. Through all the years of combat the principal architect of Vietnamese Communist military strategy has been General Vo Nguyen Giap—a revolutionary intellectual, one time teacher of history, holder of the *licence en droit* (law degree) from the University of Hanoi, hero of Dien Bien Phu, and presently, at age 59, concurrently Minister of Defense of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, commander of the PAVN, and member of the Politburo of the Lao Dong Party.

General Giap's career is so intertwined with the history of the PAVN that one tends to forget how happenstance this rise of an intellectual to the top command post of the PAVN may actually have been. Major Robert J. O'Neill's study, which focuses narrowly on Giap's military tactics, suggests that as far back as his student days Giap "always had some interest in military problems," had studied military history, displayed leadership qualities, and possessed the political shrewdness that complements a military commander's technical skills. Yet O'Neill's account of Giap's early years in China (1940-41, after escaping Japanese-held North Vietnam)



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leaves one with the impression that Ho Chi Minh picked young Giap from among the small exile community for his political talents and dedication rather than any clearly discernible military leadership potential.

Whatever the rationale, Ho's choice proved sound, as Giap steadily grew into his command. He recruited thousands of Vietnamese into the PAVN prior to the outbreak of hostilities against the French in December 1946 and by 1950 was able to surprise the French Army with his successful operations in northern Vietnam. A year later, Giap suffered three costly setbacks in frontal assaults against French positions in the Mekong delta, but he soon recovered the initiative, ultimately shattering French morale with the capture of Dien Bien Phu in 1954. Throughout this period, Giap displayed tactical ingenuity, strategic flexibility, and the ability to win with limited resources—characteristics which earned him Ho Chi Minh's confidence and support. On the other hand, Giap has shown no striking originality as a military theorist, drawing heavily from Mao and Truong Chinh, a senior Politburo figure and Chairman of the Standing Committee of the North Vietnamese National Assembly, in his military writings—a fact which Major O'Neill seems to appreciate more fully than does Georges Boudarel, judging from the latter's otherwise useful introduction to Giap's *Banner of People's War.*

Giap's skills have been severely tested in the Second Indochina War, which the reviewer would date from 1965, when the American bombing campaign began and US ground forces in South Vietnam nearly quadrupled. These developments, as Patrick McGarvey explains in an excellent introduction to his collection of Vietnamese Communist military writings, apparently triggered a strategy debate in Hanoi that pitted Giap and most of his colleagues against PAVN General Nguyen Chi Thanh, who commanded the Viet Cong forces in the South until his death in the summer of 1967. Thanh wanted the Communist main forces in South Vietnam to confront the US and ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) units in an active offensive strategy, whereas Giap favored a passive offensive strategy, one emphasizing guerrilla tactics. McGarvey is probably correct in suggesting that Thanh's views prevailed during the dry season of 1965-66 (November to May), but a number of captured documents[1] not included in McGarvey's collection indicate that he may err in asserting that the strategy debate remained unresolved until the summer of 1967, when Thanh was killed. McGarvey's careful analysis and documentation do show that Thanh continued to propose an alternative strategy, and his opposition may explain why some Communist units in the South continued to fight a conventional strategy after May 1966. But Hanoi had decided upon a basic change in strategy in early 1966 and after Thanh's death was able to enforce its execution by Communist forces in the South.

The captured documents indicate that the Lao Dong Party's Central Committee authorized the strategy shift in March 1966, and it is this new strategy which appears to have guided Communist military activities in South Vietnam ever since. The party's decision was relayed to the Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN—the Viet Cong's military and political headquarters), which in April 1966 ordered all units to emphasize guerrilla warfare aimed at inflicting heavy casualties on the South Vietnamese troops. Rejecting the assessment that conditions were ripe for a "general uprising" in the South (a view which had been held prior to the sharp increase in US involvement), COSVN now instructed the Communist forces to conduct a protracted struggle and to postpone any uprising or major offensive until circumstances were more favorable.

The new strategy displayed all the trademarks of Giap's thinking. It was essentially a strategy of attrition but, typically, left the door open for large-unit actions under "favorable" tactical conditions. The fact that the Communist document describing the strategy referred both to "a decisive victory in a relatively short period of time" and to "continued protracted struggle" was not evidence of a contradictory strategy, as would appear at first glance; it underlined the flexible long-term planning by which Hanoi hoped to effect an eventual US withdrawal. As McGarvey observed, "implicit in Giap's position is an acknowledgment that a strictly military solution [in the South] is unattainable."

This strategy has remained essentially intact to the present, despite the ostensibly contradictory evidence of the February 1968 Tet offensive, and also despite the changes introduced by initiation of the Paris peace talks, termination of US bombing in the North, and the US policy of "Viet-

[1] These documents, released by the US Embassy in Saigon, include the notebook of an apparently high-ranking Viet Cong cadre reporting on the presentation of Le Duan's views before the Lao Dong Party's 12th Plenum; a letter transmitted by Le Duan to the COSVN containing the Party Plenum's decision; and the ensuing resolution of the COSVN of April 1966 at its 4th Congress—based on the Lao Dong Party decision.



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namization," *i.e.*, transfer of increasing military responsibilities to Saigon and the ARVN, combined with reductions of US combat forces.

The continuity in Hanoi's strategy was evidenced in Giap's strategic evaluation of September 1967, "Big Victory, Great Task," reprinted in *Visions of Victory.* He considered the war stalemated—it might last "five, ten, twenty, or more years"—and saw the only means of forcing the US into a settlement favorable to Communist interests (Giap avoided any direct mention of negotiations) to be a combination of a "grueling, protracted war of attrition and morale-shattering attacks on urban centers."

Giap echoed the 1966 strategy in calling for attacks on the ARVN in order to demoralize Saigon and divert American units from their search-and-destroy missions. He foresaw that Communist successes would bring more American troops into South Vietnam and that the Americans would extend the ground fighting to Laos and Cambodia. He also wrote of the need for increased air defenses in North Vietnam to prepare for an expected invasion by the United States.

Seen in the light of Giap's September 1967 statement, the Tet offensive of February 1968 was not really the radical strategic departure that it appeared to be—a reality stressed by both McGarvey and O'Neill. In laying seige to 26 provincial capitals, Giap had not renounced his "protracted-war" strategy in favor of an "urban" strategy (although he doubtless hoped to stimulate urban uprisings). Instead, he was merely employing a new tactic in the long-term Hanoi effort to subvert Saigon's authority, to inflict heavy casualties on ARVN and US units, and to convince his foes of the continued vitality of the Communist forces. It is not clear whether Tet was launched from a position of weakness (O'Neill's thesis) or to prepare the way for negotiations (McGarvey's view), but its great costs in lives and materiel may have appeared justified in Hanoi's eyes because of the offensive's profound political impact on Saigon and Washington.

By the end of 1969, political and military circumstances in South Vietnam had again changed: negotiations were under way in Paris, and the US had announced the phased withdrawal of its combat troops. Nevertheless, Giap still adhered to his basic principles of protracted war in his December 1969 strategic evaluation, reprinted in *Banner of People's War.*[2] This statement did now recognize the "main role" of military struggle (as opposed to political struggle), and Giap called for improved equipment for his armed forces; but the strategy of what he now called "protracted resistance" was retained. While advocating a guerrilla war of attrition, Giap discussed diverse forms of warfare and use of terrain and praised the Tet offensive highly. (However, he evinced no interest in trying another such campaign in the near future.)

The effect on Giap's protracted-war strategy of the movement of US and ARVN units into Cambodian sanctuaries in the spring of 1970 remains uncertain. But the subsequent strengthening of the Communists' grip on northeastern Cambodia, Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese activity in southern Laos, and the low level of fighting and limited contact of main-force Communist units with their foes in South Vietnam—all suggest that the strategy remains in vogue, although with new tactical variations.

This strategy has its economic costs—costs which Giap and his supporters seem ready to undertake, but which may be raising doubts in some Hanoi political circles. Speaking to a military conference in January 1967 (reprinted in *Visions of Victory),* Giap criticized those colleagues who feared the excessive diversion of economic resources to wartime needs. In his 1969 *Banner of People's War,* Giap asserted that the North's economy should be so organized as to be easily convertible into wartime operations. Since the war was far from over, he seemed to be arguing, the 1967 slogan of "everything for the front" should continue to guide economic policy. The recent announcements by Le Duan and others of plans to increase domestic production, to satisfy consumer demands, and to resolve problems of mismanagement, corruption and waste may signal increased economic constraints on the North Vietnamese military. Yet the North Vietnamese media have also recently reported a decision to increase the army's strength.[3] In the future, it would appear that while Hanoi may change its strategic time-table and seek to make its strategy more economical, the regime will continue to place primary reliance on Giap's forces and strategy to further its objectives in Indochina.

[2] The Giap book is actually a re-publication of a seven-part series, "The Party's Military Line is the Ever-Victorious Banner of People's War in Our Country," which appeared in issues of the Hanoi newspapers *Nhan Dan* and *Quan Doi Nhan Dan* commemorating the 25th anniversary of the PAVN, in December 1969.

[3] *E.g., Quan Doi Nhan Dan* editorial of May 30, 1970, and a Hanoi English-language radio broadcast of August 6, 1970, citing Le Duan.



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# Cult-ivating Kim

**By B. C. Koh**

BAIK BONG: *Kim Il Sung: Biography* (3 Vols.). Tokyo, Miraisha, 1969 and 1970.

DAE-SOOK SUH: *The Korean Communist Movement, 1918-1948.* Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1967.

THE MOST STRIKING feature of contemporary North Korean politics is the all-pervasive personality cult centered about Kim Il-song,[1] the 58-year old Premier of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and General Secretary of the Korean Workers' Party. In an apparent attempt to establish and enhance the legitimacy of his patently harsh one-man rule, Kim has sought to generate an image of himself as the greatest man Korea has ever produced. Article after article and volume after volume have glorified the "revolutionary accomplishments" and eulogized the "lofty virtues" of the North Korean leader.

The three-volume biography of Kim by Baik Bong, though published by a *bona fide* commercial publishing house in Japan, represents an unmistakable attempt to spread the adulatory legend of Kim beyond the borders of North Korea.[2] Indeed, as the "translation committee" points out in notes appended to each of the three volumes, the book is an English translation of Baik Bong's Korean-language biography, *General Kim Il Sung: the Sun of the Nation,* published in 1968 by Inmun Kwahak-sa, a North Korean government publishing house. When full-page advertisements of the book appeared in *The New York Times* and *The Times* of London late in 1969, North Korea hastened to claim that the world's press had published laudatory "articles" on Kim.[3]

Even as an unabashed propaganda document, the book never ceases to amaze the reader with its fantastic claims and fulsome superlatives. For example:

*General Kim Il Sung, the great Leader of the 40 million Korean people, peerless patriot, national hero, ever-victorious, iron-willed, brilliant commander and one of the outstanding leaders of the international Communist movement and working-class movement . . . a legendary hero . . . who is capable of commanding the heavens and earth, an unrivaled brilliant commander who, as it were, can shrink a long range of steep mountains at a stroke and smash the swarming hordes of enemies with one blow.*

Kim is portrayed as devoid of human frailities and endowed with every imaginable virtue and strength, a man who was destined by history to save the Korean people from the miseries suffered under Japanese colonial rule as well as under bourgeois and feudalistic exploitation.

Such a Messiah, of course, could only have been born into an uncommon family, and we are told that Kim's was a truly "revolutionary family," studded with patriots and revolutionaries, beginning with the very founder of the clan, Kim Key-sang. Although space does not permit even a brief summary of Kim's feats, narrated with tedious redundancy in 1,800 pages, a few of the astounding allegations merit passing mention. Having "read with great interest many classics of Marxism-Leninism, including *Das Kapital,*" by the age of 15, Kim reportedly became a confirmed Communist revolutionary and organized numerous revolutionary groups and activities among students, peasants, and workers in Manchuria. By the age of 19 his feats had allegedly earned him the title of "General" among his ardent followers, as well as a new name—Il-song (meaning "becoming the Sun") in place of his original name, Song-ju.

After the 1931 Manchurian

[1] Kim Il-song is the romanization of the name according to the McCune-Reischauer system. The North Korean spelling, however, is Kim Il Sung.

[2] It is noteworthy that in June 1970 Yoshio Nishitani, President of Miraisha (the Japanese publisher of the biography), and his wife visited North Korea and met Kim. See *The Pyongyang Times,* June 29, 1970.

[3] See the lead story in *Nodong Shinmun* (Pyongyang), Nov. 23, 1969. For the advertisements, see *The New York Times,* Oct. 27, 1969, and *The Times* (London), Nov. 3, 1969. For a more recent claim in the same vein, see the article entitled "Korea Has Produced [the] Hero of the 20th Century," in *The Pyongyang Times,* June 8, 1970.



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Incident, Kim founded an anti-Japanese guerrilla "army" which is claimed to have waged a "heroic struggle against the Japanese," culminating in the liberation of Korea. The book also states categorically that it was not the United States, but the Soviet Union, together with the guerrilla forces commanded by Kim, that defeated the Japanese in World War II. The book asserts that the Americans and British induced the Soviets to bear the brunt of the fighting, and then "brazenly" tried to claim credit for the victory.

This, however, is the last favorable mention of the Soviet Union one encounters. In its effort to portray Kim Il-song as the greatest figure in all Korean history, the book credits him with all good things that transpired in North Korea since 1945. He almost singlehandedly "won" the Korean War of 1950-53, which allegedly was started by "American imperialistic aggressors and their South Korean lackeys." Conspicuously absent in this chauvinistic account is any mention of Soviet military assistance or of the "Chinese People's Volunteers" to whom North Korea owes its survival. Likewise it was Kim's "revolutionary ideas" and "ingenious leadership"—not assistance from the Communist bloc—which subsequently transformed the war-devastated country into a "self-reliant" industrial nation.

The volume imputes "epochal" significance to Kim's ideas, of which *juche* constitutes the pivotal concept. Translated as "independent stand," the term is defined to mean "abiding by the principle of solving all problems of the revolution and construction independently, in accordance with the actual conditions of one's own country and primarily by one's own efforts." Having "demonstrated" the inestimable efficacy of *juche* in the North Korean context, the book presumes to apply the concept on a global scale. This entails repudiation of both "the right-wing opportunism" of Moscow and "the left opportunism" of Peking[4] in favor of forming a united Communist front to crush "American imperialism." Somehow, the author never explains how such a course of action is related to an "independent stand" for North Korea. Nor is there the slightest recognition of the colossal contradiction between the notion of independence and the exhortation not only to the Korean people but to all leaders of the Communist orbit to heed the wisdom of Kim Il-song.

Who is the real Kim, the man behind this image of an omniscient and omnipotent leader of all Korea and the savior of mankind? For the best available clues to his true identity, one must turn to Dae-Sook Suh's meticulous study, *The Korean Communist Movement.* Originally prepared as a Ph.D. thesis at Columbia, the study makes extensive use of Korean, Japanese, Chinese, and Russian sources to present an impressively credible picture of the trials and tribulations of Korean Communists who struggled long and hard, only to be eclipsed and then annihilated by Kim Il-song, a man who had played only a peripheral role in the Korean independence movement. Of particular interest is the last quarter of the book, dealing with the rise of Kim Il-song. Relying heavily on Japanese police records of the 1930's and 1940's, the author shows that Kim was neither a complete impostor nor a major revolutionary figure of the stature of a Mao Tse-tung or Ho Chi Minh.

The available evidence establishes that, prior to World War II, Kim led a Korean anti-Japanese guerrilla force in Manchuria which inflicted sufficient damage to cause the Japanese to initiate a determined campaign to annihilate his forces. On the other hand, Suh makes clear, Kim's force was at this time only part of a Chinese Communist guerrilla army, in which he rose to the rank of division commander. Despite this impressive title, Kim probably never commanded more than 300 men at a time. Nor was he the only Korean to command such a "division." In fact, at least two Koreans rose to the position of "army commander"—a full rank higher than Kim—in this struggle.[5]

Under stepped-up Japanese pressure, Kim and his surviving comrades-in-arms fled to Siberia in 1941. Whether he subsequently received Soviet military training

[4] Although neither Moscow nor Peking are explicitly mentioned, Kim's words leave little doubt as to the identity of those whom he is attacking.

[5] An important source on Kim's guerrilla activity has recently come to the reviewer's attention: *Manshu ni kansuru yoheiteki kansatsu* (Observations on Military Tactics in Manchuria), Tokyo, Fukuinkyoku Shiryo Seirika, Vol. 12, 1952. The volume comprises recollections by former Japanese Army officers who participated in or had access to classified information about Japanese counterinsurgency operations in Manchuria. While corroborating much of Suh's account of Kim's revolutionary past, this Japanese source links Kim and his guerrillas, not with the Chinese Communists, but with the Soviet Union, from which they are said to have received the bulk of their arms and ammunition, and which provided them with refuge when they fled across the Siberian border under Japanese pursuit. It also includes a number of photographs of Kim Il-song in guerrilla attire and states that Kim was extremely popular among Koreans in Manchuria, who acclaimed him as a "hero of Korea" and gave him "material and moral support." I am grateful to Mr. Key P. Yang, of the Orientalia Division of the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., for giving me access to this rare source.



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and served as an officer in the Red Army, as many sources claim, is not verified in Suh's study. What is clear, however, is that he came to North Korea with the Soviet occupation troops after the Japanese surrender in 1945 and, with the apparent blessing of the Soviet Union, began a series of maneuvers culminating in his seizure of power in Pyongyang.

Suh underscores the point that Kim did not owe his rise exclusively to the Kremlin. Of crucial importance were the miscalculations and follies of the "old Communists," such as Pak Hon-yong, who lingered too long in the American-occupied South, where the chances of a Communist takeover were nil, instead of rushing to the North where establishment of a Communist government was a foregone conclusion. When Pak and his associates finally headed north under duress, Kim was already firmly entrenched and soon had his rivals exterminated as American spies. Kim's political takeover was due in no small measure to his political acumen and Machiavellian tactics—factors which have been equally instrumental in perpetuating his monolithic political control for the past two decades.

As one leaves the bizarre legend of Kim Il-song, one wonders why Kim and his sycophants persist in their Herculean efforts to create a mountain out of a molehill. Possibly they believe, with Hitler, the dictum: "the bigger the lie, the better." More probably, Kim may be the unwitting victim of his own personality cult—a man who not only derives satisfaction from the interminable cries of "Long Live Comrade Kim Il-song" but has really come to believe in his own "unrivaled greatness" and "historic mission" to lead men both in Korea and beyond. One shudders at the thought that Kim, thanks to Moscow and Peking, commands considerable resources to pursue that "mission."

# Rice and Revolution

**By Alexander Woodside**

ROBERT L. SANSOM: *The Economics of Insurgency in the Mekong Delta of Vietnam.* Cambridge, MIT Press, 1970.

MR. SANSOM'S BOOK is one of the most cogent, hard-hitting studies of southern Vietnamese economic problems ever published. It is really a survey of the entire Mekong delta economy, both as it was in the 19th century and as it is today. It devotes its various chapters to comprehensive examinations of some of the more controversial and basic features of this economy—irrigation, credit institutions, usury, labor, fertilizer, rural income and investment aggregates, and production opportunities. In short, the focus of the work is much broader than the title reference to the "Economics of Insurgency" advertises—indeed, the chief "insurgents" in the Mekong delta, the Viet Cong, play only a supporting role throughout much of the study. Thus, for scholars with a narrow, exclusive interest in the study of communism and comparative communism, the book's usefulness is limited. In whole chapters, like Chapter IX ("Fertilizer: A Subsistence Investment"), the National Liberation Front is mentioned only once, peripherally. Yet the author should be congratulated for offering more than he promised. His observations on such matters as the dynamics of the Cochin China rice export trade under the French, the degree of economic rationality of the Vietnamese peasant, and the technical limits on the returns to fertilizer use in rice economies where high-yielding varieties and techniques have not been perfected, make his book highly rewarding.

Here, however, I shall confine my attention to Mr. Sansom's analysis of insurgency. The author sees the National Liberation Front's land reform program, not the "organization" of its "infrastructure," as the key to its successes. This program possessed the "mass appeal" that Ngo Dinh Diem's land reforms lacked, being implemented to please the tenant farmer, not "to ease the pain to the landlord." And it represented



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a response to real grievances (which he feels are generally underestimated by US observers).

The program incorporated land redistribution, rent reduction, and a campaign to raise the wages of rural workers—in effect, the establishment of a minimum wage rate. Large landlords found themselves denied the local labor resources they needed by the Front's creation and adroit political use of "labor exchange associations." Many landlords had their holdings confiscated or were driven out of their villages by the threat of terror. When they hired rent-collecting agents to return to the villages to garner what was due them, their agents were killed. In the resulting polarization, what was undermined was the authority of the Saigon government. The Viet Cong determined land rents in the areas they controlled, while a frightened, resentful landlord class, ignoring government regulations, collected higher rents in compensation elsewhere. Apart from their uniform attack upon large-scale farming, NLF land policies were highly sensitive to local circumstances—soil productivity, the supply and demand for land, the social composition of a given village. The Saigon government, meanwhile, fell into the trap of collecting rents for absentee landlords, of drifting into a situation where "complicity with landowners at the lower government levels, where officials and army officers were often landowners, determined the government's policies."

The other side of the coin, according to the author, is that NLF tax policies damaged the economic well-being of the Mekong delta peasant almost as much as NLF land reform efforts helped it. From late 1964 on, when the NLF decided to abandon purely guerrilla warfare in favor of larger confrontations and needed expanded revenues to do so, it began to collect some 10-20 percent of the gross incomes of the peasant families that it could tax. This represented less than half the rents paid by peasants tilling land in government-controlled regions, but still hardly seemed like another milestone on the way to the socialist utopia. Another problem of the "economics of insurgency" was the NLF's determination to make the areas it ruled economically self-contained units. Since it was unable to provide a market for all the crops grown in these regions, cadres at the village level were forced to ignore many of the Front's restrictions against trade with non-NLF parts of the delta. To win the war, the NLF would have to compromise with capitalism on the issues of "technology, capital, and trade." The Saigon government, for its part, would have to compromise with communism on the issue of an equitable distribution of the delta's land resources.

One of the main thrusts of Sansom's book is his sharp criticism of American "revisionists," in Saigon, Washington, and at the RAND Corporation, who have engaged in "exercises of technological self-deception" and other acts to convince themselves that the land reform problem was not a major factor in the war. (As Sansom uses the term,* "revisionism" means the tendency to assert that Southeast Asian guerrilla movements do not revolve around economic and social grievances as much as they pretend to, but rather owe their success or failure to organizational and other non-economic factors.) The author suggests that "coming from a capital-intensive economy, Americans did not attribute to the institutions of land tenure their true significance in the land-labor traditional economy of the delta."

Even if, now and then, Sansom flogs a few dead horses in his desire to expose the shortcomings of culture-bound officials, his warning is a forceful one. On the other hand, in his criticisms of the myopia of policymakers and bureaucratic experts on the Vietnamese crisis, Sansom's choice of targets is curiously parochial. "Revisionism," in the sense he defines it, is not entirely a recent, American, made - in - Washington phenomenon. It is the common property of much of the Western world. The reviewer can think of some influential British "revisionists" who definitely predate their Washington counterparts in the formation of such views.

At the same time, it is worth remarking—and Sansom certainly does not argue to the contrary—that the NLF appeal to Vietnamese villagers was based upon intangible as well as economic factors. For example, the NLF very successfully exploited the spirit of rural puritanism in Vietnam—the belief that the village should be the place to confront the cosmopolitan, Western-inspired degeneration in the cities with a revival of all the somewhat Confucian moral austerities of frugality, loyalty, and filial piety. NLF writers like Anh Duc very notably invoked this "back-to-the-village" cultural and moral nostalgia, which is shared by many Vietnamese but which the NLF sought to monopolize politically—and for a while nearly did.

To sum up, this book is a most exciting contribution, both as scholarship and as scholarly polemic, to the growing English-language literature on Vietnam.

* Not to be confused with the more common use of the term to refer to recent reformist tendencies within the world Communist movement.—Ed.



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# Reviews in Brief

## Patterns of Asian Marxism

HELENE CARRERE D'ENCAUSSE and STUART R. SCHRAM: *Marxism and Asia, An Introduction with Readings*. London, Allen Lane Penguin Press, 1969.

THIS PERCEPTIVE work is defined as a study of the "successive stages in the acclimatization of Marxism to Asia over the past century." Over two-thirds of the volume consists of documents ranging over a 100-year period (the first is dated 1853, the last 1968) which, as the authors point out, offer a selective sampling rather than comprehensive coverage of their complex topic. What gives the book its special value is the authors' introductory essay, which not only is thoughtfully conceived and well-written but offers a number of provocative and important propositions for consideration.

Since the earliest days of Marxism, the authors maintain, the problem of adapting and applying Marxist theories to non-European situations has been an extremely difficult one. In years past a continuing effort was made to make Marxism relevant and acceptable to non-Europeans, but the process was marked by intensive debate and accompanied by numerous nationalist heresies and deviations. Over time, a "widening abyss" developed "between the disciples of Marx in Europe and Asia."

In the authors' view, the Chinese Communists have now transformed Marxism "into a vehicle for Chinese nationalism"; they further maintain that in the world at large, "the evolution of communism today increasingly brings to the fore a theory which dissociates the task of carrying out the revolution not only from the proletariat but from any class basis whatsoever." As a result, the "only alternative lies in a choice between a scholastic Marxism which has nothing to do with revolution and a revolution which has nothing in common with Marxism."

As an examination of "Marxism and Asia," the study is both broader and narrower in scope than its title implies. It is broader in the sense that it focuses attention on several issues that were central to the problem of adapting Marxism to the entire non-European world; it is narrower in the sense that in tracing the gradual emergence of "Asiocentric communism," it deals almost exclusively with China.

Of the many ideological issues that have been the subject of debate in the evolution of Marxism and Leninism, the authors single out a few as especially significant. These they have variously labeled "strategic" issues (for example, the roles and relative importance of European and non-European areas in the world revolution, and the question of how extensively Communists should support national movements in non-European areas); "tactical" issues (the proper attitude toward the bourgeoisie in national revolutions in non-European areas, the role of violence in revolutions in such areas, and so on); and "cultural" issues (most fundamentally, the gulf between European-centered and Asian-centered outlooks).

The study starts with an analysis of the views on the non-European world held by Marx, Lenin, and others prior to the Bolshevik Revolution, then deals with the debates that took place in the Comintern, and finally traces the growing divergences since the rise of the Communists to power in China. Marx, it is pointed out, was basically "Europocentric" and paid relatively little attention to the non-European world. In fact, his early ideas on the "Asiatic mode of production" tended to treat Asian societies as not only different but inferior; in his view, although they could play a certain role in relation to world revolution, they themselves needed to be Europeanized. Later, however, he did come to regard the peasants as potential allies of the proletariat and to recognize the value of certain national independence movements, even when led by the bourgeoisie—and this opened the door for others after him to devote more attention to the non-European world.

It was mainly Lenin who "mediated" between Marxism and the non-European world. Lenin clearly saw the important role that non-European bourgeois-democratic nationalist movements could play in the overall effort to weaken imperialism, and he increasingly recognized the similar potential of the peasantry. Yet the authors argue that Lenin, too, was basically "Europocentric" in his cultural outlook.

The first great post-1917 debate on issues relating to revolution outside Europe took place at the Second Congress of the Comintern in 1920. The viewpoints articulated there by Lenin, the Indian Communist M. N. Roy, and others are analyzed in some detail by the authors to show the roots of divergences that later developed.



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The authors next turn their attention to China, where communism evolved as a "complex, dynamic, and perhaps explosive mixture of Leninist and Chinese elements." Although the Soviets were at first successful in imposing their views of what was needed in the way of an alliance with bourgeois forces, ultimately the Chinese, under Mao, went their own way and "Sinified" Marxism. By the late 1940's, the Chinese were inclined to go further than the Soviets in collaboration with the national bourgeoisie, yet at the same time they put greater stress on the element of violence in revolution than did the Soviets.

During and after the traumatic 1950's—which ushered in, first, destalinization, and at the end of the decade, the Sino-Soviet split—both the Chinese and the Soviets, not to mention other Communist elements, increasingly departed from both Marxist and Leninist orthodoxy. The result, in the authors' view, was "a frontal attack on Marx's most fundamental aims and beliefs" and "complete abandonment of the whole logic of Marxism." In China, Mao substituted himself for the party as the basic source of authority, glorified the army, and placed his primary faith in the countryside and the peasantry. The Chinese Communists also started to assert that the non-European world (meaning China) was now the real center of world revolution and that "The Thought of Mao Tse-tung" had acquired universal applicability. The Soviets similarly departed from orthodoxy in many respects—for example, in their recognition of the vital role that revolutionary armies could play in non-European areas—thus accommodating theory to the realities of recent developments.

To sum up, the d'Encausse-Schram study is of obvious value to anyone who wishes to understand the historical background of recent ideological splits within world communism and the growing gap between Europocentric and Asiocentric views. It is not—and does not purport to be—an explanation of the totality of complex forces that have led to schisms in the Communist bloc and world movement. One cannot really understand the Sino-Soviet split without taking into account, for example, the specific clashes of national and political interests—including differences over nuclear policies and territorial disputes—that took place in the years 1957-59, preceding the ideological split of 1960. These were, on balance, far more important in causing the rift than ideological issues of the kind dealt with in the study under review. Nevertheless, a knowledge of the ideological issues is important—in part because, as this study highlights, they in turn reflect and illuminate the more fundamental differences in cultural outlook that have influenced European and Asian Communist views of the world.

**A. Doak Barnett**

## Balance of Trade

SIDNEY KLEIN: *Politics versus Economics: The Foreign Trade and Aid Policies of China.* Hong Kong, International Studies Group, 1968.

THIS STUDY, as the author puts it, "describes and evaluates China's foreign trade and aid programs and is particularly concerned with the relationship between the economic and the political aspects of her foreign trade" (p. 1). The data used are basically those published in the West, and no new estimates or adjustments are provided.

The bulk of the book is a chronological, country-by-country survey of the economic and political relationships between Communist China and her trading partners. As might be expected, China's relations with Soviet Russia receive the most detailed attention. There is a rather lengthy description of Sino-Soviet trade and Russian aid to China in the 1950's, and the author concludes that without Russian aid the Chinese First Five-Year Plan would very probably have failed.

After 1959, Sino-Soviet trade began to decline, a reflection of increasing political friction. Four major areas of friction are examined: China's attitude toward Comecon, Sino-Soviet trade relations, Sino-Soviet boundaries and spheres of influence, and competition for ideological and economic supremacy in underdeveloped areas. The author's view is that these frictions are very substantial and are likely to embitter relations between the two countries for many years to come.

Throughout the discussion, the point is made that the economic relationships between China and other countries have been influenced in large measure by political developments. In Asia (with the exception of Japan) trade and aid have been used by China as instruments of Sino-Soviet competition, whereas in Africa and the Middle East they have been used for wider political purposes. Even in the case of Japan, which has successfully insisted that economic relations should be free of political influence, the author suggests that for the foreseeable future Sino-Japanese economic relations will be influenced to a considerable extent by political considerations.

But despite the political orientation of foreign economic policy (demonstrating the notion that "politics takes command"), the author finds that the role of foreign trade has been "to assist in the solution of the major problems facing China's economic plans" (p. 1), and "to provide, in a general kind of way, in the short run, what domestic production and trade have been unable to provide" (p. 2). Thus, in the 1950's, the level and composition of China's imports were dictated by what was needed for the country's reconstruction and industrialization; in 1961-63 food imports lessened the severity of the food shortage; and since 1963, imports of complete plants and industrial equipment from Western Europe and Japan have contributed greatly to China's recovery.

One is left somewhat uncertain as to what exactly has determined the overall pattern of China's foreign trade: economic variables or international politics. The author states that China has used "political considerations as a lever to obtain the most favorable economic terms possible, and, conversely, has used economic considerations to get the most favorable political terms possible." This is probably true, but the question remains: if there had been no political considerations, would the level, composition, and terms of trade have been substantially different? Such questions are hard to answer, but merely by posing them the author might have developed a clearer analytical framework. Nonetheless Mr. Klein has performed a very useful function in pulling together a vast amount of material and producing a highly informative volume.

**Chi-ming Hou**



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## R&D in China

YUAN-LI WU and ROBERT B. SHEEKS: *The Organization and Support of Scientific Research and Development in Mainland China.* New York, F. A. Praeger, 1970.

ON THE FIRST PAGE of this extensive compilation of information on Communist China's scientific research and development establishment, the authors confront the central problem facing any student of contemporary China: How does one compare one aspect of a society like the Chinese with equivalent sectors of other societies, when social conditions and the political and economic contexts in China differ so widely from the framework with which we are familiar in Europe and North America, and with which we are becoming familiar in the Soviet Union? The authors rightly acknowledge that "comparisons are hazardous at best."

The comparison is particularly difficult in the case of R&D (universal shorthand for the research and development establishment), an institution characteristic of the most advanced industries in the most highly developed countries, having potentially great but as yet unrealized bearing on the process of economic development. Nonetheless, parallels must be drawn, mainly because China's leaders—and indeed, the general population—are committed to the goal of economic growth and are particularly aware of the potential contribution of science and science-based technology to development. Thus China could someday be one of the major proving grounds for the role of science in economic development.

In addition to its role in shaping development, R&D is very much a part of the society in which it functions. It both affects and is affected by the education and training of scientists and technicians; the organization of the institutions in which they perform research and develop innovations; the goals toward which they work and the incentives which encourage them toward their goals; the support, in terms of money and equipment, which they receive for their work; their awareness of economic needs and concrete production situations; and finally, their knowledge of the range of solutions which might prove to be scientifically and technically feasible. In short, the functioning of the R&D establishment both as a social system in itself and as a subsystem of a larger society determines the effectiveness of its contribution to economic development. The configuration of a multitude of factors —political, economic, historical, psychological, and sociological—will affect the nature and function of scientific research and development in any given society.

Yet to point to the different social contexts in which R&D is performed begs the question of the universality of science and, indeed, the modernization process. Will China and other underdeveloped countries eventually evolve into societies similar to today's industrialized nations if they use science to achieve modernization? Will science figure in China's development as predominantly as it has in the development of Europe, North America and the Soviet Union? What features characterize scientific research and development, irrespective of the social context? As yet there are no sure answers to these complex questions, but Messrs. Wu and Sheeks have opened the door to further exploration by compiling and integrating all the known facts about those institutions in China which correspond to their model of a research and development establishment. As a source of concrete information, their work should be an invaluable reference tool for the further study of Chinese development.

**Genevieve Dean**

## Education and Re-education

R. F. PRICE: *Education in Communist China.* New York, F. A. Praeger, 1970.

ANYONE WHO MAKES a career of combing Chinese publications and radio broadcasts for the occasional tidbits that Peking sees fit to release has one overwhelming ambition: to have a chance to look at China from the inside. As a British scholar hired to teach English at the Second Foreign Languages Institute in Peking between 1965 and 1967, Mr. Price had just such an opportunity to learn about China's educational system through observation; discussion with students, teachers and administrators; and simple osmosis. But if his experience was typical, anyone seeking firsthand information in China would only suffer frustration and disappointment. Mr. Price admits that he was unable to acquire "any particular information," and he therefore relies almost exclusively on secondary sources in English, appropriately sprinkled with excerpts from various translation services.

Writing primarily for "comparative educationists" and others who may not be familiar with China, Mr. Price rightly includes some background information on such subjects as geography, economy, the Communist Party, and the People's Liberation Army. Although interesting, some of the material is much too detailed for the reader interested in education, and hardly appropriate is the inclusion of a 100-page analysis of the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung and their roots in Chinese philosophy and tradition—especially since most of the discussion has little relevance to the subject of education.

Perhaps the most obvious weakness of the three chapters that do pull together the available information on education is the absence of an adequate time frame. Education in Communist China has been in a constant state of flux, and it is virtually impossible to describe the structure, administration, curricula, financing, or any other aspect of the educational system without following the effects of political and economic forces through time. Nevertheless, Mr. Price uses sources with almost no regard to chronology—apparently attempting to avoid the issue through the simple use of the past tense. To select just a few examples, he states that "the great majority of secondary schools were boarding schools." This is true enough, but only for the early 1950's, the date of information quoted in the Russian source used. Further, Mr. Price points out that one way in which institutions tried to improve teaching methods was by "giving students more free time." True again, but only during 1961 and 1962 when many of the students were overworked and sometimes even undernourished. Moreover, although the author does indicate in the first chapter that one of the primary aims of the Cultural Revolution was to reform Chinese education, he does not even mention the closing of the schools or suggest that reinstatement of the system described in later chapters is unlikely in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution.



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Undoubtedly, the short section that deals with the author's personal experiences is the most refreshing and informative. Among other interesting particulars, Mr. Price mentions: the fact that "a Chinese teacher was designated to act as guide, interpreter, and general helper to each foreign teacher"; the curious combination in his institute of "a Department of German and Japanese"; the problems that were created by the confusion between British and American dialects and spellings; the difficulties that were encountered in enabling students to acquire a working knowledge of a foreign language without absorbing any foreign ideas. One could well wish that Mr. Price had seen fit to keep and publish a diary of his daily experiences.

A minor point, but one that is most exasperating for its constant recurrence, is the author's use of the Chinese Communist *pinyin* system of transliteration rather than a more familiar system acceptable to Western publications, such as the Wade-Giles. Although the general reader will identify Mao Ze-dong, it is doubtful that he would recognize Jiang Jie-Shi without the author's parenthetical "Chiang Kai-shek." Even one familiar with Chinese names is forced to refer to the appendix on "transcriptions." Mr. Price's statement that *pinyin* "is gradually being adopted throughout the world" is rather curious, since even the Chinese Communists use the more universal Wade-Giles in their English-language publications.

The problems faced by Mr. Price are readily appreciated. The severe restrictions on the mobility of foreigners and on the exchange of information even under informal conditions are well known. Even trained observers at foreign embassies in Peking are seldom able to provide new and interesting information. Most important, few persons would have planned such a book in advance, and undoubtedly Mr. Price had to do most of his research retrospectively. Nevertheless, by way of curiosity rather than criticism, it is interesting to speculate whether he would have been more successful in gaining both information and insights about Chinese education had he intended to do the book, read all the sources in his bibliography before going to China, and been familiar with existing gaps in information.

**Leo A. Orleans**

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STEWART E. FRASER, ED.: *Education and Communism in China, An Anthology of Commentary and Documents.* Hong Kong, International Studies Group, 1969.

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THE RECORD OF CHINA under communism since 1949 has been one of continual upheavals, all of which took the form of mass movements. In both scope and intensity, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution dwarfed such earlier movements as the Land Reform, the Resist-America Aid-Korea campaign, the Three-Anti and Five-Anti campaigns, and even the Great Leap Forward in the late 1950's. In a broad sense, all the mass movements, aside from their immediate and specific goals, have had significant educational implications, in that they all sought to re-educate the Chinese in the Maoist image. To Mao and his adherents, the task of Communist revolution in China cannot be accomplished without the Chinese people being formally taught and informally conditioned to accept Mao's revolutionary doctrines.

While there now exists a considerable fund of studies on the political, social and economic aspects of Communist development on the mainland of China, especially in the wake of the Cultural Revolution, the educational side of the contemporary scene has received insufficient attention. Therefore, Stewart Fraser's new volume, *Education and Communism in China,* is a valuable addition to what has been a regrettably inadequate literature on Chinese education.

To those who have followed events in Mainland China in general and educational developments in particular, Mr. Fraser is certainly no stranger. An earlier anthology, *Chinese Communist Education,* which he compiled and edited (Nashville, Tenn., Vanderbilt University Press, 1965), covered the first decade of the Communist regime, offering a number of well-selected speeches, articles and documents on Chinese education, as well as a highly useful bibliography. His monographic introduction, under the title "Education, Indoctrination, and Ideology in Communist China," provided the needed insight and interpretation for a meaningful use of the anthology.

The present volume in no way duplicates his earlier effort. While the 1965 volume sought to set the record straight, so to speak, through the writings and pronouncements of the Chinese themselves, *Education and Communism in China* is a collection of twenty articles by foreign observers and scholars. The authors address themselves to some of the essential aspects of Chinese education from the pre-1949 days to the time of the Cultural Revolution. Divided into nine sections, the book begins with a general survey of education, followed by sections on elementary and secondary education, teachers and teacher training, higher education, spare-time and part-time education, ideological education, scientific and technological education, international exchanges, and finally education and the Cultural Revolution (the last of which Fraser wrote himself). As is often the case with anthologies, the authors are not equal in scholarship or reputation, producing a rather obvious discrepancy in the degree of articulateness with which various topics are treated. This unevenness in coverage and quality should not, however, be viewed as a reflection on the knowledgeability of the editor; rather, it points up the state of neglect which characterizes the crucial field of research on Chinese education.

Beyond this problem, one is inclined to feel that the study of Chinese education, because of the exceedingly broad way in which the term education has been used and understood by the Communists, calls for new conceptual and methodological approaches different from the essentially descriptive and institutional approaches that were favored by professional educationists in the past. Characterized as it is by periodic radical change, by a leadership that is far from stable, by a student body with no educational experience other than what the regime has prescribed, and finally by an almost total absence of meaningful statistical data, contemporary Chinese education simply does not lend itself to conventional methods and terms of study.

Hopefully, the state of research on Chinese education will improve. Meantime, Mr. Fraser's selections seem to represent some of the best available on the subject. The editor also appends eleven documents comprising Peking's major policy statements on education since the Cultural Revolution, which



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not only offer clues to future developments but also reveal some of the areas of tension in cultural and educational affairs that led to the GPCR—the bitterest struggle since the Communists' accession to power.

In compiling and editing his second anthology, this time with outsiders looking in, Professor Fraser has performed a valuable service where it was badly needed.

**C. T. Hu**

## Early Struggles

RICHARD C. THORNTON: *The Comintern and the Chinese Communists, 1928-1931.* Seattle and London, University of Washington Press, 1969.

IN THIS EXCELLENT short study, Prof. Richard Thornton reexamines the period in which Li Li-san was the dominant figure in the Chinese Communist Party. Using many previously unavailable documents recently located in Taipei, Hong Kong, and Moscow, supplemented by interviews and correspondence with two former leaders of the CCP, Chang Kuo-t'ao and Yuan Ping-hui, the author has illuminated the complex and dynamic triangular relations between the Comintern, the Chinese Central Committee in Shanghai led by Li Li-san, and the developing soviet areas in South China, especially the district controlled by Mao Tse-tung.

The basic thesis of this study is that Li Li-san could not carry out Comintern policy without dangerously weakening his own position in the central leadership of the Chinese party. At the Sixth Congress of the CCP, held under Comintern direction in Moscow (June-July 1928), it was decided to re-establish the shattered party organization and to create small soviet bases in the countryside, using guerrilla units to expand the territory under Communist control. Mao supported and developed this strategy, while Li, who feared Mao's political and military power, attempted to prevent the consolidation and expansion of soviet bases under Mao's control. Li was in a dilemma. If he worked to increase the strength of the Red Army before he had consolidated his control over its leaders, he would be helping to build up the political base of Mao and other rival party leaders who might displace Li in the future. On the other hand, if he did not give full support to the strengthening of the Red Army, he would be contravening Comintern policy, and sooner or later his *de facto* opposition would be discovered and condemned by his superiors in Moscow. To resolve this dilemma, Li attempted to use the Red Army that he did not fully control to capture an urban base that he could control. He failed, and his line was repudiated both by the Comintern and the leaders of the Red Army.

Li's covert disobedience began shortly after he returned from Moscow in the fall of 1928, when he ordered the Chu-Mao army to disperse and carry out guerrilla operations. Li continued to issue similar orders (including one order calling for Mao and Chu to turn over the command of their troops to others) until the Comintern, during the Chinese Eastern Railroad crisis in October 1929, ordered the CCP to strengthen and extend guerrilla warfare both in Manchuria and in South China. Then Li ordered Mao's army to concentrate its forces, create a real Red Army, and prepare to attack and occupy large cities in coordination "with the nationwide workers', peasants', and soldiers' struggle to bring closer the great revolutionary tide" (quoted on p. 105 from a central circular of the CCP).

After the CER crisis ended, Li continued to urge this new tactic—most specifically in a party circular of Feb. 26, 1930, in which he gave the first clear formulation of what was soon to be called the "Li Li-san line." Chou En-lai objected to the contents of the circular and left for Moscow to report his misgivings. At that point, Prof. Thornton suggests, Li began to play a double game. He published statements of his policy in *Hung-ch'i* (Red Flag), but he did not permit their publication in party circulars or letters to the ECCI (the Comintern Executive Committee) until he got his new policy accepted at a conference of delegates from the soviet areas of China in late May 1930.

Thus from late February until early June, no information on his policy or line could reach Moscow through regular channels. He was assisted in his double game by the fact that the Comintern representatives in Shanghai were discredited right-wingers who had been purged with Bukharin but then had recanted and been sent out to China. Li could ignore them on the assumption that any reports they might send to Moscow on Li's policies probably would be disregarded as the carping criticism of disgruntled rightists.

Although Moscow certainly learned of Li's policies immediately after the May conference, the Comintern was in no position to force him to alter his line or remove him for disobedience until his policy had failed—after Mao and Chu ordered their army to retreat during the second attack on Ch'angsha in September. Although Li's policy was no longer viable after that debacle, it took the Comintern three more months to remove him from power and replace him with men who would follow Moscow's directives. The men chosen by the Comintern in 1931 were not Mao and Chu, but Wang Ming and other students returned from Russia.

The author's contention that Mao was following, or attempting to follow, Comintern policy on guerrilla warfare throughout this period is, in the reviewer's opinion, not yet proved. But it is certainly possible to give full support to Prof. Thornton's conclusion that the Li Li-san line was "essentially Li Li-san's endeavor to secure the power of undivided leadership in his own hands and to prevent that power from passing [to] Mao Tse-tung" (p. 226).

**John E. Rue**

## Cantonese Style

EZRA VOGEL: *Canton under Communism: Programs and Politics in a Provincial Capital, 1949-1968.* Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1969.

AN UNDERSTANDING of contemporary China would be easier to achieve if more studies of particular peoples, regions, or events in that society were available. Too many of our existing secondary sources analyze Communist China, its political-economic system and its leaders at an unwarranted level of generality, either ignoring the important problems created by the great diversity in contemporary Chinese society, or belittling these problems for the sake of arriving at some relevant generalizations about



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developments in the society as a whole. In this respect, Ezra Vogel's new book, concentrating on *Canton under Communism*, is a very welcome addition to existing literature on Mainland China.

Canton and its province of Kwangtung do not represent the largest or most important of the many dissimilar political-economic regions found within China's borders. Based on figures that are outdated but still presumably indicative of demographic and economic trends, Kwangtung is the sixth-largest province in China, with about six percent of China's total population (1957); Canton is the sixth-largest city, with about two percent of the total urban population (1953). The larger and more important political-economic regions are the North China Plain, with one-third of China's total population; the Szechwan Basin, China's largest agricultural province (accountable for 10 percent of the total value of agricultural production in 1957, *vs.* six percent for Kwangtung); and the Manchurian Plain, China's industrial heartland (accountable for 22 percent of the total value of China's industrial production in 1957, *vs.* less than five percent for Kwangtung).

Nonetheless, Canton and Kwangtung do have special features which recommend the area for a considerable research effort. To the Westerner, Canton has served as the "front door" to China for over a century, and the majority of overseas Chinese are members of families who originally came from Kwangtung. Now that China has returned to a period of isolation, the role of Canton and Kwangtung as a link between China and the West has become important once again. China's semi-annual trade fair for Western businessmen is held in Canton, while most of the refugees who have left the country since 1949 are from Kwangtung or bordering regions.

Interestingly, T'ao Chu, who is perhaps the least well-known of China's leaders during the last two decades, rose to power while serving in various capacities in Kwangtung. He arrived in that province in early 1952 with "the blessings of the central authorities" (p. 116) to give corrective guidance to the land reform campaign. After serving as First Secretary of the party in Kwangtung and then Secretary of the Central-South Bureau, T'ao eventually was called to Peking to become "the fourth-ranking man in all of China" (p. 325). Too much of an organization-man to be a real Maoist, T'ao could not escape his inevitable fall and was named a "counterrevolutionary double-dealer" in January of 1967.

Vogel's description of how the land reform campaign in Kwangtung was utilized to replace the local or regionally-oriented cadres with leaders representing the central authority is one of the particularly illuminating sections of *Canton under Communism*. Another informative section discusses and analyzes the impact of the Cultural Revolution on Kwangtung.

In describing events in Kwangtung, the author makes a particular effort to de-emphasize what is unique about the particular area and to stress what is typical of all China. In reading *Canton under Communism*, one is in fact struck by how little difference there is between the portrayal of news in *Jen-min Jih-pao* (Peking's daily newspaper) and what Vogel has gleaned from *Nan-fang Jih-pao* (Canton's daily newspaper). At the same time, Vogel's description and interpretation of events is both original and informative, providing worthwhile reading on China under communism.

**Robert F. Dernberger**

# Mysterious Occident

YUAN-LI WU: *As Peking Sees Us*. Stanford, Calif., Hoover Institution Press, 1969.

THIS HOOVER INSTITUTION *monograph* is a useful complement to Robin A. Remington's earlier MIT monograph, *Revolutionary Role of the Afro-American*, which dealt with the comparative approaches of China and the USSR to the black revolution in America.[1] Yuan-li Wu's work focuses more explicitly on the Chinese response in the 1963-69 period, attempting to uncover the origins of Peking's interest in the American domestic situation and to analyze Chinese tactical efforts to exploit it to political advantage in Indochina.

Mr. Wu develops the thesis —validly, I believe—that the conflict in Vietnam has demonstrated to the Communist leadership that one of the countermeasures it can use to offset American military superiority in Asia is to encourage domestic American propaganda against US intervention. By the same token, the author points out that it is logical for Peking to encourage domestic revolution —including racial revolution —in the United States, not as a matter of ideological conviction but as part of the defensive strategy to defuse US military pressure.

Relying on a range of evidence of Peking's propaganda aims and activities, Dr. Wu concludes that Americans must beware of a "conspiratorial element" in the civil rights revolution and avoid "solutions that might otherwise be quite innocent . . . [but] might very well create situations that could, and probably would, be exploited by militant extremists, abetted by one or more foreign powers"—by which solutions I understand him to be referring, in the first instance, to a separatist black state.

While many analysts would agree with such conclusions, one must question the author's rigorous effort to relate Peking's current propaganda effort to Sun Tzu or to Mao's "people's war" strategy. In the period of more than 50 years since the Russian Revolution, the Comintern itself, several of its affiliates, and various national Communist parties have attempted to exploit the American racial situation—presumably without much knowledge of either Sun or Mao. As early as 1924, while a student at Moscow's University of the Toilers of the East, Ho Chi Minh was publishing articles urging blacks to revolt in America. In the same decade the Fourth Congress of the Red International of Trade Unions established a Negro Bureau, with George Padmore as its chairman, for much the same purpose. In short, the condition of the black minority in the US has always been recognized as one of the weak links in the American chain of defense—just as the Soviet nationalities problem has been propagandized in the West and, more recently, by the Chinese as well.

Similarly, the current disposition of Eldridge Cleaver and other Black Panther officers to describe the black community in America as a "colony" need not be laid to Mao's inspiration. The term was first used at the Sixth Comintern Congress in 1928 by the American delegate John Pepper; five years later a Soviet work by A. Amo, entitled *Negro Workers in the United States*, even laid out a county-by-county outline of

[1] *Revolutionary Role of the Afro-American: An Analysis of Sino-Soviet Polemics on the Historical Importance of the American Negro*, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Center for International Studies, 1968.



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an independent Black Republic which, it was argued, should be established by this "colony." [2]

A historic perspective of Communist efforts to exacerbate the racial situation in America is necessary in gauging the proper response to current Communist tactics—whether of Chinese, Soviet or other origin. (Such a perspective also suggests that the only real solution to the race issue lies in removing the conditions which for so long have poisoned black-white relations in the United States.)

Dr. Wu provides a useful 36-page appendix that includes the text of Mao's 1963 and 1968 statements on the Afro-American struggle, as well as several key commentaries of the New China News Agency.

**William J. Parente**

## China's New Left

KLAUS MEHNERT: *Peking and the New Left: At Home and Abroad.* Berkeley, University of California Press, 1969.

THIS WORK FOCUSES on the relationship between the "ultra left" factions of the Red Guards and the central leadership in Peking, or putative cliques within that leadership, in the years 1967-68. The study was produced by Berkeley's Center for Chinese Studies as the fourth in its series of China Research Monographs. It consists of an uneven, often flippant, 60-odd-page essay by Pekingologist (also Kremlinologist) Klaus Mehnert, and of approximately 80 pages of documents—nearly all of which were previously available in English, not infrequently in more than one translation.

The high point of the volume, as Professor Mehnert recognizes, is one of the republished documents — the incisive essay entitled "Whither China," purportedly written in January 1968 by members of the "ultra left" Hunan Provincial Proletarian Revolutionary Great Alliance Committee, abbreviated in Chinese as *Sheng-wu-lien.* This essay, whether or not authentic—and its authenticity is neither clearly established nor even seriously argued by Professor Mehnert—provides an extremely stimulating, self-assertedly Maoist, "ultra left" critique of the "new establishment" emerging in 1967, especially of the Revolutionary Committees and the armed forces. An analysis in detail of the document, of its ancestry in Chinese and Western thought and politics, and—assuming its authenticity for the sake of argument —of the particular context in Hunan which fostered its production would have been very valuable. Unfortunately, such an analysis is not adequately provided. Instead, the author spends most of his essay dealing with the relatively better-known national developments that produced the "ultra left" and with Peking's reactions to the challenge.

Nevertheless, Mehnert's essay begins rather well with a brief section on Hunan's "ultra left." But from that promising beginning, it becomes less consistently well organized and less consistently insightful, with the decline in quality paralleling somewhat the decline in substantive content of the accompanying documents. Moreover, the essay is increasingly marred by self-indulgent excursions into irrelevance, insignificance and gratuitous ridicule. Why, for example, spend two pages (pp. 43-44) ridiculing the mango incident of August 1968, when, whatever its trimmings, the incident's meaning was clear: "The entire country took Mao's mango gift as clear proof of his approval of the worker teams" (p. 44)? How can the inclusion in the essay of most of the subsection entitled "Mass Enthusiasm over a Piano" be justified? And the sub-section entitled "The Fifteen Girls and the Peanut Piles"? And is it not overmuch, even for a Pekingologist, to refer to Chiang Ch'ing as "God's Wife"?

There are other serious defects in this monograph as well. First, the information provided on the only groups specifically referred to as the "ultra left"—the *Sheng-wu-lien* group and the "May 16 Corps"—is scant, to say the least, being largely confined to the *Sheng-wu-lien* documents themselves; to an article from a tabloid of a Red Guard organization described as "bitterly hostile" to *Sheng-wu-lien;* and to the unsystematic, generally uninformative criticisms of the "ultra left" by several high officials, at least one of whom (K'ang Sheng) does not claim to know much about the *Sheng-wu-lien* group. And if the material on *Sheng-wu-lien* is thin, that on "The May 16 Corps" is virtually non-existent.

Second, because Professor Mehnert does not begin to define what he means by the term "new left" until the next to the last section of his essay —and does not offer until the final pages of the essay a fuller description of the characteristics he ascribes to the new left—the reader is left confused for most of the essay as to whether the term applies generally to the Red Guards or exclusively to the "ultra left." It appears from his discussion on pages 61 and 70-71 that Mr. Mehnert would limit application of the term to the "ultra left," for he declares that the Red Guards in 1966 lacked "spontaneity . . . an indispensable element of the new left." But what of the Red Guards in 1967? Did they lack spontaneity? If one looks back to an earlier section of the essay to find the answer, one is only further confused: the Red Guards during the period from August 1966 to August 1967 are described as having "spontaneous . . . enthusiasm" and a "real . . . enthusiasm and revolutionary dynamism" (p. 56).

Assuming, however, that Mr. Mehnert might be justified in restricting application of the term to the "ultra left," an evaluation of the significance of the new left in China then requires a fairly careful determination of the period of the "ultra left's" organized existence. Mehnert maintains that "there was no new left in China when the Cultural Revolution was started," but that "there is one there today. Or at least . . . there was one in 1968" (p. 71). On the basis of the evidence offered in this volume, however, it seems more judicious to date the existence of *Sheng-wu-lien* and the "May 16 Corps" from August 1967 through February 1968. The evidence adduced for the continued existence of the "ultra left" organizations after that date seems to be quite tenuous, consisting largely of inferences drawn from amorphous attacks on "the left," on "anarchists," and the like.

Third, in the final analysis, Professor Mehnert tells us too little about the nature of the "ultra left" organizations. Were members of such organizations, for example, based almost entirely in the cities, as is implied on page 47? What did these organizations actually do? How large were the numbers of the "ultra left"? What were the class backgrounds of its members? Did it have local allies? While such questions,

[2] Moscow, *Partiinoe Izdatelstvo,* 1933.



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at best, are exceedingly difficult to answer, it also is difficult to see how one can write meaningfully about a group when so many critical questions remain unanswered —and even unasked.

As a whole the monograph left this reviewer intellectually provoked and unsatisfied. Even if it were true, as asserted in the foreword by the chairman of Berkeley's Center for Chinese Studies, that "the need for and accomplishments of . . . Pekingology are acknowledged by all who have attempted to study Communist societies," it is still at least an open question whether Pekingology is suited to the study of all kinds of problems. Judging by *Peking and the New Left*, the reviewer can only conclude that Pekingology — characterized generally by its short-term perspectives, frequently mocking tone, limited data base, and focus on personalities and factions, particularly within the elite—does not lend itself well to serious analysis of such topics as the new left in China.

**Richard M. Pfeffer**

## The CPJ in Perspective

ROBERT A. SCALAPINO: *The Japanese Communist Movement: 1920-1966.* Berkeley, University of California Press. 1967.

THIS WORK IS THE BEST and most comprehensive study of Japanese communism written to date. It avoids most of the meaningless jargon which so often clutters the pages of scholarly writing. In preparing the book, Prof. Scalapino has incorporated material gleaned from his own interviews with Asian politicians over a decade or more, and his other sources, as reflected in the footnotes, are excellent and diversified.

After briefly surveying the pre-World War II legacy of the Japanese movement, Mr. Scalapino concentrates on its course and fortunes during the postwar period. He devotes particular attention to the conflict between the Communists' need to develop a mass base in Japan and their (willing or unwilling)

## Reviewers in This Issue

G. F. HUDSON—Director of the Center for Far Eastern Studies at St. Antony's College, Oxford, and editor of St. Antony's Far Eastern Affairs papers; author of, among other works, *Fifty Years of Communism, 1917-1967* (New York, Basic Books, 1968).

J. BANDYOPADHYAYA—Professor and Head of the Department of International Relations at Jadavpur University, Calcutta; author of *Indian Nationalism versus International Communism* (Calcutta, Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyaya, 1966) and *The Making of India's Foreign Policy* (Bombay and Calcutta, Allied Publishers, 1970).

MELVIN GURTOV—Staff member of the Social Science Department, RAND Corporation; author of *Southeast Asia Tomorrow: Problems and Prospects for US Policy* (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1970).

B. C. KOH—Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Illinois; his latest book is *The Foreign Policy of North Korea: A Study in Communist Rhetoric and Behavior* (New York, Praeger, 1969).

ALEXANDER WOODSIDE—Assistant Professor of History at Harvard University and research associate in the East Asian Research Center; his writings include a contribution to *In Search of Southeast Asia,* D. J. Steinberg, Ed. (New York, Praeger, 1971).

A. DOAK BARNETT—Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution, Washington, DC; among his many works on the Far East is *Communist China and Asia, Challenge to American Policy* (New York, Harper & Bros., 1960; 2nd ed. published in New York by Prentice-Hall, 1969).

CHI-MING HOU—Charles A. Dana Professor of Economics at Colgate University, currently on leave as Fulbright Lecturer in Taiwan; he has written extensively on the economy of Communist China.

GENEVIEVE DEAN—Research Fellow in the Science Policy Research Unit at the University of Sussex (England) specializing in Chinese Communist policies for technical innovation in industry.

LEO A. ORLEANS—China research specialist at the US Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

C. T. HU—Professor at Teachers' College, Columbia University; his most recent book is *Aspects of Chinese Education* (New York, Tower Publications, 1970).

JOHN E. RUE—Professor of Political Science at Oakland University, Rochester, Mich.; his latest study is *Mao Tse-tung in Opposition, 1927-1935* (Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1966).

ROBERT F. DERNBERGER—Associate Professor of Economics at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor; he has published numerous articles on China's foreign trade and domestic economy.

WILLIAM J. PARENTE—Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences at the University of Scranton, in Pennsylvania, a frequent contributor of articles on Communist affairs.

RICHARD M. PFEFFER—Assistant Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore; editor of *No More Vietnams? The War and the Future of American Foreign Policy* (New York, Harper & Row, 1968).

RODGER SWEARINGEN—Professor at the School of Politics and International Relations, University of Southern California; co-author with Paul Langer of *Red Flag in Japan* (Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1968).



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subordination to foreign elements, and he traces in detail the shifting position of the Japanese Communist Party from that of a Soviet dependency to that of a Chinese tool and finally to one of "autonomy" and "independence."

This tortuous path inevitably spawned factions and even splits in the party's ranks. Some members, after all, had studied in the USSR, and some had studied and worked in China. Hence, they tended to identify with either Moscow or Peking. Prof. Scalapino goes into these divergences at length.

He likewise examines the interaction between the CPJ and the Japan Socialist Party in depth. As a Marxist party of visibly independent stature, the JSP has enjoyed a popular appeal far beyond that which the CPJ could boast, and relations with the JSP have therefore stood at the heart of the CPJ's internal strategy. Also brought into the picture are the relationships of the Communists and the Socialists to Sohyo, Japan's large and influential left-wing labor organization.

The author winds up his discussion with an estimate of the strengths and weaknesses of the party as of 1966 and an appraisal of the prospects and problems confronting it. He concludes:

*In the absence of some dramatic change in the world balance of power or collapse of the domestic economy, any immediate influence of the Japanese Communist Party is strongly dependent on the reestablishment of a broad united front on the left—a fact that even the most dogmatic party theorists are forced to admit.*

Sophisticated analysis and insights abound in the volume. For example, Mr. Scalapino attributes the growing influence of the Chinese Communist Party on the CPJ between 1950 and 1965 to three fundamental factors. First, most Japanese Communists felt that they could understand their Chinese comrades, whereas the Russians frequently seemed bureaucratic, highhanded, foreign, and aloof. Second, the Chinese gave direct aid and assistance to the CPJ, not the least of which was welcoming a large number of party leaders who sought refuge in Communist China. (The author might have noted too that several influential CPJ leaders—the so-called Yenan group—had earlier worked with Mao Tse-tung in North China.) Third, and most important, Mr. Scalapino states that "the Japanese Communists, in company with a number of other Asian comrades, found themselves increasingly opposed to both Soviet policies and to Soviet methods of operation."

Not everything in the work is beyond challenge. One instance will suffice for illustration. As of November 1964, the CPJ claimed 100,000 party members, nearly 200,000 *Akahata* daily subscribers, and some 600,000 Sunday edition subscribers. By October 1966, the figures had jumped to 270,000, to 326,000, and to 1,180,000, respectively. The author ascribes this substantial growth to intensified organizational activities and maintains: "There is absolutely no indication that it was the result of party policies on substantive issues or a product of general conditions in Japan and the world." I must respectfully disagree, for I believe that the rise in strength came about because of both organizational zeal and vital issues at home and abroad. Certainly, the party was able to exploit to its advantage the United States' involvement in Vietnam and to link this specific issue to the Communists' favorite propaganda ploy—"peace."

On balance, however, what little there is to criticize fades in the light of the book's overall excellence. More contributions of its caliber would greatly assist students in universities as well as government analysts in their efforts to grasp the difficulties and opportunities facing Communist movements in diverse national settings.

**Rodger Swearingen**



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# Correspondence

## Bulgaria-Two Views

TO THE EDITORS: At the risk of sounding hypersensitive, I must take up some remarks about my book, *Bulgaria under Communist Rule,* made by Professor R. V. Burks in your November-December 1970 issue. Mr. Burks had, of course, to be brief. But even allowing for this, I cannot help thinking that his generalizations were rather too simplistic and that, in the course of presenting his own points, he was a little less than accurate in reflecting my own. And since he found my English "felicitous" and comforted me on "packaging (Bulgaria) so attractively," I assume he understood what my points were.

I hope that I do not misrepresent Mr. Burks when I say that (at least in his review) he assumes a monolithic Bulgarian regime. He makes no mention whatever of the disunity in the Bulgarian leadership from the death of Stalin to 1965, which is the main political theme in my book. Does he deny this disunity? I don't think that anyone with even a passing knowledge of Bulgarian developments can deny it—and Professor Burks surely has much more than a passing knowledge. The sentiments he attributes to the "Bulgarian regime"—*i.e.*, a romantic, revolutionary attitude that was anti-Khrushchev and was, in part, at times and for various reasons, sympathetic to China—were those of a large element in the Bulgarian Communist Party. After 1954, this element steadily lost ground to the Zhivkov faction, whose power was at first only nominal but then became increasingly real. And it became increasingly real because Zhivkov leaned so heavily first on Khrushchev (Mr. Burks can surely not deny this) and later on Brezhnev. For about the last five years, the Bulgarian regime has been much more united than ever before, because Zhivkov has consolidated his mastery and perhaps also because his erstwhile opposition finds Brezhnev much less unpalatable than the unpredictable Khrushchev.

The anti-Khrushchev feeling and the fascination with China were certainly there, and I spend a lot of time talking about them in my book—although one would not think so from Mr. Burks' remarks. But to attribute this "deviation" to the "regime" is to make a most complicated situation almost breathtaking in its simplicity.

So much for what I consider to be our general point of disagreement. Now for a few smaller points:

1) The Bulgarian Great Leap Forward. There is much in this episode which I don't understand, but Mr. Burks' assurance leaves me doubtful. It was perhaps inspired by the Chervenkovites, who were anti-Khrushchev, but it was appropriated by Zhivkov, who gave his name to the famous Theses. However, there is no evidence whatsoever of Zhivkov's relations with Khrushchev being strained during 1959 and 1960. (What the Soviets did object to was the bizarre rumblings at the end of 1958, when it seemed that some Bulgarians were accepting Chinese ideological pretensions about the communes.) And by the way, I did not say that the Great Leap Forward was something the Bulgarians "inexplicably failed to clear fully with Moscow."

2) Kremikovtsi: The plans for this were laid long before the failure of the Great Leap Forward, and the Soviets assisted right from the start. The project was conceived on this assumption.

3) Did the Royal Bulgarian Army "prevent" the BCP from organizing resistance in Macedonia before 1944? The Yugoslavs considered this a BCP excuse. So do I.

4) Of course, Bulgaria wants Macedonia back. I did not say that this "aspiration" was "a reflection of the competing interests of the Soviet camp and Macedonia." What I did say was that the *"heat* of the Macedonian dispute between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia was usually a good indication of relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet bloc as a whole." This is, surely, quite different.

I hope that Mr. Burks will one day expand on the ideas he has put forward on Bulgaria, untrammeled by the confines of space and the obligation of reviewing somebody else's book. It would make interesting reading.

J. F. BROWN
Radio Free Europe
Munich, Germany

PROF. BURKS REPLIES: I am very sorry indeed if I was unfair to Mr. Brown in my review of his very able book, *Bulgaria under Communist Rule,* and I do appreciate his kindness in pointing out that I was working against a limitation of space. Perhaps what follows will make my meaning clearer.

The issue which divides Mr. Brown and me is not that of factional conflict, for on the one hand I regard such conflict as the process by which any Communist regime resolves major issues of policy, and on the other I would deny Mr. Brown's assertion that substantial unity has been restored to the Bulgarian CP in the last five years. During these years a promising economic reform has been *de facto* reversed after heavy infighting, and we now witness a new flight into the never-never land of left-wing oppositionism in the rapid formation of huge agricultural-industrial complexes. These, to me at any rate, smell of Chinese communes; they run to 38,700 hectares, as compared to a maximum of 10,000 hectares in the Great Leap amalgamations of 1958.

Rather, the issue between Mr. Brown and me is the nature of the Bulgarian regime: whether it is, as he maintained, only a pale and subservient, if somewhat troubled, reflection of its Soviet parent; or whether, as I believe, it is instead based on substantial strength of its own, conditioned by circumstances and interests which sometimes run parallel, at other times contrary, to those of the USSR. My contention is that the data so elegantly marshaled by Mr. Brown will support my interpretation at least as well as they support his.

Thus I raise the question whether in 1958 and 1959 there did not exist serious



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danger that the Bulgarian regime would follow Albania into the Chinese orbit. That the deviation was "perhaps inspired by the Chervenkovites" seems to me an overly cautious statement, to say the least. The Great Leap was not formally initiated until immediately after Chervenkov returned from a visit to China. Mr. Brown does not appear to think such a trip remarkable for a Stalinist leader recently downgraded by Khrushchev, even though by 1958 the quarrel between Moscow and Peking was probably irreconcilable. Nor does Mr. Brown advert to the Chinese Great Leap as in part a condemnation of the Soviet leadership for its refusal to provide the Chinese with the all-out assistance needed for the rapid industrialization of their country. While it is true that Party Secretary Zhivkov officially fathered the Bulgarian version, it could be argued that, in the circumstances, he had little choice. In any case it seems to me a gross misinterpretation to write off the question of whether Great Leaps were good for building communism or only good for constructing socialism as "bizarre rumblings." The issue was major to the Sino-Soviet negotiations, and if the Chinese withdrew to the position that they were only *achieving socialism, the Russians* summoned the Extraordinary 21st Party Congress so that Khrushchev could formally announce that all socialist regimes would reach the Elysian Fields of communism at approximately the same time. The fact that in Sofia it was Chervenkov himself who publicly made this fundamental correction is at least one indication that it was he, and not Zhivkov, who was in charge of the Bulgarian version of the Leap. Indeed, Mr. Brown spends a great many pages describing the difficulties which Khrushchev and Zhivkov encountered, subsequent to the failure of the Leap, in finally (in 1962) removing Chervenkov and his associates from public life. And if Mr. Brown did not assert that the Great Leap was something the Bulgarians "inexplicably failed to clear fully with Moscow," he most assuredly did say, on pp. 267-68: "There can be little doubt that, in part, this was an initiative on which Moscow was not fully consulted. The original enthusiasm for the communes, soon to evaporate under Moscow's frown, seems to confirm that in the latter part of 1958 Sofia was prepared to take initiatives without first consulting the Soviet Union, but immediately abandoned them when the Soviets' displeasure became known."

On the score of Kremikovtsi, *Bulgaria under Communist Rule* adduces no evidence that the Soviets had assumed any responsibility for this project prior to 1960. Mr. Brown argues cogently that the project envisioned by Sofia could only produce an enormous white elephant, but he does not think it odd that the bulk of the machinery for the new combine was provided by the USSR, despite Moscow's open and increasing opposition to autarkic policies among Comecon members, and despite its refusal to give the Romanians any help whatsoever with an analogous enterprise at Galati. Yet the paradox cries out for explanation. Could not, for example, Kremikovtsi be conceived of as a huge Soviet bribe in support of Zhivkov and as a massive subsidy of a continuing pro-Soviet orientation on the part of the Bulgarian CP? Did not Kremikovtsi prove that if the Russians refused to go all out in support of Chinese industrialization, they were more generous with the Bulgarians? And is it not remarkable that Kremikovtsi turned out to be the single most important element in a new Twenty-Year Plan put forward in 1962, and that the goals of this Plan bear a striking family resemblance to those of the Great Leap? For his part, however, Mr. Brown puts Kremikovtsi down to the ingrained autarkic mentality of the East European leaders. Indeed! But I do not insist on my hypothesis; I only insist that it will fit Mr. Brown's facts at least as well as does his own.

I did not assert that the Royal Bulgarian Army prevented the Bulgarian Communists from organizing resistance in Yugoslav Macedonia before 1944; rather, I attempted to make clear that Bulgarian occupation of this territory, together with the promise of ultimate annexation, caused the Macedonian comrades to secede from the Yugoslav party and join the Bulgarian, all the while collaborating with the occupying authorities. Nor did I speak of the "competing interests of the Soviet camp and Macedonia," but rather of the "competing interests of the Soviet camp and Yugoslavia." Again the real difference between us lies elsewhere. I think the Macedonian issue a major source of strength for the regime, one which it deliberately manipulates to bolster its own position. Mr. Brown considers it an unfortunate obstacle to a closer association of Bulgaria with revisionist Yugoslavia, and therefore to the development of a more civilized life in Bulgaria.

Finally, Mr. Brown proposes that I undertake a longer exposition of my position. I suggest rather that he glance at my "Die Auswirkungen des sowjetisch-chinesischen Konflikts auf die kommunistischen Parteien in Suedosteuropa," *Osteuropa* (Stuggart), June 1965. I trust he will find it interesting.

## Corrections

TO THE EDITORS: In my article "Czechoslovakia: The Return to 'Normalcy,'" published in the November-December 1970 issue of *Problems of Communism*, I listed the writer Josef Skvorecky among the authors *expelled from the Communist* Party of Czechoslovakia. As Mr. Skvorecky has since informed me that he never was a member of the CPCS, I am writing to correct this regrettable error.

EDWARD TABORSKY
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TO THE EDITORS: Unfortunately, due to a typographical error, several words were omitted from my letter published in your September-October 1970 issue, with the result that a part of what I had to say became unintelligible.

With the words "the demands of rule and" properly inserted, the relevant sentence reads: "If we must seek a comprehensive framework for understanding Chinese politics today, I suggest that of *revolutionary rule*—which postulates that the demands of rule and the demands of revolution in China must both be satisfied, simultaneously or sequentially in cycles."

As I referred your readers to my "Revolution and Rule: Where do We go From Here?," *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* (April-July 1970), where I have begun to develop this idea, I would like them to be assured that there may be more to the concept than one might gather from the garbled sentence.

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